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Energy transition is on the cutting edge of policies. The expansion of renewable en-
ergy is a key factor to reach global and national climate targets. However, support
from governments in form of monetary subsidies is still essential. For the allocation
and determination of support levels, competitive bidding processes are globally be-
coming the instrument of choice. Auctions have proven to reduce the costs of support,
increase efficiency, and control the expansion of renewable energy. Accompanied by
a rapid increase of auctions for renewable energy support in the last few years, this
thesis focuses on particular questions raised by practice. First, we provide a compre-
hensive theoretic framework for auctions in the renewable energy support context.
Then, we discuss various design options with particular focus on three specific real-
world auctions in Germany. The first example applies non-binding awards, the second
discrimination and the third favoritism in the respective auction. All those design
options are considered unconventional in theory and policy. We show that they ad-
dress important market and framework conditions and hence offer great opportunities
for successful auction implementations in the renewable energy support context. Our
approach is based on game-theoretic and mathematic methods and partially comple-
mented by laboratory experiments to test our theoretical hypotheses with regard to
human behavior.
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“Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time” state the United Nations
in their 2030 Goals for Sustainable Development (General Assembly of the United
Nations, 2015). The General Assembly of the United Nations (2015) alert about
diverse climate change impacts, which endanger “the survival of many societies, and
of the biological support systems of the planet”. Responding to this challenge, the
parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2015) set
a milestone for global climate actions in the Paris Agreement. They aim to limit
global warming to well below 2 degree Celsius above pre-industrial levels this century
by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For that, the transition from fossil fuels, the
main emitter of greenhouse gases, to clean and sustainable energy sources becomes a
key factor.
Renewable energy is collected from naturally replenished sources like wind, solar,
wave or biomass (Lund, 2007). We focus on renewable energy provided for electric-
ity generation, but renewable energy is also used for heating or cooling and in the
transport sector. In 2015, renewable energy provided 23.7% of the global generation
of electricity (REN21, 2017). Although energy transition is well underway in many
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countries, policies have to further promote the global expansion of renewable energy
in order to fulfill the ambitious goal of the Paris Agreement.
In both global and national agreements, governments decide about their individual
and legally binding contributions to a sustainable development. IRENA and CEM
(2015) report that, as of 2015, 164 countries commit to individual expansion goals
for renewable energies. Among those, some even aim to be a 100% renewable energy
country by mid-century (REN21, 2017).
In 2000, the German Federal Parliament (2000) released the Renewable Energy
Act (EEG) to foster the expansion of renewable energy in Germany. Until today many
adaptations have been made, however, basically the EEG regulates the support for
renewable energy and grants feed-in priority to electricity from renewable energy.
Starting with 8.6% of electricity generated by renewable energy in 2002, they provide
38.2% in 2017 (Fraunhofer ISE, 2017). Furthermore, Germany sets a minimum target
of 80% by 2050 (German Federal Parliament, 2017a).
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1.1 Background
1.1.1 Renewable Energy Support
The sun shines, wind blows and water flows without consuming essential resources.
Hence renewable energy sources are unlimited and available for free. However, due
to not matured technologies and still high investment costs the generation of elec-
tricity from renewable energy is not yet competitive with conventional power plants.
Therefore, governments support the expansion of renewable energy.
They grant feed-in priority to renewable energy and subsidize new installations
(German Federal Parliament, 2000). In the past, support levels predefined by gov-
ernment have been widely used as support schemes. That is, project developers
received a long-term contract including a predefined monetary amount depending on
their electricity generation. While project developers benefit by reduced uncertain-
ties, predefined support levels caused diverse problems for governments. Especially,
the determination of appropriate support levels represents a fundamental problem.
On the one hand, expansion stagnates, if support is insufficient. Overcompensation,
on the other hand, may lead to an uncontrolled expansion and hence uncontrolled
support costs.
A good example is the German photo voltaic (PV) installation boom starting in
2001. Expansion goals have been exceeded for years leading to excessive costs for
government and consumers. Several adjustments of the EEG have been released to
successively reduce predefined support levels from 50,6EURct per KWh in 2001 to be-
low 20EURct per KWh in 2012 with further degressions to below 10EURct per kWh
in 2014 (German Federal Parliament, 2000; Appunn, 2014; Wirth, 2018). Rapidly
falling prices for PV collectors because of technological developments have been the
main reason (Wirth, 2018). However, those multiple adjustments indicate that pre-
defined support levels are not suitable to adequately reflect volatile installation costs
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for renewable energy. Further, due to long-term support contracts over 20 years,
Germany still bears the consequences of overcompensation (Wirth, 2018). The intro-
duction of a volume limit might have mitigated overfulfillment of expansion, however,
would have raised the question of whom to grant support in case of oversupply.
Consequently, government needed to rethink the support scheme towards a con-
trolled and sustainable renewable energy expansion by simultaneously reducing costs.
In case of oversupply, competitive bidding mechanisms, i.e. auctions, enable competi-
tive price determination and aim to efficiently allocate support to project developers.1
Many countries have recently implemented or are planning to implement auctions for
the allocation of support and determination of support levels for renewable energy.
IRENA (2017) report that the number of countries worldwide that already imple-
mented auctions for renewable energy support raised from 5 in 2005 to at least 67 in
2016. Many of these countries already achieved record low support costs through the
introduction of auctions (del Ŕıo and Linares, 2014).
Finally, we enter a new era by introducing competition in the so far non compet-
itive and non balanced sector of renewable energy support. Rule-based and competi-
tive awarding designs, as auctions, are predestined to harmonize supply and demand
in this challenging market. However, auctions traditionally are also accompanied by
practical challenges, which is the point where this thesis steps in.
1.1.2 Laws and Guidelines for Auctions for Renewable En-
ergy Support
The State Aid Guidelines from the European Commission (2014) determine that
from 2017 onwards renewable energy support, with only very few exceptions, has to
be determined through competitive bidding processes. Basically, the auctions shall be
open to all generators producing electricity from renewable energy sources on a non-
1Alternatives to auctions are discussed in del Ŕıo et al. (2016) and Kitzing et al. (2016)
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discriminatory basis. However, due to different stages of technological development
for renewable energy technologies so far, technology specific tenders are allowed. In
addition, member states are free in designing appropriate auctions within their coun-
tries.
In Germany the Renewable Energy Act 2017 (EEG 2017) specifies technology
specific auctions for renewable energy support for electricity from solar, wind on-
shore, wind offshore and biomass (German Federal Parliament, 2017a). Projects with
smaller nominal capacity are excluded and will still receive fixed support levels.2 For
all others, auctions are held on a regular basis, up to quarterly, throughout the year.
The auction volume is aligned to the expansion targets, where a slight exaggeration
is due to default risks. Additionally, prequalification criteria and penalties in case of
non-realization after award have been introduced. Furthermore, from 2018 to 2020
technology neutral auctions for renewable energy support for electricity from solar
and wind onshore are scheduled as a pilot. Besides the EEG 2017 further laws have
been enacted. For instance, the detailed implementation of the technology neutral
auctions, as suggested in the EEG 2017, is regulated in German Federal Parliament
(2017b). The Offshore Wind Energy Act (WindSeeG) provides implementation rules
for wind offshore auctions in Germany (German Federal Parliament, 2016b).
1.2 Objective
In general, this thesis aims to contribute important lessons learned from theory for
auctions for renewable energy support to facilitate successful implementations in real-
world. In particular, we consider three different auction designs as implemented in
Germany.
2Solar and wind onshore projects with a nominal capacity greater than 750 MW can participate
in the auction. For biomass, nominal capacity must exceed 150MW.
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So far, a close link between auction theory and renewable energy has been missing
and speculations or half-truths exist that discourage project developers and policy
makers. This thesis analyses different auction formats and implementations under re-
newable energy relevant conditions and shows how sensitive auctions are. In auctions
for renewable energy support an immense diversity (regarding auctioned goods, bid-
ders and auctioneers) has to be combined - starting with different renewable energy
sources, geographic conditions and technologies to political goals and frameworks as
well as financing conditions. Though global guidelines, the concrete decision about
auction design and implementation are surrendered to the countries. The large variety
of design parameters pose a challenge to both policy makers and project developers.
Governments need to design suitable auctions that adequately reflect their goals.
Project developers, on the other side, now face an award uncertainty and have to
deduce an optimal bidding strategy. So far, neither side is particularly experienced
with auctions. Here this thesis steps in and sheds light on the promising opportunity
of auctions for renewable energy support.
The basis of our work forms a comprehensive introduction into the principles of
auction theoretic modeling in the context of renewable energy support, in Chapter
2. Motivated by three German examples, we investigate auctions with non-binding
awards, discriminative auctions and favoritism in auctions.
In Germany’s auctions for renewable energy support for electricity from solar,
bidders have to provide a security within a certain time frame after being awarded.
If they did not submit this security their award expired (German Federal Parliament,
2017a). As a consequence, awarded bidders may withdraw from their award and ex-
pansion targets may be missed. Previous research on non-binding awards in auctions
barely3 exists and hence became a matter of urgency in 2015 when the first pilot
3Cramton et al. (2015), Merlob et al. (2012), McMillan (1994) mention and analyze prominent
examples of non-binding auctions that were, however, implemented with minor success.
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auctions started. Besides our theoretical analysis, we also investigated the impacts of
non-binding awards in laboratory experiments in Chapter 3.
Asymmetries among bidders in renewable energy auctions are diverse and in-
evitable. For instance, installation costs may differ significantly between renewable
energy sources. Thus, discriminative measures as quotas, different maximum prices
and boni are often discussed with regard to technology-neutral auctions. The Euro-
pean Commission (2014) presupposes non-discriminative auctions, however, several
countries4, e.g. Germany, insist on specific discriminations to address asymmetries in
their technology-neutral auctions (German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Energy, 2017; German Federal Parliament, 2017b). Beyond existing literature5, this
thesis contributes a general theoretic analysis of three different forms of discrimina-
tion in renewable energy auctions followed by a discussion of those regarding practical
implementation, in Chapter 4.
In the early stage of Germany’s wind offshore auctions, from 2017 to 2018, existing
projects are auctioned. To accommodate the special position of the project owners in
the auction a right of subrogation is granted to them (German Federal Parliament,
2016b). In more detail, the favored bidder has the option to win the auction by
matching the winning bid after award. Chapter 5 presents a simplified model with
specific asymmetries among bidders to analyze this favoritism in auctions with regards
to its cost decreasing potential.
1.3 Approach
We combine auction theory and practice to identify factors for (un)successful auction
implementations in the renewable energy context. Our research is based on abstracted
4For instance, also Denmark, California and Mexico implemented discriminatory elements in their
technology-neutral auctions.
5Discriminatory instruments have been theoretically analyzed in a general context by, e.g., Varian
(1989), Bulow and Roberts (1989), McAfee and McMillan (1989), Schmalensee (1981) and Myerson
(1981).
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models that allow us to analyze auctions in a structured way with game-theoretical
and mathematical methods. Furthermore, we use laboratory experiments to analyze
human behavior and decision-making, i.e. bidding, in such auctions.
Chapter 2 highlights the general suitability of auctions for renewable energy sup-
port substantiated by auction theoretical findings and statements from the renewable
energy sector. Based on previous research, we provide basic principles of auction
theory and establish a standard theoretical framework for renewable energy auctions.
General theoretic advantages and disadvantages of potentially suitable auction for-
mats are presented in this simplified framework. However, in the real world, mar-
ket and framework conditions may deviate from what is suitable, may differ among
countries, and may change over time. This is why, we then widen our simplifying
assumptions successively and analyze the impacts.
In Chapter 3, we develop a model with non-binding awards and reallocation in
multi-unit auctions. We deduce explicit, if applicable, and numerical solutions for
optimal bidding strategies and symmetric Nash equilibria. In those, we compare
auctions with non-binding awards to the respective binding auctions. Furthermore,
we conduct laboratory experiments to test our theoretical hypotheses with regard to
human bidding behavior. In both theory and experiments, we conclude that auctions
with non-binding awards are not necessarily doomed to failure suggested by previous
examples.
Chapter 4 introduces three discriminative measures - quota, different maximum
prices and boni - into auctions for renewable energy support. Thereby, we assume that
bidders are asymmetric regarding their individual costs, which is modeled by different
elasticities of supply for each bidder group. Based on this assumption, we show that
despite favoring weaker bidders, the support costs for governments are minimized
and the three measures are theoretically equivalent, however, differ regarding their
practical implementation.
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In Chapter 5, we focus on favoritism of one particular bidder through a right of
subrogation. This chapter is based on Haufe (2014) and extends the results to the
context of auctions for renewable energy support. Haufe (2014) chooses beta dis-
tributions as exemplary costs distribution functions and models asymmetries among
bidders by the concept of stochastic dominances, or more precisely by the reverse
hazard-rate order. This theoretical analysis reveals cases of asymmetry where a first-
price auction with right of subrogation outperforms a standard second-price auction
in terms of higher profit for the auctioneer.
Each chapter is based on a separate paper with only minor adaptations for consis-
tency and reader-friendly presentation. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the corre-
sponding authors and titles as well as the current publication status and the journal
of submission.
Ch. Authors Title Status Journal
2 Marie-Christin Haufe,
Karl-Martin Ehrhart


















for Renewable Energy Sup-


















Table 1.1: Overview of publications authored during this work.
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Chapter 2
Auction Theory meets Renewable
Energy Support
Auctions are a promising approach for the support of electricity from renewable energy
sources (RES-E). The aim of this chapter is to assess relevant auction formats for RES-
E per se as well as under specific market and framework conditions from an auction
theoretic perspective. Pros and cons of relevant auction formats are discussed under
different assumptions regarding RES-E specific market and framework conditions.
In order to promote a deeper understanding of those auction formats per se, we
start with a first overview of their fundamental characteristics and emphasize general
differences between them. For that, we base our theoretical analysis on simplifying
basic assumptions for the beginning and refer to those as benchmark case. As an
important result from auction theory, under these particular assumptions, there are
no crucial differences between certain auction formats due to which the auctioneer
should prefer one over another. Nevertheless, we emphasize smaller differences that
become decisive for real-world applications, identifying those auction formats that are
not considered suitable for the RES-E context, and consequently skip these auction
formats in the subsequent analysis.
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In the next step, we neglect and extend the simplifying assumptions in order to
investigate the remaining auction formats under market and framework conditions
relevant for RES-E. We will find that auction formats differ widely in several situa-
tions, because they react differently to specific conditions. Hence, in some situations
the negative characteristics of a particular format prevail, whereas under different
conditions this format will be the most suitable compared to others. As a result, this
section provides guidance about which chances and risks are involved in particular
auction formats under certain RES-E specific market and framework conditions and
consequently which is the most appropriate one in each case.
2.1 Why are Auctions Potentially Suitable for
RES-E?
In the beginning the question arises why auctions are potentially suitable for RES-E
at all. Indeed, several answers or good reasons exist for their implementation in that
specific context. Note that the following reasons are not unique features of auctions
and there might also exist further appropriate RES-E support mechanisms that fulfill
certain context specific requirements presented in the following. First, an important
factor is that project developers usually have more precise information on their ex-
pected costs and revenues than the government, i.e. in the RES-E context there
exists a situation of information asymmetry (McAfee and McMillan, 1986; IRENA
and CEM, 2015). Therefore, project developers should come up with a suggestion
of a cost-covering support level as it is the case in auctions and not vice versa as
for example in case of fixed feed-in tariffs predetermined by government. Hence a
decentralization of information about costs and revenues can be exploited by intro-
ducing auction schemes. Another valid reason for auctions for RES-E is the option
of controlling costs, expansion and the technology mix (IRENA and CEM, 2015).
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That is, the auctioneer can either limit the annual auction budget for RES-E, where
the number and total size of awarded projects is uncertain, or restrict the annual
number or total size of awarded projects and thereby leave the budget needed uncer-
tain (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005). Further, the alternatives of conducting
technology-neutral or technology-specific auctions enable the regulation of the tech-
nology mix in an appropriate manner (Kopp et al., 2013). Since auctions primarily are
an allocation mechanism, the auctioneer aims to ensure allocative efficiency. Namely,
if an auction allocates the good or multiple goods efficiently to the bidders, there exist
no ex post incentives for resale (Ausubel et al., 1998). Therefore, we will focus on the
identification of allocative efficient auctions in our following analysis. However, there
might be certain market and framework conditions that rather compromise allocative
efficient outcomes than others (see Subsection 2.7). Furthermore, well-designed auc-
tions are a competitive market mechanism through which valuable information can
be generated. On the one hand, the government collects signals about cost-covering
support levels. On the other hand, even project developers can learn from the auc-
tion outcome, especially if the award prices are released. Because project developers
face competition in an auction in form of award risks, a well-designed auction also
generates incentives for innovation (Kopp et al., 2013).
2.2 Classification of Auctions Relevant for RES-E
An auction is a mechanism (institution) in which a good or several goods (here:
the power (MW) or physical work (MWh) of renewable energies) are offered up for
bidding. It is a market mechanism with several aims, whereby auction theory mainly
focuses on competitive price determination and efficient allocation of one or multiple
goods. Consequently, auctions for renewable energy support are applied in order to
reduce costs of support and identify the ”best” (with respect to predefined targets
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and criteria) suppliers for renewable energy. Since those suppliers will act as bidders
(sellers), who offer the auctioned good to the auctioneer, we refer to these auctions
as so-called procurement auctions. That is, the auctioneer will buy the good from
those bidders offering the best bid, e.g. the lowest price. As the auctioned volume
might be split up and delivered by several bidders, our analysis focuses on multi-
unit auctions with homogeneous or heterogeneous goods. The homogeneous goods
are certain equivalent subsets of the total power offered up for bidding, where the
scaling may differ (1MW, 10MW, etc.). The heterogeneous goods are predetermined
projects by the auctioneer that are offered for realization. The bidders (suppliers)
will be awarded an amount of the power subsets or projects according to their bids,
i.e. the best bids will win as long as the offered amount is less than or equal to
the demanded amount. In addition, single-unit auctions may be implemented (see
wind offshore auctions in Denmark), which represent a special case of multi-unit
procurement auctions with only one single good. Here the same applies as above, the
auctioneer can either predetermine the project auctioned and bidders compete for
this sole project (intra-project competition) or the each bidder participates with his
individual developed project (inter-project competition). The best bid(s) can either
be determined based solely on the price (i.e. costs of support) or by multi-attributive
criteria such as price, actor diversity, geographical and technological conditions, etc.
For reasons of clarity, we will limit our analysis on the former kind of auctions,
i.e. homogeneous or heterogeneous multi-unit procurement auctions with the bidding
price as sole criterion. Note that each multi-criteria auction can be transformed into
a single-criterion auction, if the criteria and evaluation approach are traceable and
transparent to all bidders and hence the corresponding bid reflects all criteria (e.g.
price-based weighting of all relevant criteria).
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2.3 The Specifics of RES-E as an Auctioned Good
2.3.1 What is Auctioned?
The question of what is or should be auctioned strongly depends on the preferences
regarding the auctioneer’s aims. Is his fundamental aim to keep to a predetermined
budget? Or is his primary aim to achieve the expansion goal? Hence, we start by
attending to the determination of the auction volume, which can either be determined
endogenously or exogenously. That is, the auctioneer has two options, where he can
either restrict the monetary budget or limit the amount of supported RES-E, e.g.
the awarded rating power in MW, the amount of supported MWhs or the number
of projects. Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005) conducted controlled laboratory
experiments in order to compare budget-constrained and target-constrained auctions
and find that there exist no crucial reasons to favor one approach over the other.
Endogenous Auction Volume The first option, that is to limit the budget,
strongly focuses on controlling and reducing the support costs and even accepts the
risk of not achieving predefined expansion goals. The bids demanding the lowest
support levels will be awarded until the total budget is reached. Hence, if bidders
submit relatively high bids the total budget is reached early and consequently the
expansion goal is missed. However, note that an appropriate reservation price (i.e.
maximum price) may reduce the risk of strategically high bids. Finally, this approach
only makes sense for multiple and only individually developed projects, i.e. bidder
specific projects. An application example of this option can be found in the Dutch
SDE+ auction.
Exogenous Auction Volume The second option, to limit the supported amount,
corresponds to the idea of achieving a predefined expansion target, where the sup-
port costs become a secondary goal. Although the government aims to increase the
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expansion of RES-E, they are interested in a controlled expansion, for example due
to grid constraints or public acceptance issues. In this case, the lowest bids based on
demanded support levels will be awarded until the expansion target (MW or MWh) is
reached. However, this option leaves the support costs uncertain in favor of a fulfilled
expansion goal. Note that the support costs, however, can be limited by setting an
adequate reservation price (i.e. maximum price).
Based on the volume dependent approach, there exist several options for the goods
auctioned in an RES-E auction. Consequently, the auctioneer has to determine before-
hand whether a single good, multiple homogeneous goods or multiple heterogeneous
goods are offered up for bidding. In the RES-E context, the former option occurs
if only the support for one renewable energy project (or one bundle of projects) is
awarded per auction. In this case, the project can either be predetermined by the
auctioneer or individually developed by each participating bidder. If the support for
more than one project should be determined per auction, on the one hand, the auc-
tioneer can demand a certain amount of homogeneous power or energy units that is
delivered by several individual projects of the bidders. On the other hand, he can
auction the support of particular heterogeneous projects predetermined by himself,
e.g. specific projects at different locations.
Depending on what the auctioneer demands and offers up for bidding, different
auction formats will be considered relevant in our analysis, as presented in Table 2.1.
Moreover, they fulfill specific requirements for suitability in real-world applications
as presented in Section 2.6, where we undertake a detailed analysis of those auction
formats.
2.3.2 Revealed or Hidden Auction Volume
In addition to the choice of auction volume itself (i.e. the monetary budget or the
amount to be supported), the question arises if the auction volume should be revealed
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Single good Multiple goods
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
Static First-price Pay-as-bid auction, Generalised Vickrey
auctions auction, Uniform price auction
Second-price auctions,
auction Vickrey auction
Dynamic Dutch auction, Descending clock Simultaneous multi-
auctions English auction auction round descending auc-
tion
Table 2.1: Suitable multi-unit auction formats for RES-E auctions depending on the
auctioned goods.
or hidden. A public auction volume represents a signal that is relevant for the bid-
ders estimation of competition. In this regard, a hidden auction volume incorporates
the same effects with regard to uncertainties of the estimated competition level for
bidders as an unknown number of participants from a theoretical point of view. How-
ever, from a practical perspective, potential bidders are rather more suspicious of a
hidden auction volume, which seems to be consciously undisclosed by the auctioneer
potentially for some intransparent reason, than of an unknown number of partici-
pants, which in contrast can be taken rather as a given by the participants. For the
following argumentation, we will limit the discussion on the question about revealed
or hidden auction volumes. In general, a revealed auction volume provides certainty
and represents transparency and reliability for potential bidders in real-world appli-
cations. A hidden auction volume in contrast induces high uncertainties for potential
bidders and thus may lead to a reduced acceptance of the auction or even lower the
participation. In theory, uncertainties generated by a hidden auction volume refer
to the bidders estimation of competition, i.e. the competition they believe to face in
the auction. The higher bidders estimate the competition level the more aggressive is
their bidding behavior, i.e. the lower their submitted bids. Especially non-incentive
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compatible auction formats are sensitive to this effect, since the degree of costs ex-
aggeration strongly depends on the bidders beliefs about competition. Under certain
basic assumptions , both alternatives, i.e. revealed or hidden level of competition,
generate the same expected auction outcome in first-price and second-price auctions
(Harstad et al., 1990), whereas under modified assumptions of risk averse bidders the
auctioneer benefits from a hidden number of bidders in terms of a higher expected
auction revenue in the first-price auction (McAfee and McMillan, 1986). However,
the unknown competition level because of a hidden auction volume may lead to mis-
estimating in real-world applications. On the one hand, bidders may underestimate
the competition level and submit less aggressive, i.e. higher, bids. Supposing all bid-
ders behave according to this, a hidden auction volume increases the expected support
costs. However, on the other hand, especially in case of low competition, general over-
estimating of the competition level might be indeed favorable for the auctioneer in
terms of lower expected support costs. To conclude, a hidden auction volume should
in practice only be implemented with caution. Misestimating of competition can al-
ways happen in both directions, leading to some bidders bidding more and others less
aggressively under the assumption of higher or lower competition. Consequently, hid-
den auction volumes may induce allocative inefficiencies, especially in non-incentive
compatible auction formats, which could have been reduced by revealing the mone-
tary budget or amount of RES-E offered up for bidding. Finally, the main argument
for a revealed auction volume is the clear and transparent signal provided by the auc-
tioneer, which creates confidence and acceptance among potential bidders, especially
in light of a repeated conduction of the auction. Note that for an incentive compatible
auction mechanism the weakly dominant strategy to bid one’s true costs is preserved
for revealed and hidden auction volumes and hence no related inefficiencies may occur
in both cases. Further, Damianov et al. (2010) observe in their experiments that the
uniform-price auction outperforms the pay-as-bid auction in terms of higher auction
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revenues and allocative efficiency under uncertainties regarding the auction volume.
Furthermore, Back and Zender (2001) find that an ex post reduction of the auctioned
volume may eliminate collusive strategies for multi-project bidders in uniform-price
auctions.
2.3.3 Valuations for RES-E as an Auctioned Good
In the following we define the valuations for RES-E as an auctioned good from the
bidder’s perspective as well as from the auctioneer’s perspective. Bidders evaluate
the good, i.e. the projects, in two dimensions: On the one hand, they expect a certain
project specific energy generation [MWh] over a plant’s lifetime which is for instance
based on regional conditions and project size. On the other hand, they have certain
individual costs to bear over the lifetime [], e.g. for project development, realization,
operations and maintenance. Assuming that all costs have to be covered by the sup-
port of the project, the minimum required support level is defined by the Levelized
Cost of Electricity (LCOE). Hence, from now on we refer to a bidder’s valuation for a
RES-E project as the expected average LCOE, i.e. the project specific cost-covering
support level. Besides achieving the expansion goal and reducing the support costs,
the auctioneer may have further aims as, for instance the promotion of domestic indus-
try or a certain regional distribution of RES-E plants (IRENA and CEM, 2015). To
analyse those further aims theoretically, they have to be reflected in the auctioneer’s
individual valuation, e.g. by a monetary quantification. Imagine that two auctions
generate the same expected support costs and the same amount of RES-E awarded.
If the auctioneer benefits more from the auction that scores better in terms of actor
diversity or regional distribution he should consider further appropriate criteria for
allocation. Hence, in order to transfer multiple goals of the auctioneer adequately
in the auction, so-called multi-criteria auctions can be used. Multi-criteria auctions
are auctions in which further (weighted) criteria beyond the bidding price, such as
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the institutional organization or project location, are relevant for the award decision
(Che, 1993; Branco, 1997). For the implementation of a (multi-criteria) auction that
takes the individual valuation of the auctioneer into account, the scoring and eval-
uation principles of the auctioneer have to be clear and transparently published to
all participants (Bushnell and Oren, 1994; Bichler, 2000; De Smet, 2007). Further-
more, there exist specific design options for RES-E auctions as the implementation
of contingents within an auction for certain bidder groups that may also serve those
requirements, see Chapter 4.
2.3.4 Bid Specification
Based on the good specification and the valuations, the auctioneer defines what in-
formation bidders have to submit within their bids. We limit our analysis to the
following bid specification: If the auctioned project(s) is (are) completely predeter-
mined by the auctioneer, then bidders bid on their requested support level for the
realization regarding the particular project. If bidders participate with their own in-
dividually developed projects, they submit bids representing all project specific data
relevant for the evaluation of the auctioneer, e.g. size, power rating, region, business
form, etc., and the corresponding support level requested. Finally, all (valid) submit-
ted bids are transferred into the award process of the auction, where the auctioneer
evaluates them according to the predefined criteria and correspondingly awards them
until supply equals demand.
2.4 Criteria to Assess Different Auction Types
Suitable for RES-E




• Expected auction revenue (RES-E support costs)
• Incentive compatibility
• Allocative efficiency
• Auctioneer’s risks, e.g. risks of unfavorable strategic behavior (strategic reduc-
tion of competition, implicit collusion)
• Bidder’s risks, e.g. award risk, award price risk, risk of the winner’s curse.
Note that for an overall assessment of an auction, those criteria should not be con-
sidered separately but combined and weighted according to the auctioneer’s goals.
Price Determination A well-designed auction is a mechanism that serves to gen-
erate competitive prices, in particular in markets where the market clearing price
is unknown. We distinguish between different forms of price determination, i.e. ei-
ther a common price for all winning bidders is generated or each bidder receives an
individual price. However, all prices are determined through the submitted bids in
the auction. Finally, one common price per RES-E auction might be favored from a
political point of view, because a common price represents one clear price signal. We
will go more into detail with the price determination issue in the further work of the
project.
Signal Generation If information about the auction outcome, e.g. the award
price(s) as the spectrum or average of bids and/or award prices and the awarded
volume as well as the submitted volume, is revealed during or after the auction, the
auction generates signals for the participating bidders as well as for potential bidders
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in future auction rounds. That is, project developers receive information from the
auction outcome that helps them evaluating their individual risks and chances regard-
ing a future participation in the auction as well as to re-evaluating their strategy in
the past round. Provided that the auction is well-designed and generates competitive
prices, potential project developers learn about their competitors support levels and
can thus derive which costs and bids are competitive. Although dynamic auctions,
for instance, may generate more information during the bidding process than static
auctions, the ex post accessible information strongly depends on what the auctioneer
reveals after conduction of the auction. In addition, there are auction formats that
generate information that is more precise than others. For example, in some auction
formats the submitted bids correspond to the expected costs of the particular bid-
ders. We refer to this characteristic as incentive compatibility, see below. Incentive
compatible mechanisms facilitate the acquisition of information.
Expected Auction Revenue (RES-E Costs) The reduction of support costs
for renewable energy has become an important goal pursued by the introduction of
auctions. Hence, the success of an auction will be evaluated based on the support costs
generated through the auction, for instance, in comparison to alternative support level
setting mechanisms such as administratively set feed-in tariffs, where further results
as the expansion achievement etc. may be considered as well. The expected auction
revenue may differ between auction formats, where not only the auction format itself
but also the market and framework conditions in which those auction formats are
conducted play a crucial role. Assuming the auctioneer is only focused on achieving
the expansion goal, he aims to minimize his expected support costs by choosing the
corresponding cheapest auction format based on the existing market and framework
conditions. However, if the auctioneer pursues additional goals, e.g. actor diversity or
regional distribution of RES-E plants, by conducting the auction, these goals have to
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be incorporated in his individual valuation, e.g. by a monetarily quantification. This
may lead to the auctioneer benefiting more from an auction outcome that ensures
actor diversity than from another that generates lower support costs.
Incentive Compatibility As the auctioneer aims to minimize the expected sup-
port costs through the choice of an appropriate auction format, a bidder maximizes
his expected profit by optimizing his bidding strategy in the auction. The incentive
compatibility is an important characteristic of bidding induced by certain auction
formats and framework conditions. It means that bidders have an incentive to reveal
their true costs in their bids. One reason for that is that bidders cannot influence
their own support level through their bid in incentive compatible auction formats.
They only determine whether they will be awarded or not by bidding. Usually, incen-
tive compatible auctions induce weakly dominant bidding strategies. In non-incentive
compatible auctions, bidders determine or at least partly impact their support level
in case of being awarded. As a consequence, they usually have an incentive to ex-
aggerate their true costs in their optimal bidding strategies. Hence, bidders submit
higher bids in non-incentive compatible auctions than in incentive compatible for-
mats. However, incentive compatible auction formats do not necessarily generate
lower support costs. There are also situations in which it is exactly the opposite.
Under specific conditions, certain incentive and non-incentive auction formats even
generate the same expected support costs (see Section 2.5). This auction theoretical
phenomenon is stated in the so called revenue equivalence theorem. The main advan-
tages of incentive compatibility are that the optimal bid is easy to calculate for the
bidders and that incentive compatible auctions result in allocative efficient outcomes,
since the truthful (optimal) bid of a bidder is independent of his risk attitude and his
beliefs about his competitors. It is a very straight-forward strategy to bid one’s own
expected costs in contrast to calculate an optimal bid exaggeration in non-incentive
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compatible auctions. Hence, it is often argued that incentive compatible auctions are
easier to understand and to manage, especially for smaller or less experienced bid-
ders (Harrison, 1989). Nevertheless, it is often observed that bidders do not honestly
reveal their true costs in incentive compatible auctions in real-world applications. Es-
pecially, the practical risk of underbidding is higher in incentive compatible auctions
than in non-incentive compatible auctions (Kagel and Levin, 1993; Cooper and Fang,
2008). Finally, the incentive compatibility only applies under very limited conditions
that, however, may not adequately reflect the given reality. For instance, the uniform-
price auction with lowest rejected bid is often mentioned as an incentive compatible
auction mechanism (Myerson, 1981). Nevertheless, only single-project bidders, who
further participate in only one single auction round, have incentives to reveal their
true costs in that particular auction. Multi-project bidders would have incentives to
exaggerate their costs at least for some of their projects (see Section 2.7.2). The same
applies if bidders have the chance to participate in later auction rounds as well. Then
incentives for bidders occur to exaggerate their individual costs in an earlier round,
since they anticipate an additional winning probability through their participation
in later rounds. From a theoretical point of view, it can be expected that the bids
regarding one project of a particular bidder will decrease continuously over multiple
rounds and converge towards the optimum bid in the corresponding one-time auction
(Gale and Hausch, 1994).
Allocative Efficiency An auction serves not only as price determination but also
as allocation mechanism of goods in case of excess supply. In theory, the ques-
tion of an optimal allocation generally addresses the aim of Pareto efficiency and of
maximizing welfare. An allocative efficient auction mechanism maximizes welfare by
allocating the good to the participant with the highest valuation. Or in other words,
the best bidder wins, i.e. the project developer with lowest support costs and/or
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highest scores in other relevant transparent criteria predetermined by the auctioneer
and represented in the corresponding bid. Hence, the aim of allocative efficiency is
important in terms of fairness, mitigating resale incentives (Ausubel et al., 1998).
Allocative efficiency can be at risk due to incentives for unfavorable strategic bid-
ding behavior, asymmetries regarding valuations and information between bidders,
e.g. because of different risk attitudes or planning periods, and the participation of
multi-project bidders in the auction. Since the actual or expected costs of project
developers are (at least partly) private information, it is not possible to assess an
auction outcome in real-world applications as allocative efficient. Consequently, note
that though allocative efficiency is an ex post criterion, it cannot be proven ex post in
real-world applications but only in theory. However, from an auction theoretical per-
spective auction formats can also be evaluated ex ante with regard to their expected
allocative efficiency. That is, a theoretical efficiency investigation serves at least the
purpose of identifying which auction format is expected to be suitable for generating
allocative efficient outcomes in practice.
Auctioneer’s Risks In the decision of conducting an auction for RES-E the auc-
tioneer has to face and balance certain risks such as excessive prices, insufficient com-
petition and unfavorable strategic bidding behavior. The latter refers particularly to
strategic supply reduction and implicit collusion. Obviously those three categories
of risk, the former two in particular, may interact. For instance, decreasing compe-
tition increases prices. However, their triggers are complex and in order to identify
their original causes, the analysis benefits from a separate consideration. Although
the auctioneer can choose the auction format generating the lowest expected support
costs under given market and framework conditions, there exist further reasons be-
yond the auction format that lead to increasing bid prices, e.g. uncertainties regarding
high penalties or a high willingness of bidders to take award risks in non-incentive
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compatible auctions. Furthermore, potential bidders may distrust an intransparent
or too complex auction mechanism. Additional uncertainties which the bidders, such
as sunk costs stemming from expenditures for prequalification in unsuccessful bids,
may discourage bidders and hence lower the participation in the auction. Strategic
supply reduction is a phenomenon that, on the one hand, can occur if at least one
bidder is interested in realizing more than one project and consequently submits more
than one bid in the same auction. These multi-project bidders consider before as well
as during the auction, especially in dynamic auctions, whether it is better for them
to bid on all units they are interested in or to withhold some bids in order to generate
more profitable support levels for the remaining ones. If a bidder is able to increase
his expected rent by waiving additional units, he will reduce his bids accordingly.
This behavior is called strategic supply reduction and leads to a reduced competition
in favor of higher support levels. On the other hand, the issue of strategic supply
reduction is also relevant before the background of repeated auction rounds, since
bidders may have incentives to reduce their supply in particular rounds and instead
coordinate their total supply over multiple auction rounds. Finally, collusion is an
unfavorable strategic bidding behavior that is eventually less tangible and benefits
from a transparent bidder structure, meaning that bidders know each other quite
well and/or the number of participating bidders is relatively low. Explicit collusion
is commonly prohibited by law, but in real-world applications it can be observed
that bidders succeed to circumvent the law by implicit collusion. A famous exam-
ple of implicit collusion is the auction for telecommunication licenses in Germany in
2000, where bidders succeeded to communicate via number combinations in their bids
(Klemperer, 2002). Appropriate auction designs, for instance static auctions instead
of dynamic auctions or pay-as-bid instead of uniform-price auctions (see Section 2.6),
minimize any incentives for bidders to coordinate as well as hinder the realization of
implicit collusion strategies.
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Bidder’s Risks The first obvious difference between the more traditional renew-
able support schemes, such as feed-in tariffs with guaranteed support levels, and
competitive auction mechanisms is the award risk. The necessary condition of suffi-
cient competition for a successful auction implies that some bidders have to go away
empty-handed. Consequently, whereas project developers often had a guarantee for
support in earlier schemes, they now have to handle the risk of not being awarded in
an auction mechanism. How the bidders evaluate/quantify this risk strongly depends
on the investments for prequalification, since these costs are sunk and lost in case
of not being successful in the auction. The higher the sunk costs, the more are bid-
ders discouraged to bear the award risk and participate in the auction. Furthermore,
there are auction mechanisms in which the award price is uncertain at the time of
bid submission. That is the case if a bidder’s bid has no influence on the correspond-
ing award price in case of winning, which applies for instance in the uniform-price
auction (with lowest rejected bid) and the Vickrey auction. The award risk as well
as the award price risk increase uncertainties on bidders side and might discourage
bidders to participate in the auction at all. Another prevalent phenomenon that may
occur under specific assumptions is the risk of the winner’s curse. If a bidder suffers
from the winner’s curse, he realizes after being awarded that his actual costs exceed
the award price. This phenomenon applies to situations where the individual actual
costs are unknown before the auction and bidders can only estimate them, whereas
the support costs are either the same for all bidders or at least are interdependent
among all bidders. From a theoretical perspective, a rational bidder will ex ante never
suffer from the winner’s curse as he anticipates this aspect adequately in his bidding
behavior. However, the phenomenon may still occur from an ex post point of view.
In general, there are auction mechanisms with higher and lower risks of the ex post
winner’s curse. For instance, dynamic auctions potentially mitigate this risk as they
can facilitate the adequate anticipation of the winner’s curse because bidders may
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obtain valuable information during the auction. This is true if the individual valua-
tion of a particular bidder depends in fact on the signals of the competing bidders,
e.g. in case of interdependent valuations, and he can actually observe those during
the bidding procedure. A similar but different risk is the risk of underbidding, i.e.
the risk that bidders bid below their costs. We distinguish between conscious under-
bidding for strategic reasons and unconscious underbidding that may occur if bidders
had not calculated their costs appropriately. Whereas a rational bidder would never
unconsciously underbid, conscious underbidding may occur in real-world applications
due to securing long-term market power through crowding out.
Excursus: Irrational Bidding An auction theoretical analysis is always based on
the assumption of rational bidders. A rational bidder maximizes his expected profit
by submitting an optimal bid according to his available information at the time of
bid submission. However, if auctions are implemented in real-world applications the
assumption of rationality cannot be taken as a given and irrational bidding behavior
may occur (Miller and Plott, 1985; Harrison, 1989; Manelli et al., 2006), i.e. submit-
ting bids that are not expected to be profit maximizing according to the information
available. There exist several reasons for irrational bidding in practice. First, the
auction format can be misunderstood by the participants and it can be an overly
high burden for bidders to develop an optimized bidding strategy (e.g. Uniform-price
auctions, see Section 2.6). Besides, bidders may incorporate the available information
incompletely and/or incorrectly in their bidding strategies. Finally, the insufficient
anticipation of the winner’s curse may provide another reason for underbidding in
case of an interdependent value approach (see Section 2.5). In general, each auction
format involves a different risk of irrational bidding behavior and hence auction for-
mats have to be evaluated separately in that context. However, the auctioneer could
reduce the general risks of irrational bidding by providing appropriate information
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and/or trainings for potential participating bidders, as the experiences of participat-
ing bidders regarding the implemented auction format plays a crucial role. That is,
if bidders are rather experienced with auctions or particularly the specific auction
format, the risks of irrational bidding behavior can be mitigated.
2.5 Theoretical Framework: Independent Private
Value Model or Interdependent Value Model
In auction theory, two approaches are distinguished in order to model bidders valu-
ations (costs and revenues, see Subsection 2.3.3) of the good (Krishna, 2009). Both
approaches are relevant for the RES-E context depending on the specification of the
auctioned good: On the one hand, all bidders can participate with their individually
developed projects in the auction and only be awarded with their own project. On the
other hand, one or several project(s) can be predetermined and offered up for bidding
by the auctioneer, where multiple potential project developers compete for the award
of those predetermined project(s). Whereas the so-called independent private value
approach lends to model the former case, the interdependent value approach can serve
to abstract the latter case. Consequently, we will look at two different value models
here in order to distinguish between individually developed projects by bidders and
predeveloped projects by government. This will form the basis for understanding the
auction formats which are introduced in the next section.
2.5.1 The Independent Private Value Model (IPV)
The independent private value approach (IPV) is often used as a starting point be-
cause of its simplifying theoretical properties. This model assumes that each bidder
exclusively knows his own costs and only has certain beliefs about the other bidder’s
costs, where the costs of all bidders are independently drawn from a known distribu-
28
tion. All that is common knowledge to all participants, meaning that all bidders and
the auctioneer have the same information.
From a theoretical point of view, there exists a unique symmetric Nash-equilibrium
in pure strategies in the IPV model under the assumption of symmetric, risk-neutral,
single-project bidders for the following multi-unit auction formats
• Static auctions: pay-as-bid auction, uniform-price auctions and Vickrey auction
• Dynamic auctions: ascending and descending clock auction
Hence, let us have a first look at these auctions under those assumptions. In the
corresponding equilibria, all multi-unit auction formats are expected to be allocative
efficient as well as revenue equivalent (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1988). That is, although
bidders submit different bids depending on the auction format, all auctions end with
the same expected result (Maskin et al., 1989). In each auction, a bidder chooses the
strategy that maximizes his expected rent (profit). The expected rent is computed
from all possible rents, which can be achieved by the strategy, weighted by their
corresponding possibilities of winning. In all auction formats bidders will submit bids
equal to or greater than their costs in order to ensure a positive profit in case of
winning. The uniform-price auction with lowest rejected bid, the Vickrey auction,
and the descending clock auction are incentive compatible under above mentioned
assumptions, which means, that bidders have an incentive to bid their true costs.
One reason for that is that bidders cannot influence the award price through their
bids in case their bids are awarded and consequently bid exactly their true costs. The
pay-as-bid auction and the uniform-price auction with highest accepted bid as well as
the ascending clock auction, in contrast, are not incentive compatible, since the bid
determines the award price, i.e. the award price is equal to the bid in the pay-as-bid
auction and is determined by the bid with positive probability in the uniform-price
auction or the ascending clock auction. As a consequence, bidders exaggerate their
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true costs in order to balance the trade-off between increasing their rent in case of
winning (higher bidding) and increasing their winning probability (lower bidding).
Nevertheless, the higher bids in the non-incentive compatible auctions are balanced
in the corresponding equilibria and all above mentioned auction formats result in the
same efficient allocation as well as in the same expected award price (Engelbrecht-
Wiggans, 1988). Because of the revenue equivalence, the IPV approach provides an
appropriate starting point for further analyses and a profound understanding of the
particular auction formats as well as for carving out differences between them.
Note that this result also applies for single-unit auctions, i.e. first-price auction
and second-price auction. But whereas the second-price auction is incentive compati-
ble, bidders have the incentive to exaggerate their true costs in the first-price auction
(Myerson, 1981).
How the IPV Approach Applies to the RES-E Context We consider the op-
tion for RES-E auctions where each bidder participates with one or several individual
projects that differ e.g. by their particular locations. Each project developer knows
his individual project-related costs but not those of his competitors. The reason is
that, on the one hand, individual cost structures per se are usually not public and, on
the other hand, bidders often do not know who else participates in the auction. Never-
theless, project developers may have certain estimations about the competition level
as well as their competitors costs, e.g. based on earlier experiences in the particular
industrial sector or respective market analyses. That is, project developers have only
certain beliefs about their competitors costs, but do not know them exactly. Further,
the competitive costs are widely irrelevant for their own cost calculation as projects
differ significantly, e.g. depending on the location. Another aspect is that project de-
velopers often have to face long development periods and thus uncertainties regarding
their individual costs estimations may occur as well. That is, potential bidders have
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not only limited information on their competitors costs but sometimes even with re-
gard to their own costs. However, since they can undertake assessments of their own
particular situation as for example quantify the potential of wind or solar power for
their individual project and know their planned power rating and construction type,
bidders can estimate their individual costs quite well (Bofinger, 2013). Assuming the
bidders know their individual costs exactly, uncertainties regarding the competitor’s
costs are mathematically modeled by random variables. In these models, the spread
of the expected cost outcomes decreases as information about the competitors costs
structures improves, i.e. the more precise the approximations of their competitors
costs structures become. Note, for example, that bidders in technology-specific auc-
tions may have quite similar costs structures, whereas in technology-neutral auctions
costs can vary significantly between bidders. In case there are also uncertainties
regarding the individual costs of a bidder, the IPV approach has to be extended
correspondingly. Therefore, the individual costs can also be modeled by random vari-
ables that represent the expected individual costs including all relevant uncertainties.
However, the success of an adequate mapping from real costs (competitive and/or
individual) into a theoretical distribution is limited. Nevertheless, the abstraction of
the real situation for RES-E described above into the IPV model involves only very
small natural trade-offs and hence serves as a suitable theoretical approach.
2.5.2 The Interdependent Value Model (IV)
The interdependent value approach (IV) includes private value components as well
as common value components. That means that the individual valuation of a bidder
depends not only on his own signal but also on other (unknown) signals as for example
those of his competitors or even further external signals. A pure common value
approach, as an extreme case of the interdependent value approach, acts on the
assumption that all bidders have the same valuation for the good. This applies if the
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individual valuations of all bidders are affected equally by the same signals, e.g. if
the actual valuation of the good is represented by the sum or average of all signals.
In contrast, the individual valuation of the good may also be primarily influenced by
the bidder’s individual signal, for example, which leads to different actual valuations
among bidders. However, in all cases the exact valuation of the good is uncertain for
all participants at the time of the auction. That is, although bidders have a private
signal regarding the value of the good, they can only estimate the exact value based on
their individual signal plus common information such as the distribution functions of
the other relevant signals or the scope of the value distribution of the good. In general,
the value estimation would be facilitated if bidders also received the other relevant
signals, e.g. those of their competitors. That is, the more signals a bidder would
receive the more accurate becomes his estimation about the value of the good. At
this point, the question may arise why it is actually important for the bidder to make
his valuation as accurate as possible at the time of the auction. The reason is that
bidding without knowing one’s actual valuation carries a general risk of under- and
overbidding based on erroneous valuations. Especially underbidding may represent
a serious risk for bidders in procurement auctions, since a non-cost award price may
be the consequence. In auction theory, we refer to this phenomenon as the winner’s
curse. We suppose that the bidder submitting the lowest bid wins, who is in the
extreme case of a common value model probably exactly the bidder who unfortunately
underestimated the costs of the good the most. Hence, it is apparent that in an
interdependent value model, bidders benefit from learning about other bidders signals,
e.g. in dynamic auctions, in order to reduce their risk to suffer from winner’s curse. In
general, the higher the common value component in an interdependent value model,
the higher is the risk of the winner’s curse (Krishna, 2009).
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How the IV Approach Applies to the RES-E Context? If one (or several)
particular project(s) is (are) offered up for bidding to several potential project devel-
opers, there exist common value aspects, e.g. represented by the potential of wind or
solar power in the region of the corresponding project(s). Before the auction, bidders
may have different estimations about this potential and only in case of being awarded
they will learn the actual potential of the project. Particularly, all bidders will re-
alize the same potential over time if they have been awarded. Consequently, this is
a common value dimension. In addition, there remain bidder specific private value
aspects as for example operating and investment costs. Hence, if bidders compete for
identical projects the, IV approach is suited as a theoretical model. The more project
features such as power rating, equipment manufacturers and others are predetermined
by the auctioneer, the higher the common value component.
2.6 Auction Formats Suitable for RES-E
As auction mechanisms are not a panacea, there are several requirements to fulfill in
order to ensure the suitability in general and for RES-E in particular. First and fore-
most, a necessary condition is sufficient competition, i.e. supply must exceed demand
in procurement auctions, in order to avoid excessive prices. Hence, the auctioneer
needs to determine the auction volume (supply) in an appropriate manner, e.g. ensure
excess of supply based on recent market analyses. A suitable auction design reflects
adequately the predetermined policy goals as well as the bidder’s calculus (Kopp et
al., 2013). First, that means that each specific design element is implemented in the
auction so as to trigger a specific behavior or situation that can be directly linked to
the policy goal it was aimed at. The adequate reflection of bidders calculus by a corre-
sponding bidding structure can for example be implemented with quantity price-bids,
since for a bidder’s calculation the power rating of the project [MW] and the related
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support level [ per MWh] is decisive. Further, a suitable auction mechanism should
minimize bidders risks as well as specific risks of the auctioneer. Note that these
risks are likely to occur particularly under certain market and framework conditions
(see Section 2.7). For multi-unit procurement auctions a broad variety of auction
formats exists. For those, we distinguish between static and dynamic auctions as well
as hybrid auction formats. Our analysis here will be limited to auctions in which the
following three basic principles are met:
• Bids are binding
• The best bids (according to a pre-specified evaluation rule considering all rele-
vant criteria) will win
• The winning bidders will at least receive their bid price
These principles are motivated by the aim of a transparent and fair auction mecha-
nism that induces high acceptance among project developers and hence a high level
of participation, especially against the background of repeated auctions. First, the
option to crowd out other projects within the auction, e.g. the submission of rela-
tively low bids that are withdrawn in case of award, should be avoided by binding
bids and awards that are combined with withdrawal penalties. Second, an allocation
which is subsequently considered fair should award the best bids according to relevant
criteria, with the criteria having been revealed before the auction to the participating
bidders. Finally, bidders have to face award price risks in some auction formats, i.e.
they do not know their future award price as they have no influence on their price in
case of winning. Hence, a bidder friendly auction should at least guarantee a mini-
mum award price for each bidder based on his corresponding bid. Namely, in light of
bidders already having to cope with award volume risk, it might lead to excessively
high risk for investors if they also should face award price risk in an auction design
that does not guarantee them at least receiving their bid level when being awarded.
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Another reason for the third principle is, that auctions in which bidders may receive
less than their bid set strong incentives for unfavorable bidding behavior. Although
these basic principles seem very intuitive, there exist auction formats, not only in
theory but also in practice, which do not meet all of them. For instance, the median
price auction, which was implemented to auction durable medical equipment in the
U.S.in 2009 and failed in many respects, does not meet the third criterion, as the
following example illustrates (Cramton et al., 2015).
Example: Unfavorable Characteristic of the Median-price Auction We
assume, that K = 3 goods are auctioned and i = 1, , 5 potential suppliers, where
each supplier can only deliver one good, submit the following bids in monetary units:
b1 = 10; b2 = 12; b3 = 13; b4 = 15; b5 = 16. Then the auction allocates the 3 goods
to Bidder 1, 2 and 3. The award price p is the median of the winning bids, i.e.
p = b2 = 12. Consequently, Bidder 3 gets less than his bid, p = 12 < 13 = b3. This
characteristic sets strong incentives for unfavorable bidding behavior as strategically
high bids, for example, and hence should be avoided.
In the following we will focus on suitable auction mechanisms for RES-E that fulfill
those three basic principles. If not mentioned separately, we will as a starting point
base our analysis on the following simplifying assumptions: We investigate relevant
auction formats under the standard assumptions of an independent private value
(IPV) model with symmetric, risk-neutral single-project bidders. Further, we start
by assuming that there are no prequalification or penalty measures. Hence, for now we
limit our investigation to these basic assumptions without further restrictions in order
to understand and emphasize essential characteristics of the relevant auction formats
for RES-E as well as identify fundamental differences between them. Furthermore,
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we will discuss suitable auction systems under specific market conditions deviating
from these basic assumptions in Section 2.7.
Finally, in the following relevant auction formats are analyzed and evaluated re-
garding their suitability for RES-E. Based on our simplifying assumptions, Table 2.1
divides the relevant auction formats in single- and multi-unit auctions. To avoid re-
dundancy, the subsequent assessment in Subsection 2.6.1 covers single-unit auctions
as a special case of multi-unit auctions for homogeneous goods with only one unit,
where bidders participate with their individual projects. Furthermore, multi-unit auc-
tions for heterogeneous goods are analyzed separately in Subsection 2.6.3. Note that
single-unit auctions in which the auctioned project is predetermined by the auctioneer
have to be analyzed under common value assumptions and are hence considered in
Subsection 2.7.3 rather than in this section.
2.6.1 Multi-unit Auctions for Homogeneous Goods
Static auction formats
The most common static auction formats of multi-unit auctions for homogeneous
goods are the pay-as-bid auction, both variants of the uniform-price auction and the
Vickrey auction.
Pay-as-bid auction First note that the pay-as-bid auction corresponds to the first-
price auction if only one good is auctioned. In a pay-as-bid auction, bidders determine
their winning probability as well as their award price through their submitted bid.
That is, they have an incentive to exaggerate their costs in order to benefit from a
higher rent in case of winning, however, at the expense of a lower winning probability
(Krishna, 2009). Note that a bidder realizes only a positive profit in case of winning,
if his bid exceeds his costs. Hence in other words, the higher the bid the higher
the profit in case of winning, but also the lower the probability to be successful at
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all. In balancing this trade-off a bidders risk attitude plays a decisive role, because
the higher the risk aversion of a bidder, the smaller the exaggeration of his costs
(Myerson, 1981). In laboratory experiments it is often observed that human beings
rather behave in a risk-averse manner (Harrison, 1989). The main advantage of the
pay-as-bid auction is that bidders have no uncertainties about their award price in
case of winning, since they receive exactly their bid. Further, the pay-as-bid auction
is relatively stable against unfavourable bidding behaviour even under specific market
conditions as we will see in Section 2.7. However, the main disadvantage of the pay-
as-bid auction is the risk of generating very different award prices among bidders as
the following example illustrates.
Example: Different Award Prices in the Pay-as-bid Auction We assume
that three homogeneous goods are offered up for bidding and four potential sup-
pliers with single-unit supply submit the following bids: b1 = 7MU , b2 = 9MU ,
b3 = 14MU , b4 = 15MU . Consequently, the bids of Bidder 1, 2 and 3 are awarded
and the highest awarded bid (b3 = 14) is two times higher than the lowest awarded
one (b1 = 7).
Uniform-price Auctions The two variants of the uniform-price auction differ in
regard to the pricing rules, which induce different incentives for bidders and hence af-
fect the bidders individual bidding behavior in different ways. The uniform-price auc-
tion with lowest rejected bid (LRB) is incentive compatible (at least for single-project
bidders as assumed here). In contrast, the bidders have incentives to exaggerate their
true costs by bidding in the uniform-price auction with highest accepted bid (HAB)
(Krishna, 2009). One reason (i.e. necessary condition) for the incentive compatibility
in the former case is that bidders who only submit one bid never determine their
award price in case of winning, whereas in the second variant a positive probability
37
exists to determine the award price through the submitted bid. An obvious disadvan-
tage of the uniform-price auction, especially in contrast to the pay-as-bid auction, is
that bidders have to face uncertainties at the time of bid submission regarding their
award price in case of winning, see example.
Example: Award Price Risk in the Uniform-price Auction We assume that
three homogeneous goods are offered up for bidding and four potential suppliers with
single-unit supply submit the following bids: b1 = 6MU , b2 = 9MU , b3 = 10MU ,
b4 = 15MU . Hence, the bids of Bidder 1, 2 and 3 are awarded at a price of 15MU
if the uniform-price variant of the lowest rejected bid applies. If Bidder 4 submit-
ted a bid of b4 = 11MU , the award price of bidder 1, 2 and 3 would have been 11MU .
Consequently, the awarded bidders have no influence on their price at all in case
the award price solely depends on the lowest rejected bid. However, bidders know
beforehand that the award price is at least equal to their bid or even higher. Based
on this fact, another disadvantage of the uniform-price auction is the increased risk of
irrational underbidding. This is obviously caused by mistaking the auction form by
inexperienced bidders (Miller and Plott, 1985). Namely, in case of underbidding, bid-
ders basically follow the idea of increasing their winning probability by an excessively
low bid. At the same time they seem not to recognize that they only increase their
winning probability compared to a cost-covering bid by the cases of being awarded
with a not cost-covering support level. That is, they do not take into account that
a bid below their (expected) costs might lead to a not cost-covering award price in
case of winning. Finally, the main advantage of the uniform-price auction, in both
variants, is the common award price, which from a political perspective may be fa-
vored in contrast to different award prices in an auction due to a clear and common
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price signal. The vulnerability of unfavorable strategic behavior strongly depends on
further market conditions (see Section 2.7).
Note that if only one good is auctioned, the uniform-price auction with lowest
rejected bid corresponds to the second-price auction and the uniform-price auction
with highest accepted bid turns into a first-price auction.
Vickrey Auction The Vickrey auction for homogeneous goods exactly corresponds
to the uniform-price auction with lowest rejected bid if all participating bidders are
only interested in one unit and consequently submit only one single bid.
Excursus: Submitting Multiple Bids in Static Multi-unit Auctions If bid-
ders are interested not only in one unit but in multiple ones, they will consequently
submit multiple bids in the auction. This is a general option to be considered in the
context of auction mechanisms for RES-E, since a project developer may plan several
projects at the same time and hence also participate with multiple projects in an
auction round.
We assume that four homogeneous goods are offered up for bidding and three
potential suppliers participate in the auction, which is either conducted as a pay-as-
bid, uniform-price or Vickrey auction. One supplier is interested in two units, we
will refer to him as Bidder 1, and the two others, Bidder 2 and 3, are each interested
in three units. They submit the following bids: Bidder 1 bids for the first unit
b11 = 6MU and for the second unit b
2
1 = 8MU , Bidder 2 bids b
1
2 = 12MU , b
2
2 = 12MU
and b32 = 14MU , Bidder 3 submits b
1
3 = 7MU , b
2
3 = 9MU and b
3
3 = 10MU . Since
the lowest bids are awarded in the pay-as-bid, uniform-price and Vickrey auction,
both bids of Bidder 1 and the two lowest bids of Bidder 3 are awarded in every
auction. Bidder 2 is not successful with any of his bids. Pay-as-bid auction: Each
successful bid determines the corresponding award price, hence Bidder 1 is awarded
two units at a price of 6 + 8 = 14MU and Bidder 3 receives two units at a price of
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7+9 = 16MU . Uniform-price auction (highest accepted bid): If the highest accepted
bid, here b23 = 9MU , is price-determining, Bidder 1 and 3 receive each two units at
a price of 2 ∗ 9 = 18MU . Uniform-price auction (lowest rejected bid): If the lowest
rejected bid, here b33 = 10MU , is price-determining, Bidder 1 and 3 receive each two
units at a price of 2 ∗ 10 = 20MU . Vickrey auction: If Bidder 1 had not participated
in the auction, all bids of Bidder 3 and the lowest bid of Bidder 2 would have been
awarded. That is, instead Bidder 1 with his two bids, Bidder 3 would have been
awarded with b33 = 10MU and bidder 2 with b
1
2 = 12MU . Consequently, the award
price of Bidder 1s two units is 10 + 12 = 22MU . If Bidder 3 had not participated
in the auction, all bids of Bidder 1 and the two lowest bids of Bidder 2 would have
been awarded. That is, instead Bidder 3 with his two lowest bids, Bidder 2 would
have been awarded with b12 = 12MU and b
2
2 = 12MU . Consequently, the award price
of Bidder 3s two units is 12 + 12 = 24MU .
Please note that the different auction formats induce different incentives and,
thus, the submitted bids will differ between auction formats. Hence, the examples
above serve solely for illustration. Conclusions regarding a comparison of auction
revenues or efficiency are not representative. Since under different auction formats
different incentives regarding the bidding behavior occur and consequently the exis-
tence of multi-project bidders has to be considered carefully in auction format specific
analyses, which will be done adequately in Subsection 2.7.2.
2.6.2 Dynamic Auction Formats
In contrast to the sealed-bid one-shot situation in static auction formats, in dynamic
auctions bidders have the chance to observe the development of the auction price and
other bidders bids and to adapt their bidding strategies during the auction process.
Thus, dynamic auctions reveal more information than static ones, but are also more
complex to implement as well as more vulnerable to implicit collusion (Cramton,
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1998). However, since bidders can observe their competitor’s bidding behavior and
adapt their strategies accordingly, dynamic auctions reduce the risk of winner’s curse
in case of common value situations (McMillan, 1994).
Ascending Clock Auctions Clock auctions are quite established because of their
fast realization. For instance, in the Netherlands, flowers are sold via clock auctions
within seconds (Van Heck and Ribbers, 1997). In case of multi-unit procurement
auctions the procedure is as follows: The clock starts with a support level that is
low enough that no participant is willing to accept. Then the price is increased
continuously within predefined fractions of time and bidders signalize successively
their acceptance of the recent price. That is, bidders are awarded one after another
by dropping out of the auction until the demanded amount of RES-E is reached.
The award price will be determined by the last awarded bidder. Hence, this auction
format is equivalent to the uniform-price auction with highest awarded bid. If only
a single unit is auctioned the auction corresponds to the dynamic counterpart of the
first-price auction, the Dutch auction.
Descending Clock Auctions The descending clock auction is incentive compat-
ible for single-project bidders. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, the de-
scending clock auction then corresponds to the static uniform-price auction with
lowest rejected bid under simplifying basic assumptions. However, in the dynamic
descending clock auction the participating bidders can observe exactly their competi-
tors dropping out at the corresponding award prices, if this information is revealed in
the auction. Consequently, even though the descending clock auction is strategically
equivalent to the uniform-price auction with lowest rejected bid, the dynamic auction
generates weigh more information during the auction procedure than its static coun-
terpart. Note, that the descending clock auction can also be implemented with the
highest accepted bid (last auction price) variant. Nevertheless, the auctioneer has to
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deliberate carefully on the implementation of descending clock auctions under certain
market and framework conditions, see Section 2.7.
2.6.3 Multi-unit Auctions for Heterogeneous Goods
For the purpose of a comprehensive analysis of multi-unit auctions with heterogeneous
goods we extend the aforementioned simplifying assumptions insofar as bidders can
also be interested in multiple goods. The essential difference of heterogeneous goods,
in contrast to homogeneous goods, is that they differ from each other. In case of single-
project bidders these differences between heterogeneous goods are just disregarded in
bidders valuations as they are only interested in one of the goods anyway. Hence a
separate analysis for single-unit bidders is not necessary. Finally, in case of multi-
project bidders for heterogeneous goods not only the number of units awarded might
be relevant for bidders but also which unit or combination of units they will be
awarded with. For example, a bidder who participates with two projects in the auction
may be only interested in realizing both projects simultaneously due to economies of
scale. Consequently, he focuses on the award of both projects at a certain price.
Otherwise, he would not realize any of his projects or at least only at a significantly
higher price. With the objective of an efficient auction outcome, the bidder should
have the option to reflect his (complementary) valuations regarding the realization of
his projects adequately in his bids. That is, in a well-designed auction, he should be
allowed to submit a combinatorial bid for the realization of both projects as well as
two exclusive bids for the separate realization of each project. In case of substitutive
valuations (costs) the combinatorial bid is lower than the sum of the exclusive bids. In
addition, substitutive valuations (costs) exist if the combinatorial bid is higher than
the sum of the exclusive bids. This is the case, if a bidder favors a separate realization
of his multiple projects over the simultaneous one, for example due to financial or
capacity constraints. If the combinatorial bid equals the sum of exclusive bids, we refer
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to this as additive valuations. To integrate complementary, substitutive and additive
valuations (costs) adequately in the auction mechanism specific auction formats are
considered in the following. This includes the static generalized Vickrey auction and
the dynamic simultaneous multi-round descending auction. In both auction formats
bidders have the option to submit combinatorial as well as non-combinatorial bids
according to their individual valuation.
Static Auction Formats
Generalized Vickrey Auction The generalized Vickrey auction is an extension
of the Vickrey auction to heterogeneous goods. Here, bidders are allowed to submit
exclusive bids for single units as well as bids for any combination of units. Finally,
those bids are awarded that minimize the total award costs (RES-E support costs)
of the auctioneer under the conditions that all units are allocated, each unit is only
allocated to one bidder and each bidder is only successful with one of his bids. We
refer to this allocation as the optimal allocation. The award price of a bidder is the
difference of virtual award costs in case the particular bidder had not participated
in the auction and the award costs of all other bidders in the optimal allocation.
Or in other words, a successful bidder receives the opportunity costs of society of
his participation in the auction. As a consequence, award prices may differ among
winning bidders.
From a theoretical perspective, the main advantage of the generalized Vickrey
auction is its incentive compatibility. This should especially be emphasized in the
context of heterogeneous goods, because most appropriate combinatorial auction for-
mats generate complex incentives for bidders and are not incentive compatible at all
(Ausubel et al., 2006). As a consequence, the generalized Vickrey auction possesses
the advantageous characteristic of generating allocative efficient outcomes. Neverthe-
less, although the generalized Vickrey auction has favourable theoretical properties
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such as incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency, it is rarely found in real-world
applications (Ausubel et al., 2006). One potential reason is that the procedure is very
elaborate from a bidder’s perspective regarding the possible number of up to 2K − 1
bids, if K units are auctioned. Further, the determination of the optimal allocation
is a NP-complete problem. Besides the argument of being too complex especially
for unexperienced bidders, the auction format is very vulnerable to collusion and to
multiple bidding identities by a single bidder. Furthermore, a risk of very high award
prices arises, which is often mentioned as show stopper (Ausubel et al., 2006).
Good {A} Good {B} Goods {A,B}
Bidder 1 10 10 15
Bidder 2 5 10 15
Bidder 3 10 5 15
Table 2.2: Exemplary bids in the generalized Vickrey auction.
Example: High Award Prices in the Generalized Vickrey Auction The
above mentioned example illustrates the disadvantage of high award prices in the
generalized Vickrey auction in the specified situation of two bidders with additive
costs and another with complementary costs. In the following we compare the exem-
plary results, i.e. the total award costs of 20MU and the allocative efficiency in the
generalized Vickrey auction, with potential results of a pure combinatorial option in
the same situation. For reasons of simplicity, we assume that bidders also submit the
same incentive compatible bids. In an auction mechanism, where solely combinatorial
bids for {A, B} are allowed, the total award costs would be 15MU . However, the allo-
cation would not be efficient. That is, with this option lower support costs could have
been generated, however, at the expense of an inefficient allocation. Consequently,
the advantageous characteristic of allowing both combinatorial and exclusive bids in
a generalized Vickrey auction may generate an allocative efficient outcome due to
incentive compatibility, but may at the same time lead to high award prices. To con-
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clude, the generalized Vickrey auction serves rather as a theoretical benchmark for
multi-unit auctions for heterogeneous goods because of its advantageous theoretical
properties than as a promising option for real-world applications, e.g. in the context
of RES-E.
Dynamic Auction Formats
Simultaneous Multi-round Descending Auctions The simultaneous multi-
round descending auction, which is considered relevant for the RES-E context in
case of auctioning heterogeneous goods, is often called the multi-unit analogue to
the well-known English auction. However, the strategic incentives for bidders gen-
erated by the simultaneous multi-round descending auction are much more complex
than those in the English auction for a single good. Often, it is even not possible
to make statements regarding an optimal bidding strategy since e.g. multiple bid-
ding equilibria may exist. A simultaneous multi-round descending auction consists of
multiple bidding rounds. In each bidding round, bidders can simultaneously submit
bids for a number of auctioned units according to the activity rules. At the end
of each bidding round, the standing best bids per unit are announced and bidders
have the chance to underbid in the subsequent round. The particular auction for a
unit ends if no more bids are submitted for this unit in the recent bidding round.
Then the bidder who submitted the last best standing bid for this unit is awarded
at the price of his bid. Since the simultaneous multi-round descending auction repre-
sents a dynamic mechanism it is in particular suitable if bidders have interdependent
valuations for the heterogeneous goods. This is motivated by the fact that bidders
with interdependent valuations may benefit from learning about their competitors
costs signals during a dynamic auction process since this may reduce the risk of the
winner’s curse (see Section 2.5). However, even in the case of private valuations bid-
ders may have incentives not to reveal their true costs in the auction but drop out
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already at higher prices which increases the award costs of the auctioneer. If bid-
ders have complementary valuations for the goods, another disadvantage may occur.
Because complementary valuations cannot be reflected adequately in the bidding in
a simultaneous multi-round descending auction, bidders with complementary valu-
ations often suffer from the so-called regret or exposure problem (Cramton, 2004;
Goeree et al., 2006). Furthermore, the procedure of the simultaneous multi-round
descending auction may lead to very long delays. Based on that, this auction format
can be hardly suitable for RES-E, where continuous support and expansion represent
essential goals. Another unfavorable practice in simultaneous multi-round descending
auctions is strategic supply reduction, which leads to lower competition and hence
should be avoided by the auctioneer (Cramton, 2004). Thereby, the German auction
of telecommunication licenses in 1999 often serves as a famous example of strategic
supply reduction in practice (Klemperer, 2002; Grimm et al., 2003). In the following
example the basic principle of strategic supply reduction is illustrated. Assume that
the support of two projects is auctioned and two Bidders 1 and 2 participate, where
both can either realize one project or two projects. The example emphasizes the risk
of strategic supply reduction in simultaneous multi-round descending auctions.
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Example: Strategic supply reduction in simultaneous multi-round de-
scending auctions
Assumptions: The cost-covering support level of Bid-
der A is 10MU per project and that of Bidder B is
12MU per project. Both bidders are interested in re-
alizing both projects. The starting price (reservation
price) is 15MU per project.
Case I: No coordi-
nation / no strate-
gic supply reduc-
tion
A and B both bid straightforward for both projects until
their individual minimum support level is reached. That
is, B bids 12MU for each of the both units and drops out
afterwards. A would stay further in the auction since he
would bid 10MU for each of the two units.
Then both bids of bidder A are awarded and A receives
a support of 12MU per project. The rent of A is 2 ·
(12− 10)MU = 4MU . The rent of B is zero. The total
award costs of the auctioneer are 2 · 12MU = 24MU .




A and B both bid straightforward for one project each
until their individual minimum support level is reached.
That is, B bids 12MU for one project and A bids 10MU
for the other.
Then one bid of each bidder, A and B, is awarded and
both receive the starting price of 15MU per project.
The rent of A is 5MU and the rent of B is 3MU . The to-
tal award costs of the auctioneer are 2 ·15MU = 30MU .
The auction outcome is not allocative efficient.
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Conclusion Both bidders increase their rent with strategic supply re-
duction to the disadvantage of the auctioneer, who suf-
fers from higher award costs. Further, in case of strate-
gic supply reduction, allocative inefficiency occurs.
The risk of strategic supply reduction can be reduced by an ambitious reservation
price. For example, if the starting price (reservation price) was 13MU , Bidder 1
would not have increased his rent by strategic supply reduction and hence not use
this option. However, although an ambitious reservation price may reduce the risk of
strategic supply reduction, it is an additional design element needed to maintain the
success of the auction in the exemplary case. In addition, the determination of an
appropriate reservation price is another challenge: A low reservation price may reduce
the number of bidders and hence involves the risk of insufficient competition, whereas
a high reservation price still sets incentives for strategic supply reduction. The risk of
strategic reduction of competition or implicit collusion is aggravated by the situation
of repeated auctions and a relatively low number of bidders or bidders who know
each other very well (see Subsection 2.7.5). Hence, the suitability of simultaneous
descending multi-round auctions for RES has to be treated with caution and based
on an in-depth analysis of the corresponding national or international market.
2.6.4 Hybrid Auction Formats
Hybrid auctions consist of a combination of different auction mechanisms. Preva-
lently, static and dynamic auction formats are combined in a multi-stage auction
process. For instance, in the first stage bidders participate in a dynamic auction and
the winning bidders qualify for the second stage, i.e. the award stage, which is con-
ducted as a static auction. The idea behind is to concentrate competition in the final
phase via suspending weaker bidders already in an earlier stage. If there are high
discrepancies among bidders strengths and uncertainties regarding the level of com-
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petition, a hybrid mechanism may increase transparency by structuring the allocation
process in multiple stages. On the one hand, bidders in an advanced stage know that
they belong to the stronger participants but also that strengths have increased among
their competitors. The latter may lead to a more aggressive bidding behavior, i.e.
decreased bids. However, note that a rational bidder takes the existence of multiple
bidding stages already into account when bidding in an earlier stage, e.g. for exam-
ple by relatively higher bids in the beginning. Consequently, a general conclusion
regarding the expected support costs in a hybrid auction compared to a non-hybrid
one cannot be drawn. On the other hand, implementing a dynamic auction, where
bidders can observe their competitors bids, may reveal valuable information about
competition. This information can especially be helpful for the bidding behavior in
subsequent stages. This is why the conduction of a dynamic auction is particularly
reasonable in earlier stages. In Brazil, a two-stage hybrid auction mechanism was
implemented, in which a descending-clock auction was conducted in the first stage
and a pay-as-bid auction in the second stage. Furthermore, hybrid formats are also
planned or already implemented in further countries as the UK, Mexico or Morocco.
2.6.5 Summary: Evaluation of Suitable Auction Formats for
RES-E and Conclusion
The first analysis based on simplifying assumptions presented in the beginning of Sec-
tion 2.6 enables us to draw a first summary for auction formats suitable for RES-E.
The following table provides a first assessment of relevant auction formats for RES-E
according to the general auction theoretical criteria introduced and discussed in detail
in Section 2.4. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 compare the auction formats individually discussed
above for multi-unit auctions for homogeneous and heterogeneous goods with regard
to those criteria. Thereby, we distinguish for the price determination whether a com-
mon award price for all successful bidders per auction is generated, which we evaluate
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as advantageous (+) or several individual award prices are determined, which is con-
sequently evaluated as rather disadvantageous (-) the argumentation behind that can
be found in Section 2.4. Regarding the signal generation, auction formats in which
participating bidders may learn during the auction procedure about their competitors
valuations are considered positive (+). However, please note here, that learning about
competitive signals is only relevant in case of interdependent valuations. Further, the
signal generation of an auction, especially not only for participating but also potential
bidders and the public, strongly depends on what information the auctioneer reveals
afterwards. This aspect we denote by (). As we stated in 2.5, all auction formats
mentioned in Table 2.3 generate the same expected auction revenue (=) under our
simplifying assumptions. Further, we evaluate in Table 2.3 and 2.4 if the listed auc-
tion formats are incentive compatible (+) or not (-) and if they end in an allocative
efficient outcome (+) or not (-) from a theoretical perspective. Further, if there may
exist specific risks for the auctioneer as well as for bidders we mention those explicitly.
Since auctions are a competitive mechanism, the award risk for bidders is inevitable
and consequently not mentioned here. In practice, the risk of irrational bidding may
occur, which can have negative impacts on the auction outcome (see Section 2.4). If
incentives for irrational bidding behavior are high, we mark this with (-). If they are
rather low, we mark this with (+).
For a comparative conclusion of the auction formats for homogeneous goods, the
criteria of expected auction revenue, allocative efficiency and auctioneer’s risks can be
neglected since all auction formats perform equally in this regard. According to Table
4 the dynamic ascending and descending clock auctions are slightly advantageous
over their static counterparts, the uniform-price auctions (HAB and LRB), due to a
stronger signal generation during the auction. However, as already mentioned, this
is only relevant in case of interdependent valuations. Further, dynamic auctions are































































































Pay-as-bid auction − () = − + none none +
Uniform-price (HAB) auction + () = − + none award price risk −
Uniform-price (LRB) auction + () = + + none award price risk −
Vickrey auction − () = + + none award price risk −
Descending clock auction + +,() = + + none award price risk +
Table 2.3: Comparison of multi-unit auctions for homogeneous goods under simpli-
fying assumptions.
ones. The pay-as-bid auction outperforms both variants of the uniform-price auction
in terms of no award price risk and lower risk of irrational bidding behavior. However,
the pay-as bid auction generates a different award price for each successful bidder,
whereas the uniform-price auction defines a common one for all successful bidders.
Consequently, under simplifying assumptions, a ranking of the three options for a
practical implementation depends on the individual weighting of the above discussed
aspects by the auctioneer. We will learn in the following Section 2.7 that under
RES-E specific market and framework conditions, such ranking is subject to further
ambiguity. Therefore, we will briefly discuss the clock auctions as the dynamic parts
of the multi-unit auctions for homogeneous goods under specific market conditions in
more detail below.
For the heterogeneous goods, we analyzed the generalized Vickrey auction as a
static format and the simultaneous multi-round auction as a dynamic format. The































































































Generalized − () benchmark + + complexity, award −
Vickrey case high prices, price risk
auction collusion
Simultaneous − +,() no − + strategic award −
multi-round statements supply reduction, price risk
auction long delays
Table 2.4: Comparison of multi-unit auctions for heterogeneous goods.
interdependent valuations among bidders. Admittedly, both auctions generate differ-
ent award prices for bidders in an auction round. Statements regarding the expected
auction formats are not possible since there exists no unique equilibrium for bidding
in the simultaneous multi-round auction. Due to the incentive compatibility the ex-
pected auction outcome of the generalized Vickrey auction is often used as benchmark
case. However, the main disadvantage of both auction formats is that they involve
high risks for the auctioneer, which are presented in detail in Subsection 2.7.4. This
is why the practical implementation is very sensitive to given market conditions and
requires besides a profound understanding of the market almost individually perfect
conditions, which is usually not the case in reality. The hybrid auction formats in
the combinations as described above represent a specific class of auction formats that
can be split up in their individual combined parts, i.e. auction formats, for which the
corresponding evaluation above applies as well. However, the specific characteristic
of a hybrid mechanism to concentrate competition in the final phase via suspending
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weaker bidders in earlier stages may play a crucial role in some situations. Conse-
quently, it may be worthwhile to keep hybrid formats in mind even though they are
more complex and time-consuming to implement in real world applications.
2.6.6 Applicability to RES-E Support Instruments
Any auction format has to be embedded in a RES support scheme, which can make
use of different instruments such as tariffs or premiums. Hence, in the following
paragraphs potential interactions between chosen auction formats and support in-
struments will be discussed with regard to general impacts on strategic incentives
for project developers in an auction, expected auction outcomes and the resulting
achievement of policy goals. For that purpose, we distinguish for the subsequent
analysis between support instruments with external dependence, i.e. support lev-
els are partially derived from other market prices, e.g. spot market prices and sup-
port instruments without external dependence (Menanteau et al., 2003; Couture and
Gagnon, 2010; Klein et al., 2008). RES-E projects are characterized by a high share
of fixed costs for project development and implementation and usually have relatively
low variable costs. This characteristic requires relatively high upfront investments of
project developers and consequently induces the need to recover investment costs by
an adequate remuneration over the project lifetime. However, the electricity rates on
the electricity market are neither cost-covering for RES-E yet nor stable as electricity
markets feature a high price volatility. Consequently, support instruments have been
implemented by the government in the past to balance price differences to provide
long-term financial security to project developers in order to increase the expansion
of renewable energies.
Whereas support schemes solely based on instruments without external depen-
dence (such as tariffs) are often criticized in terms of lacking competitive incentives,
they represent high investment security for project developers thanks to the pre-
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dictability of future cash flows that they provide (Mitchell et al., 2006; Couture and
Gagnon, 2010). The predefined support levels are oriented at the specific generation
costs and differ e.g. according to technologies or locations. As a consequence, they fur-
ther attract especially smaller and rather risk-averse bidders and hence may increase
expansion (Mitchell et al., 2006; Couture and Gagnon, 2010). For example, feed-in-
tariffs (FITs) without external dependence were successfully implemented with regard
to an increased deployment in Germany (Butler and Neuhoff, 2008). However, prede-
termined support levels in FITs may lead to an uncontrolled and inefficient expansion
of RES-E technologies in a non-competitive context and hence in particular lead to
excessive support costs (Butler and Neuhoff, 2008). If instruments without external
dependence are combined with auctions, bidders demand their optimal cost-covering
support level individually by bidding in the auction. Thereby, a rational bidder bases
his optimal bid on the expected total costs and energy generation over project life-
time, as well as on his beliefs about competition. That is, electricity market specific
conditions can be disregarded by bidding, which may facilitate the bid calculation
for less experienced project developers. Furthermore, the allocation via auctions is
expected to be allocative efficient from a theoretical point of view under simplifying
assumptions. However, the suitability of combining instruments without external de-
pendence and auctions with regard to policy goals is ambiguous. On the one hand,
an individually demanded market-independent instrument ensures to cover individual
investment costs and consequently may be advantageous for high participation and/or
realization rates. On the other hand, incentives for bidders based on other relevant
markets, as the spot market for example, are only limited. Although they will face
competition in terms of outbidding their competitors, their bidding strategies can be
developed completely isolated from external markets as the electricity market. This
fact may hinder a smooth integration of RES-E into the electricity market which is
planned by many policy makers for the long term. With instruments without external
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dependence, project developers may not have the chance to learn about electricity
market specific fluctuations and how to develop an adequate strategy according to
the market.
An instrument with external dependence (such as premiums) in which project
developers receive support on top of the electricity market price, in contrast, al-
ready postulates the anticipation of electricity market specific uncertainties. Because
the premium will only partly cover the individual costs, project developers are incen-
tivized, for instance, to generate RES-E in time of high demand (Couture and Gagnon,
2010; Klein et al., 2008). However, instruments with external dependence increase
several risks for bidders (Mitchell et al., 2006; Klein et al., 2008) and hence perform
worse than those without external dependence in terms of providing investment se-
curity for project developers, which may lead to lower participation (Couture and
Gagnon, 2010). Thus, if bidders in an auction submit bids for their individual cost-
covering premium over project lifetime, they bear the risk of non-cost-covering total
support levels in case of underestimating future revenues at the electricity market.
These uncertainties regarding the total support level can be theoretically abstracted
by common value aspects (see Section 2.5) since the uncertainties of future electricity
prices apply to all project developers equally. This fact may affect the bidding be-
havior in the way that bidders (with interdependent valuations) may suffer from the
risk of winner’s curse due to non-sufficient anticipation of the particular situation (see
Subsection 2.7.3). Since, as a consequence, awarded bidders may not finalize their
projects due to not-cost covering support levels, the political expansion target may
be at risk. However, bidders would learn to anticipate future market developments
and related uncertainties adequately in their bids in order to exist in a competitive
market over the long term. This would finally facilitate to integrate large shares of
RES-E in the electricity market (Klein et al., 2008).
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2.7 Chances and Risks of the Identified Auction
Types in the Context of Specific Market Con-
ditions
The suitability of the auction format depends on various framework and market condi-
tions such as level of competition, participation of multi-project bidders, uncertainty
of bidders regarding project costs and energy generation, predictability of project
costs and energy generation by the auctioneer, transparency of bidders, asymmetric
beliefs, repeated conduction of the auction and last but not least default risks. The
impacts of those factors on the before identified auction types are discussed in the
following.
The previous simplifying assumptions are now relaxed in order to model relevant
aspects and settings for real-world applications in the RES-E context. We emphasize
related chances and risks for each auction type and conclude with a suggestion for
which auction format might be most suitable under given conditions. In each subsec-
tion only one assumption is neglected, all others are maintained as in the simplifying
case. Note that in reality a mix of several conditions might be most applicable and
hence the auctioneer needs to decide which corresponding chances and risks are most
relevant to him in the particular situation. Finally, we conclude our results in a
market and framework conditions specific evaluation.
2.7.1 Level of Competition
Sufficient competition is a necessary condition for the success of any auction. Klem-
perer (2002) mentions high participation as a key element of successful auctions.
However, this condition is difficult to quantify and there exists no best practice of
how to ensure high participation rates in an auction per se. It is obvious that the
56
question of who and how many bidders will probably participate in the auction is cru-
cial here. The answer strongly depends on the specific market situation and is very
sensitive to auction related risks for the bidders. Basically, competition is increased
by a higher number of bidders as well as by replacing weaker bidders by stronger
ones.
Assuming low competition, Klemperer (2002) states that weaker bidders prefer
the pay-as-bid auction over the uniform-price auction because they benefit from a
positive probability to be awarded. Unfortunately, this fact is due to inefficiencies
occurring under low competition in pay-as-bid auctions. In fact, all auction formats
suitable for RES-E benefit from a higher level of competition in terms of reduced
expected support levels and increased allocative efficiency. However, allocative effi-
ciency is hardly traceable in real-world auctions and very sensitive to asymmetries
regarding information and cost structures among bidders. Consequently, an auction-
eer focusing on reduction of support costs as well as achieving allocative efficiency
should always aim at finding appropriate measures beyond the auction format to
ensure both results at the same time. For that reason, the auctioneer should aim
at increasing participation in the auction by reducing bidders risks adequately, for
instance, by a transparent and simple auction design with low participation barriers,
which enjoys high acceptance among all potential bidders. Furthermore, appropri-
ate measures to integrate asymmetric bidder groups, e.g. bidders with essential costs
differences, might be helpful to increase participation, see e.g. establishment of boni
and mali or contingents in auctions that are analyzed in detail in Section 4.
Number of Bidders Whereas the number of bidders has no impact on the optimal
bidding behavior of a single-project bidder in a uniform-price auction with highest
rejected bid and the descending clock auction, the optimal bidding strategy, in par-
ticular the degree of cost exaggeration, strongly depends on the number of bidders
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in a pay-as-bid auction and a uniform-price auction with highest accepted bid, sup-
posed that the auction volume is constant. Since single-project bidders have a weakly
dominant strategy to bid truthfully their costs in a one-time uniform-price auction
with lowest rejected bid and descending clock auction, their bidding behavior is in-
dependent of the beliefs about their competitors, e.g. number and strengths. In a
pay-as-bid auction bidders exaggerate their true costs less strongly if more bidders
participate. That is, higher competition because of an increased number of bidders
induces more aggressive bids. The same results occur for uniform-price auctions with
highest accepted bid, where the impacts are even aggravated by the reduced probabil-
ity of bids to be price-determining when more bidders participate. Nevertheless, from
a theoretical point of view, expected revenue equivalence and allocative efficiency of
all four auction formats apply independent from the number of bidders. Note that
this result presuppose that the (expected) number of participating bidders is common
knowledge in all auction formats.
Asymmetric Bidders As bidders strengths are modeled by distribution functions,
symmetric and asymmetric bidders differ in the way that symmetric bidders draw
their individual cost signals from the same distribution function, whereas asymmetric
bidders draw them from different ones. If bidders are symmetric, all bidders have
ex ante the same expected strength, where the particular signals may differ and
are private information. Whereas we focused on symmetric bidders in our simplifying
assumptions, we now investigate the consequences of asymmetric bidders, i.e. bidders
that ex ante have different cost expectations. Consequently, for asymmetric bidders
not only the private cost signals may differ but also the expected strengths, i.e.
asymmetric bidders are ex ante distinguishable from each other by their expected
strengths. In order to assess bidders strengths, we assume that different distribution
functions can be ranked, for instance by concepts of stochastic dominance such as first-
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order stochastic dominance (Maskin and Riley, 2000). That is, a stronger bidders cost
signal is more likely to fall below a certain value than that of a weaker bidder. Or in
other words, a stronger bidder is expected to have lower costs than a weaker one.
Because of the existence of a weakly dominant strategy for single-project bidders
in the uniform-price auction with lowest rejected bid and the descending clock auc-
tion, the incentive compatibility persists. Thus allocative efficiency is maintained in
these auction formats under asymmetric bidders. However, in the pay-as-bid auction
inefficiencies may occur due to asymmetries among bidders: weaker bidders submit
more aggressive bids than stronger ones as they face higher competition.
Maskin and Riley (2000) show for the first-price and second-price auctions that
expected revenue equivalence no longer holds by neglecting the assumption of sym-
metric bidders. However, neither the first-price nor the second-price auction is per se
superior in generating lower expected support costs under asymmetric bidders. The
auction format favored by the auctioneer in terms of minimization of support costs de-
pends strongly on the specific form of asymmetry, i.e. for instance if the distributions
are shifted or stretched. Since in real-world applications, e.g. the RES-E auctions, it
might be difficult to capture and describe the form of asymmetry in an appropriate
manner, the condition of asymmetric bidders should not be taken as crucial factor
when searching for the most suitable auction format in a specific situation.
The bidding behavior in first-price and second-price auctions can be transferred
to its multi-unit extension in case of single-project bidders. Hence, there exists no
ranking of pay-as-bid and uniform-price auctions regarding expected support costs as
well, if bidders are asymmetric.
2.7.2 Participation of Multi-project Bidders
Since project developers may plan and realize several projects simultaneously, they
may also submit multiple bids in the same auction. To start with, we assume that
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each bidder has additive costs for multiple projects, i.e. the cost of simultaneously
developing multiple projects equals the cost of developing each project separately.
Hence, neither economies of scale nor additional costs due to simultaneous project
developments exist. We assume that each bidder may apply with more than one
project and submit multiple bids accordingly, i.e. for each project one bid is submit-
ted.
The participation of multi-project bidders induces the risks of strategic supply
reduction and allocative inefficiencies (Noussair, 1995; Ausubel et al., 2014a). If a
bidder is interested in participating with multiple projects, ha may have the incen-
tive withhold some projects in favor of a higher award price for the remaining ones.
Multi-project bidders balance the trade-off between realizing more projects at lower
support levels and realizing fewer projects in favor of higher support levels. Note
that supply reduction can either be reached by submitting relatively high bids on
additional projects or by not submitting any bids on additional projects at all in an
extreme case. However, incentives for strategic supply reduction for multi-project
bidders particularly occur in certain auction formats, especially in auctions where
additional bids may influence the award price for another bid of the same bidder.
Hence, in a pay-as-bid auction, where a bid only impacts its own winning prob-
ability as well as its own award price in case of being successful, bidders cannot
benefit from strategic supply reduction in case of binding bids. This is, because a
bidder only increases his award price and simultaneously lowers his award probability
in case of submitting strategically higher bids. As a result, the pay-as-bid auction
even allocates the goods efficiently under the assumption of additive valuations of
the multi-project bidders. Nevertheless, assuming that awards are not binding, i.e.
bidders can withdraw their award without additional costs, incentives occur to exag-
gerate supply and submit multiple bids that differ slightly. This bid diversification
serves as an optimization of cost exaggeration and hence as an optimized bidding
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strategy (Belica et al., 2015). Note that this situation is rather theoretical as in real-
ity, project developers usually have to apply for the auction with concrete specified
projects.
Whereas there exists a weakly dominant strategy to bid truthfully ones costs
in case of single-unit supply in a one-time uniform-price auction, the situation is
different if a bidder is interested in more than one unit and submits multiple bids:
the additional bids, i.e. the higher ones, determine with a certain probability the
award price of the previous bids, i.e. the lower ones. This fact induces incentives to
bid relatively higher on additional bids in order to gain a higher award price in case
the additional bids are price-determining (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998).
Of course, this effect strongly depends on the probability of determining the award
price with such additional bids, i.e. the fewer bidders participate or the lower the
ratio of number of bidders to number of auctioned goods the higher is the chance
to determine the price. Consequently, in both variants of the uniform-price auction
the risk of unfavorable bidding strategies, i.e. supply reduction, exists if bidders are
interested in more than one unit. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example: Incentives for Supply Reduction for Multi-project Bidders in
the Uniform-price Auction with Lowest Rejected Bid We assume that three
homogeneous goods are offered up for bidding to three potential Bidders 1, 2 and 3 in
a uniform-price auction with lowest rejected bid. Bidder 1 is interested in two goods,
Bidder 2 and 3 only have a single-unit supply. The following bids are submitted:
b11 = 5MU , b
2
1 = 6MU , b2 = 8MU and b3 = 10MU . Hence, the bids of Bidder 1
and 2 are awarded and the award price is 10MU . Alternative behavior of Bidder
1 (strategic supply reduction): Bidder 1 bids b11 = 5MU and b
2
1 = 20MU . Then
all winning bidders receive one good at a price of 20MU . Consequently, Bidder 1
increases his award price of the first good by refusing the second good.
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Hence the favorable characteristic of incentive compatibility only applies for the
specific case of single-project bidders and the first bid of multi-project bidders who
only participate in one single auction. In all other cases there exist incentives for
bidders to exaggerate their true costs in the bids. Consequently, even in a uniform-
price auctions inefficiencies are likely to occur in case of multi-project bidders.
In a descending clock auction the risk of strategic supply reduction is even aggra-
vated for multi-project bidders compared to the static counterpart, the uniform-price
auction. Because multi-project bidders can observe the bidding procedure, they can
optimize their decision of dropping out of the auction process early with one bid for
the benefit of a higher award price of the other bids.
By relaxing the assumption on additive costs, i.e. supposing bidders have sub-
or super-additive costs for multiple projects, the impacts discussed above remain
the same, except when synergies (economies of scale) between multiple projects of a
bidder become too strong. In that case, combinatorial auctions are considered more
appropriate.
2.7.3 Uncertainties of Bidders’ Valuations (IV Approach)
In this subsection we move away from the IPV model and consider the IV model,
i.e. uncertain and interdependent values (costs). This model applies to the case that
the auctioned projects are predetermined by the auctioneer (see Subsection 2.5.2).
In this case, we assume that bidders are more uncertain about their actual costs for
realizing the projects than in the case of individually developed projects, for which
we consider the IPV approach appropriate. Therefore, bidders have to build beliefs
about their uncertain costs based on the information provided by the auctioneer
as well as their private costs signals. Here, the other bidders private costs signals
may help a bidder in estimating his cost estimation more precisely. As mentioned
in Subsection 2.5.2, these properties are captured by the interdependent value (IV)
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model. In this context, the main risk is that those bidders will win who have estimated
the costs as being the lowest - the risk of the winner’s curse. Misestimating of costs,
however, can be reduced by the auctioneer as the level of uncertainties depends on
the information that the auctioneer reveals. Thus, the auctioneer may reduce the risk
of winner’s curse by publishing valuable information about the project(s) before the
auction. However, the information communicated should be transparent, traceable
and reliable, otherwise potential bidders could be discouraged to participate in future
auction rounds or they might base their expected valuation on inadequate information
again leading to misestimations. In an IV framework, bidders benefit from auction
formats that reveal information during the auction, so that they can learn from their
competitors about the actual costs, which allows them to adapt their costs estimations
and bidding strategies, respectively. This induces that dynamic auction formats as the
descending clock auction or the reverse English auction in the single-unit case should
be favored over their static counterparts. Nevertheless, the increased transaction
costs of dynamic auctions have to be weighed against the advantages of information
acquisition. Regarding the uniform-price auction and the pay-as-bid auction, so far
no essential differences have been found with respect to the risk of the winner’s curse.
2.7.4 Uncertainties of Auctioneer’s Valuation
Since information asymmetries between auctioneer and bidders are characteristic for
the RES-E context, it is a relevant issue to address the consequences of uncertainties
regarding the auctioneer’s valuation. Assuming that project developers participate
with their individual planned and developed projects in the auction, they usually are
the better informed party with respect to expected costs and revenues. Neverthe-
less, why is it crucial for the auctioneer to have precise information about expected
support levels? Besides increased uncertainties in estimating future support costs,
he will have difficulties to determine an adequate reservation price. If he sets a too
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ambitious (low) reservation price, he will risk missing his expansion goal. However, a
too high reservation price may lead to excessive prices. Consequently, valuable and
accurate information on expected support levels will help to balance this trade-off.
The auctioneer benefits in all auction formats from an optimal reservation price in
terms of reduced expected support costs. However, allocative inefficiencies may occur
in case the lowest valuation (costs) of all bidders exceed the reservation price but
not the auctioneer’s valuation. As ex ante uncertainties in the auctioneer’s valuation
persist independent of the auction format, there is no auction format that is per se
more suitable than another in order to reduce negative consequences in this partic-
ular situation. However, if there exist further incentives for unfavorable strategic
bidding behavior because of specific market and framework conditions, an adequate
reservation price gains in importance: For instance, in situations where the risk for
strategic supply reduction is relatively high (due to participation of multi-project
bidders in certain auction formats for example), an ambitious reservation price is a
unique measure to avoid unfavorable strategic behavior.
2.7.5 Transparency of Bidders
If project developers know their competitors in the auction very well, stronger in-
centives occur to coordinate with each other in all auction formats. Especially in
repeated auctions bidders might learn about their competitors. The risk of collusion
increases especially with frequent auction rounds as here the coordination is easily
continued and transferred to the next rounds. A high transparency of bidders is fa-
vored additionally by a relatively low number of project developers in the market.
Whereas it might be difficult to eliminate the incentives for collusion per se, the auc-
tioneer can at least hinder the continuing of collusive strategies. Consequently, if a
high transparency of bidders exists the auctioneer should choose an auction format
that is less vulnerable to collusion.
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As a rule of thumb, static (sealed bid) auction formats are considered as more
appropriate to avoid collusion than dynamic auction formats as the latter facilitate
implicit collusion strategies during auction process. In contrast, the sealed-bid auction
formats, i.e. both variants of the uniform-price auction and the pay-as-bid auction,
rather prevent collusive bidding behavior since bidders cannot observe their competi-
tors bids. Here, the risk for collusion is considered higher under uniform-pricing than
under pay-as-bid. Klemperer (2002) emphasizes that there exist incentives for bid-
ders to coordinate on particular shares of the auctioned volume in favor of a common
high award price. Note that in uniform-price auctions, award and award price are (at
least with a positive probability) decoupled by bidding, whereas in a pay-as-bid auc-
tion each awarded bidder receives his corresponding bid. Consequently, there exists
a positive probability that a bidder’s bid is awarded in a uniform-price auction with
a relatively high award price even if the bid itself is relatively low.
2.7.6 Asymmetric Beliefs
We denote beliefs as a participant’s expectation about competition or, in particu-
lar, his expectations about the (competitive) bidder’s strengths. Each bidder has a
concrete signal about his own strength but only beliefs about the other participants
strengths. In the beginning, we acted on the simplifying assumption that all par-
ticipants, i.e. auctioneer and bidders, have the same beliefs about each other before
the auction. Relaxing this assumption yields the case that participants may have
different information about each other. In particular, asymmetric beliefs imply that
at least one participant has wrong beliefs about reality. The higher the number of
misinformed participants and the more fallacious the misinformation, the greater is
the effect of asymmetric beliefs regarding the auction outcome. However, asymmetric
beliefs can be advantageous and disadvantageous as well as effectless for the auction
outcome. This depends on the type of misinformation and the implemented auction
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format. The crucial question is if the prevailing misinformation leads to beliefs of
higher or lower competition as compared to reality. For instance, let us assume that
all bidders believe that their opponents are relatively strong, whereas all bidders in
fact are rather weak. Then, competition is overestimated. If those bidders partic-
ipate in a pay-as-bid auction, the auctioneer will benefit from lower support costs
generated by the auction compared to the case where all bidders know that they
are all weak in reality. In contrast, if all bidders act on the assumption of weaker
competitors (misinformation), exactly the opposite applies: The auction generates
higher support costs. The reason for that is that bidders exaggerate their costs in
pay-as-bid auctions based on their beliefs about competition. Therefore the higher
bidders expect the competition to be, the lower are their submitted bids in a pay-as-
bid auction, independent if their beliefs are correct or based on misinformation. A
similar result follows for the uniform-price auction with highest accepted bid, where
the optimized bid also incorporates an exaggeration based on beliefs about competi-
tion as there exists a positive probability to be price determining in case of winning.
In the uniform-price auction with lowest rejected bid, it is obvious that the weakly
dominant bidding strategy remains unaffected even under asymmetric beliefs. Conse-
quently, the pay-as-bid auction and the uniform-price auction with highest accepted
bid generate lower (higher) expected support costs than the uniform-price auction
with lowest rejected bid in case of overestimation (underestimation) of competition.
In dynamic auctions bidders may recognize their asymmetric beliefs and adapt them
according to their observations during the auction process, e.g. the incentive compat-
ible descending clock auction reveals bidders actual cost estimations sequentially.
2.7.7 Repeated Conduction of the Auction
In order to ensure a continuous expansion of RES-E, several auction rounds have
to be conducted during a year. One motivation behind this is that bidders should
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have the opportunity to participate in an auction round whenever their project status
fulfills the prequalification criteria and hence avoid delays caused by the new system.
However, repeated auctions have specific properties that induce specific risks which
may be disadvantageous for the auctioneer. Since a bidder can take the repeated
conduction into consideration by determining his optimized bidding strategy, he can
incorporate the option to be awarded in a future round, if not being successful in the
current round. To start with, we suppose that the volume of supply is a fixed amount
for each year and all projects participate in the auction rounds until they are awarded.
Then incentives for bidders occur to bid higher in earlier rounds than in later ones in
all four auction formats (pay-as-bid, uniform-price (LRB and HAB), descending clock
auction). The reason for this is that in the beginning the bidders face the additional
chance to be successful in upcoming rounds. Note that even the weakly dominant
strategies in the uniform-price auction with lowest rejected bid and the descending
clock auction are not preserved in this case. If no new projects are added to the supply
over time, these effects are, from a theoretical perspective, compensated over time
and the expected total support costs equal those that would have been generated
by a single auction with the same amount of supply and aggregated awards. In
the RES-E context, however, it is more appropriate to assume that there accrue
new projects to the amount of supply over time. Hence, if the expected level of
competition is the same in each auction round, the optimal bid will be the same,
i.e. the optimal bidding strategy will be constant over rounds, if the number of
auction rounds is uncertain. Nevertheless, the argument that bidders may speculate
of being awarded in a later round may persist from a psychological point of view
and induce relatively higher bids in earlier rounds (McAfee and Vincent, 1993). In
that context, expected costs of delays regarding project development and realization
play a crucial role, because the lower the costs are the stronger is the incentive to
wait for being awarded in later rounds. The experimental analysis from Abbink et al.
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(2005) states that less experienced bidders submit more aggressive bids in a pay-as-bid
auction. Consequently, the pay-as-bid auction is supposed to generate lower support
costs than the uniform-price auctions in an early phase. However, as bidders will
learn about the competition and adapt their bidding strategies respectively, these
differences of expected support costs will converge over time. Moreover, it has to
be taken into account that the repeated conduction of auctions increases the chance
and, thus, the incentives for multi-project bidders to successfully implement strategic
supply reduction at the expense of higher prices and, thus, higher support costs. The
reason for this is that repeated conduction eases (implicit) collusion.
To conclude, there is no essential reason to favor a certain auction format over
another against the background of repeated auctions. However, it might be reason-
able to choose an auction format that is relatively stable against collusion, since the
repetition may increase transparency between project developers and hence facilitate
collusive strategies.
2.7.8 Default Risks
The adequate integration of default risks plays a crucial role for the design of a suitable
auction mechanism for RES-E, if project developers participate in the auction before
their projects are completely finalized. In that case, already awarded bidders may
not succeed to realize their corresponding projects in time or even not at all. There
can be several reasons for a default, such as insufficient support, missing approvals or
force majeure (act of nature beyond control) that all refer to uncertainties for bidders
at the time of bid submission. Hence, the auctioneer may benefit by reducing these
uncertainties for the bidders project planning and realization phase, e.g. through
variable support levels, appropriate prequalification measures or adequate penalties.
First, through variable support levels (such as sliding feed-in premiums), specific
uncertainties regarding actual costs and energy generation are transferred from the
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project developer to the auctioneer. Second, the auctioneer may demand specific
prequalification requirements, where bidders have to ensure a predetermined project
planning status involving the most important approvals for their project or other
appropriate proofs of suitability. Penalties may encourage bidders to pursue their
projects although their realization may not be profitable in itself. Unfortunately, all
the aforementioned default risks persist in all auction formats suitable for RES-E.
Hence, in order to accommodate these default risks, a standard auction format has
to be complemented by further appropriate RES-specific design options in addition
to the auction format, e.g. prequalification and penalty measures.
2.8 Conclusion
In the beginning of the chapter a general classification of relevant auction formats
for RES-E was presented and a comprehensive introduction to their general charac-
teristics was provided under simplifying assumptions. The main result of this first
approach is that the considered auction formats perform equally well regarding ex-
pected auction revenue (i.e. support costs) and allocative efficiency in theory, even
if the optimal bidding behavior differs in the particular auctions. However, since
auctions for RES-E as real-world applications have to be evaluated before the back-
ground of specific market and framework conditions, we extended our analysis by
relaxing those simplifying assumptions. As a result our analysis revealed a certain
ambiguity of auction formats under changing market conditions. Hence, a profound
market analysis is necessary before the implementation of auctions in order to find





Reallocation – Theoretical and
Experimental Analysis
There are real world auctions in which bidders are allowed to reject their award after
the auction, typically in combination with a reallocation procedure. The main reason
for non-binding awards is to increase competition by reducing bidders’ risks after being
awarded. We develop a theoretical model for non-binding awards in sealed-bid multi-
unit auctions. We report that non-binding awards in combination with an appropriate
reallocation mechanism do not have unfavorable effects in pay-as-bid and uniform
price auctions, i.e., auction outcomes are efficient and revenue (payment) equivalence
holds. Our experimental study supports our theoretical results. Moreover, we find
that with an exhaustive reallocation procedure, the non-binding pay-as-bid and the




Auctions with non-binding awards are characterized by the option for the bidders to
withdraw awarded bids. To offer bidders this option may appear dubious at a first
glance. However, as we illustrate in the following paragraphs, this option can be
found in sales auctions and in procurement auctions. Here, the option to withdraw
awarded bids has been either explicitly implemented or rather accidentally enabled
by the auction rules.
The main argument for the explicit implementation of this option is to invite
and not to deter bidders from participating in the auction. This, for example, applies
when the bidders face uncertainties concerning the auctioned goods at the time of the
auction, which can first be reduced or even dissolved after the award. Then, bidders
may sometimes be better off by withdrawing their award in order to mitigate initially
unforeseen costs. Particularly in procurement auctions, reducing those uncertainties
may be possible before the auction but incurs costs. McAfee and McMillan (1987)
interpret the costs of learning what the item is worth as entry costs. However, entry
costs are sunk costs for the bidders and, thus, induce lower participation in the
auction. An alternative is to let bidders gain information about uncertainties by
being awarded in the auction and simultaneously offer the possibility to withdraw
the award in case of an imminent loss. For instance, Ecofys, ZSW, ISI, and Takon
(2015) focusing on renewable energy auctions, emphasize that bidders may have better
opportunities to prepare and finance their project after the award than before the
auction.
In combination with the option to withdraw awards, specific measures should be
implemented concomitantly. The most prominent one is a reallocation procedure: af-
ter awarded bids have been withdrawn, the best losing bids move up and are awarded
instead. In case of auctions with uniform pricing, the application of a reallocation pro-
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cedure requires a recalculation of the award prices on the basis of the new allocation
after the reallocation.
The option to withdraw awarded bids generates the inventive for the bidders to
submit different bids for the same good in order to withdraw an awarded bid if another
bid, which is better for the bidder, will be awarded instead. Internet-based auctions,
for example, often facilitate multiple bidding through false instances as multiple email
addresses or user accounts due to very low costs (Yokoo et al., 2004). Guo and
Conitzer (2010) continue this line of research by studying online auctions in which
bidders are allowed to withdraw their winning bids after the auction finished. The
incentive to submit multiple bids is reinforced by a reallocation procedure because
the withdrawal of an awarded bid may induce that another and better bid of the
bidder will move up and will be awarded instead.
There are several prominent examples of auctions with non-binding awards. In the
Australian license auction for satellite-television services in 1993, where two licenses
were put up to sale, the bidders were allowed to submit as many bids as they wanted
with zero withdrawal costs. McMillan (1994) joked that “what followed was high com-
edy”, however, politicians called it “one of the world’s great media license fiascoes”.
The winning bidders kept on withdrawing their award just to regain it with a lower
bid after reallocation. This happened for 19 times, after which the licenses were allo-
cated to the very same bidders but with a delay of one year and at approximately half
of the initial award price.1 In 2009, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) conducted auctions to replace administrative pricing of medical services al-
lowing non-binding bids with minor success: the auction neither satisfied demand nor
generated competitive prices. The New York Times reports that the chosen auction
was “incredible in the inefficiency of its flawed design”.2 Cramton, Ellermeyer, and
Katzman (2015) theoretically and Merlob, Plott, and Zhang (2012) experimentally
1For more details see McMillan (1994).
2For more details see Ayres and Cramton (2010).
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point to the major problem in the design of the CMS auction: the combination of
the median-price rule and the option to withdraw bids after the award price has been
announced. More recently, numerous examples of non-binding auctions are found in
the renewable energy (RE) sector. In these procurement auctions, project developers
often face high planning uncertainties before their projects are awarded in the auction
(e.g. Kreiss, Ehrhart, Haufe, and Soysal, 2017). That is, an awarded bidder may real-
ize after the auction that the awarded support level is insufficient for getting further
agreements for funds and for finishing the project. In order to reduce these award
risks, winning bids will typically be non-binding. In fact, in many RE auctions the
option to withdraw awards is explicitly implemented. Wigand, Foerster, Amazo, and
Tiedemann (2016) report that in almost all countries bidders are basically allowed to
withdraw their awards after the auction. Nevertheless, in most cases withdrawal costs
occur in form of penalty payments depending on timing or reasons of withdrawal (e.g.
German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 2015). Only few coun-
tries, e.g. Denmark and Germany, implement supplemental reallocation procedures
instead in order to preserve high realization rates and, thus, to reach the expansion
target in case of withdrawals (Kitzing and Wendring, 2015; Tiedemann, 2015).
This paper provides a first theoretic and experimental analyses of auctions with
non-binding awards. Our main focus are the incentives caused by this option and
their impact on the auction outcome. In order to gain first insights that help to
detect the basic principles and effects of non-binding awards in combination with a
reallocation procedure, we set up an idealized model to isolate the strategic effects
of the option to withdraw awarded bids as far as possible and to reduce complexity,
particularly in the experiment. First, we consider simultaneous sealed-bid auctions
for multiple homogeneous goods. Second, we allow bidders to submit multiple bids
for one good without incurring costs. Third, we consider an exhaustive reallocation
procedure, i.e., the number of reallocation rounds is not limited. Bidders may also
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withdraw awarded bids after a reallocation has taken place and every withdrawal
again triggers a reallocation. Fourth, we abstract from uncertainty concerning the
value of the auctioned goods. We discuss relaxations of these assumptions in Section
3.4.
Within an IPV framework, we theoretically analyze multi-item sealed-bid pro-
curement auctions with single-unit supply bidders. We consider pay-as-bid (PAB)
pricing and uniform pricing with lowest rejected bid (UP-LRB) and highest accepted
bid (UP-HAB). In non-binding auctions with PAB or UP-HAB, if costs of rejection
are neglected, bidders have an incentive to submit as many bids as feasible and the
non-binding bids spread around the equilibrium bid in corresponding auction with
binding awards. In a non-binding auction with PAB or UP-HAB, if costs of re-
jection are neglected, bidders have an incentive to submit as many bids as feasible
and the non-binding bids spread As the binding UP-LRB auction, the non-binding
UP-LRB auction is incentive compatible and bidders do not have an incentive to
submit more than one bid. For the PAB auction we show that with symmetric and
risk-neutral bidders, there exist pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria in monotone
bidding functions. We analogously discuss the symmetric equilibrium strategy in
non-binding UP-HAB auctions, that we also investigate in our experiment. We show
that all considered binding and non-binding mechanisms are efficient and expected
revenue (payment) equivalent.
We conduct an experiment to test the theoretical findings of auctions with binding
awards and non-binding awards. We implement procurement auctions with PAB
and UP-HAB because these two formats are mostly used in real-world applications.
For renewable energy auctions, both price rules were recently implemented in the
German pilot auctions for photo voltaic according to the German Federal Ministry
for Economic Affairs and Energy (2015) in order to test their suitability in that
context. Also, in France and the United Kingdom experience on uniform and pay-as
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bid auctions for renewable energy support were gained (Wigand et al., 2016; del
Ŕıo and Linares, 2014). Moreover, these two price rules also become subject of
controversial debate due to their ambiguous ranking regarding revenue (payment)
and efficiency, e.g., California electricity auctions (Kahn et al., 2001) or U.S. Treasury
auctions (Ausubel et al., 2014b).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides the
theoretical analysis of binding and non-binding auction with different price rules.
The experiment is presented in Section 3.3: the experimental design in 3.3.1, the
hypotheses in 3.3.2, and the results in 3.3.3. In Section 3.4 we discuss some extensions
of our model. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Analysis
3.2.1 Model for Auctions with Non-binding Awards
Consider a sealed-bid multi-unit procurement auction in which N ≥ 2 bidders com-
pete for the supply of K ≥ 1 indivisible units of a homogeneous good, K < N .
Bidder have single-unit supply and symmetric independent private costs : bidder i
can produce one unit of the good and has private production costs Xi, which is
independently and identically distributed on the interval [x, x] according to the in-
creasing distribution function F with density f . Let X(j:N) denoted the j-lowest
order statistic and F(j:N) and f(j:N) its distribution and density, j = 1, . . . , N . That
is, X(1:N) ≤ X(2:N) ≤ . . . ≤ X(K:N) ≤ . . . ≤ X(N :N).
In the non-binding awards setting, bidders have the option to withdraw awarded
bids. Since this option may generate an incentive to submit multiple bids even for
bidder with single-unit supply, we allow the bidders to submit up to T ≤ K bids,
each offering one unit of the good at a certain price. That is, a bidder submits a bid
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vector c = (c1, c2, . . . , cT ) with c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cT . We assume that the withdrawal
of awarded bids is costless.3
We further assume that the option of withdrawing awarded bids is accompanied by
an exhaustive reallocation procedure. If a bidder withdraws one of her awarded bids,
a reallocation round starts. The best (i.e., lowest) non-awarded bid moves up and is
awarded instead of the withdrawn bid and award prices are adjusted. If then again
a bidder withdraws one of her awarded bids, a new reallocation round starts, and so
on. The reallocation procedure is repeated until no bidder withdraws an awarded bid.
After the bidders submit their bid vectors, the K lowest submitted bid components
of all submitted bid vectors are initially awarded. If bidders submit multiple bids, it
is possible that more than one bid of a bidder is awarded. In this case, the bidder has
an incentive to withdraw her lower awarded bids. Since this is a weakly dominant
strategy, we assume that the bidders withdraw all but the highest awarded bids in
case of multiple awards in each reallocation round.
In each reallocation round, bidders have individual successor foresight : a bidder
knows if one of her bid components is the best non-awarded bid and would move up
in case of reallocation. In this case, if the bidder is already awarded with a bid, she
will withdraw this because she knows that then her higher bid will move up and will
become an awarded bid.
In those non-binding auctions, bidders compete against the first, i.e., the lowest
components c1 of each opponent’s bid vector c. Since c1 will play a crucial role in
our analysis we will refer to it as the leading bid. A bidder is only successful, i.e., is
awarded, if her leading bid outbids the K lowest leading bids of the other bidders.
Lemma 1. In a non-binding auction with individual successor foresight with N bid-
ders, a bidder is awarded if and only if her leading bid is lower than the K-th lowest
leading bid of the other N − 1 bidders.
3We discuss a relaxation of this assumption in Section 3.4 and consider the case that withdrawing
an awarded bid is not costless.
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For the proof see A.1. As a consequence, the additional bids c2, c3, . . . , cT may only
impact the award price but never the award. Considering a representative bidder, we
denote the distribution and density function of the submitted K-th lowest leading
bid of her N − 1 opponents by GK and gK .
3.2.2 Pay-as-bid Pricing (PAB)
In auctions with PAB, the award prices are determined by the respective awarded
bids.
Binding Awards under PAB
Each bidder submits one bid and is awarded if her bid is lower than the K-th lowest
bid of the opponents. The expected profit of a bidder with costs x is E[π(x, b)] =
(b − x)(1 − HPABK (b)), where HPABK and hPABK denote the distribution and density
function of the bidder’s beliefs about her opponents’ K-th lowest bid. The first-order
condition of the maximization of E[π(x, b)] with respect to b leads to the implicit






That is, bidders have an incentive to exaggerate their costs. Analogously to sales








Each bidder bids the expected K-th lowest signal of the other bidders conditional on
having a lower signal. The auction outcome is efficient and the expected average price
per good is E[X(K+1:N)] and the auctioneer’s expected payment is KE[X(K+1:N)].
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Non-binding Awards under PAB
In a PAB auction with non-binding awards, a bidder has an incentive to submit
multiple bids because there exists a positive probability for an additional bid to be
awarded – initially or by moving up after reallocation. In these cases, the withdrawal
of all but the highest winning (or succeeding) bid will increase a bidder’s profit. Thus,
the submission of additional bids weakly increases a bidder’s profit.
Proposition 1. The optimal bid vector cPAB = (cPAB1 , . . . , c
PAB
T ) of a bidder with
signal x ∈ [x, x] in the non-binding PAB auction satisfies the following conditions.
(1) x < cPAB1 < c
PAB

































t = T ,
where GPABK and g
PAB
K denote the distribution and density function of the bid-
der’s beliefs about the K-th lowest leading bid of the bidder’s N − 1 opponents.
The proof is presented in Appendix A.1. A bidder’s optimal leading bid cPAB1
is higher than her costs x. Every additional bid cPABt , t ∈ 2, 3, . . . , T exceeds the
preceding bid cPABt−1 , where the markups depend on the distribution G
PAB
K . Note that
(3.1) corresponds to cPAB1 for T = 1.
The following proposition states that equilibria in monotone bidding strategies
exist, i.e., bidders with lower costs submit lower bids than bidders with higher costs.
Proposition 2. In the non-binding PAB auction, there exists a symmetric bidding
equilibrium in pure strategies γPAB = (γPAB1 , γ
PAB
2 , . . . , γ
PAB
T ) : [x, x) → RT , where
x < γPAB1 (x) < γ
PAB
2 (x) < . . . < γ
PAB
T and each component γ
PAB
t with t = 1, . . . , T
is increasing in x.
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The proof is presented in Appendix A.1. Because of the monotonicity of γPAB1 ,
the outcome of the non-binding PAB auction is efficient and the same as of its binding
counterpart.
Proposition 3. In the symmetric equilibrium generated by γPAB of the non-binding
PAB auction the following holds.
(1) The auction outcome is efficient.
(2) The bidders’ winning probabilities and expected profits and the auctioneer’s ex-
pected average payment per good (equal to E[X(K+1:N)]) are the same as in the
binding PAB auction.
The proof is presented in Appendix A.1. Although both auctions result in the
same allocation, the actual award prices for the auctioned K units may differ. In
the binding PAB auction the award prices are determined by the K lowest bids,
while in the non-binding auction award prices may also be determined by additional
(i.e., non-leading) bids. Moreover, although bidders’ winning probability and their
expected profit do not differ between the two auctions, the awarded bidders’ actual
profits may be different. If a bidder only wins with her leading bid in the non-binding
auction, her actual profit is lower than her profit in the binding auction. If a bidder
also wins by withdrawing bids, her actual profit may be higher than in the binding
auction. Thus, the non-binding PAB auction offers an optimization of bid-shading
by diversifying bids.
Corollary 1. Let βPAB : [x, x] → R be the equilibrium bidding strategy in a binding
PAB auction and γPAB = (γPAB1 , γ
PAB
2 , . . . , γ
PAB
T ) : [x, x] → RT be the equilibrium
bidding strategies in a non-binding PAB auction with exhaustive reallocation proce-
dure. Then the non-binding bid components spread around the corresponding binding
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bid, i.e.,
γPAB1 (x) < β
PAB(x) < γPABT (x) for all x ∈ [x, x] and T ≥ 2.
The proof is presented in Appendix A.1. In the binding PAB auction, a bidder has
only “one shot” βPAB(x) to balance the trade-off between the winning probability and
her profit in case of winning. The non-binding auction allows multiple shots, which
incentivizes bidders to diversify their K bids. That is, γPAB1 (x) < β
PAB(x) increases
the winning probability compared to βPAB(x) but lowers the profit in case of winning,
while γPABK (x) > β
PAB(x) generates a higher profit in case of winning, while reducing
the chance of winning.
If the bidders are allowed to submit as many bids as they want, they will submit
a continuous bidding function from x to any maximum bid. Then, the award price
equals the market clearing price given by the K + 1-lowest costs x(K+1:N).
Example 1: The symmetric equilibrium in the binding PAB auction (3.2) of our












We compute the two bidding functions γPAB1 (x) and γ
PAB
2 (x) of the symmetric equi-
librium in the non-binding PAB auction in the experiment with T = 2 numeri-
cally via the corresponding differential equation system (see A.4). Figure 3.1 shows
that γPAB1 (x) is below β
PAB(x), γPAB2 (x) is above β
PAB(x), both functions con-
verge towards βPAB(x) if x increases, and the three functions meet in x̄ = 199 with
γPAB1 (x̄) = γ
PAB
2 (x̄) = β
PAB(x̄) = x̄.
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Figure 3.1: Symmetric equilibrium bidding functions in the binding and the non-
binding PAB auction.
3.2.3 Uniform Pricing (UP)
We consider two variants of uniform pricing in procurement auctions: lowest rejected
bid (UP-LRB) and highest accepted bid (UP-HAB). While UP-LRB is incentive com-
patible, UP-HAB induces bidders to exaggerate their costs. However, both versions
lead to an efficient outcome and the same expected auction prices (e.g. Engelbrecht-
Wiggans, 1988).
Binding awards under UP-LRB
Under UP-LRB, bidders have the (weakly) dominant strategy to reveal their costs:
bLRB(x) = x. Thus, the unique symmetric equilibrium is given by βLRB(x) = x (e.g.
Smith et al., 1985). The auction outcome is efficient and expected average price per
good and the auctioneer’s expected payment are E[X(K+1:N)] and KE[X(K+1:N)].
Non-binding Awards under UP-LRB
In auctions with non-binding awards and UP-LRB, it is (weakly) dominant for a
bidder to reveal her costs in the leading bid (i.e., first bid component), as with binding
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awards: cLRB1 (x) = x. Additional bids are irrelevant for a bidder because they neither
increase her winning probability nor the award price. If an additional bid determines
the award price, the bidder will withdraw her awarded bid, which leads to same results
without submitting additional bids. Thus, additional bids can be set arbitrarily or
simply skipped.
Proposition 4. In an auction with non-binding awards and UP-LRB there exists a
class of equilibria with dominant leading bids γLRB1 (x) = x and arbitrary additional
bids.
The outcome of these equilibria is efficient as in the uniform price auction with
binding awards and UP-LRB. This equivalence also holds for the bidders’ winning
probabilities and their expected profits and the award price.
Binding awards under UP-HAB
In an auction with binding awards and UP-HAB, a bidder’s optimal bid has to fulfill









K denote the distribution and density function of the bidder’s be-
liefs about her opponents’ K-th lowest bid. Bidders exaggerate their costs with their
bid, i.e., bHAB(x) > x, which depends on the probability of being price-determining
HHABK−1 (b
HAB(x))−HHABK (bHAB(x)), i.e., bHAB(x) lies between the (K−1)th and K-th
lowest opponents’ bid (Hao, 1999). The symmetric equilibrium strategy of the UP-
HAB auction with K goods and N bidders is the same as in the first price auction
(i.e., PAB auction with one good) with N −K + 1 bidders.
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Proposition 5. The unique symmetric equilibrium in monotone bidding strategy of







The proof is presented in Appendix A.1. As a consequence, the auction outcome
is efficient and revenue equivalence applies, i.e., the auctioneer expected payment per
good is the same as under UP-LRB and PAB and, thus, equal to E[X(K+1:N)]. Because
under UP-HAB the highest accepted bid determines the uniform price, whereas under
PAB an awarded bid determines its award price, the UP-HAB equilibrium bids are
smaller than the PAB equilibrium bids and higher than the UP-LRB equilibrium bids:
βPAB(x) > βHAB(x) > βLRB(x) = x for x ∈ [x, x̄) ,
βPAB(x̄) = βHAB(x̄) = βLRB(x̄) = x̄ .
Example 2: The symmetric equilibrium in the binding UP-HAB auction (3.4) of
our experiment with K = 2, N = 3 and uniformly distributed costs on [100, 199] is
given by
βHAB(x) =






Non-binding awards under UP-HAB
Analogous to the non-binding PAB auction, a bidder has an incentive to submit as
many different bids as feasible, which all exaggerate her costs. For illustration, we
compare the case in which a bidder submits only one bid c1 with the case in which
the bidder also submits an additional bid c2 > c1. If c1 is not awarded, neither c2
is and the bidder’s profit is zero in both cases. If c1 is not awarded, either c2 is not
awarded or c2 is also awarded (or will be awarded if c1 is withdrawn). In the former
case, bidder’s profit is equal to the case of only submitting c1. If in the latter case
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the bidder withdraws c1, a higher bid (either an opponent’s bid or c2) moves up and
determines the award price, which thus increases. Since this argumentation also holds
for T > 2 bids, we can conclude that submitting additional bids is always worthwhile
for a bidder. This argumentation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6. If in the UP-HAB auction exists a symmetric equilibrium γHAB =
(γHAB1 , γ
HAB
2 , . . . , γ
HAB
T ) : [x, x]→ RT with γHAB1 (x) is increasing in x, the following
holds:
(1) x < γHAB1 (x) < γ
HAB
2 (x) < . . . < γ
HAB
T (x).
(2) The auction outcome is efficient.
(3) The bidders’ winning probabilities and expected profits and the auctioneer’s ex-
pected payment per good (equal to E[X(K+1:N)]) are the same as in the binding
UP-HAB auction.
(4) The non-binding bid components spread around the corresponding binding bid:
γHAB1 (x) < β
HAB(x) < γHABT (x) for all x ∈ [x, x] and T ≥ 2.
The proof is presented in Appendix A.1.
3.2.4 Summary of Theoretical Results
Also with the option to withdraw awarded bids in the non-binding auctions, the
revenue equivalence theorem (RET) applies to the non-binding and binding auctions
with PAB, UP-LRB, and UP-HAB. In the symmetric equilibrium of the binding and
non-binding auctions, the outcome is efficient, the bidders’ winning probability and
their expect profit are equal, as well as the auctioneer expected (average) payment
per good, which is equal to E[X(K+1:N)].
However, their are differences with regard to the bidding behavior. Under UP-
LRB, the option to withdraw awards has no effect: bidders have no incentives to
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submit additional bids in the non-binding auction, and both the binding and the
non-binding auction are incentive compatible, i.e., to reveal the costs in the bid is a
weakly dominant strategy. Non-binding awards affect bidding in the non-incentive
compatible PAB and UP-HAB auctions, where the bidders submit as many bids
as feasible, which spread around the corresponding binding bid, although revenue
equivalence holds. This is the motivation and starting point for our experiment, in
which we compare binding and non-binding auctions with PAB and UP-HAB.
3.3 Experimental Analysis
This section presents the experimental procedures, treatments, hypotheses and re-
sults.
3.3.1 Experimental Design
Our experiment is based on a procurement auction, in which the auctioneer demands
two units of a homogeneous good. These can be produced by three subjects each with
single-unit supply. Hence, the bids of two of three competing subjects are awarded.
We implement two treatment variables Award and Pricing, each with two categories.
(Award : binding awards and non-binding awards, Pricing : PAB and UP-HAB.) This
results in four treatments: Binding PAB, non-binding PAB, binding UP-HAB and
non-binding UP-HAB.
The binding treatments correspond to the standard auction mechanisms, i.e. each
subject submits one bid and the two subjects with the lowest bids are awarded. In the
non-binding treatments, subjects are allowed to submit up to two alternative bids for
their supply of the single good, only one of which could finally be awarded. If in any
initial allocation a subject profited from withdrawing her lower bid, an automated
reallocation procedure would withdraw the lower bid and would replace it with the
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subject’s higher bid.4 Thus, still, the two subjects with the lowest bids are awarded,
but their award prices not only depend on their lowest bids, but also on their higher
bid.5
In the experiment, in each of the four treatments, the described procurement
auction with three bidders is repeatedly played ten times (periods) under the respec-
tive treatment conditions within a matching group of six subjects (stranger setting).
Each subject and, thus, each matching group participates only under one price rule,
either under PAB pricing or UP-HAB, but under both award variations – binding
awards and non-binding awards. That is, each matching group participates in two
treatments, where it plays the repeated auction of both treatments twice. Binding
and non-binding treatments alternated every 10 periods, e.g. periods 1-10 and 21-30
binding, periods 11-20 and 31-40 non-binding.6
In each of the 40 periods, each subject independently draws her private production
costs and competes for the sale of one unit of a homogeneous good against two other
subjects of their matching groups. In each period, every auction group of three bidders
is randomly drawn out of a matching group of six subjects which remains constant
over the 40 periods. For comparability, the private costs of all rounds were drawn from
a uniform distribution over the set of integers {100, 101, . . . , 199} in advance. Each
subject receives any particular costs signal only once, but the costs constellations, i.e.,
triples of production costs of the three bidders in one particular auction, are the same
for each treatment and each matching group. We controlled for order effects within
4Withdrawing an awarded bid is only profitable if the second bid moves up and will be awarded
instead.
5A similar experiment was conducted by Smith (1967), who also allows to bid for one or two
of the auctioned units, however, bids are binding and each subject has resale opportunities for up
to two units. Also, Smith, Cox, and Walker (1985) and Alsemgeest, Noussair, and Olson (1998))
conduct experiments with binding auctions, where all subjects are either interested in one unit or
in two units predefined for each auction round.
6We controlled for order effects by permuting Binding (B) and Non-binding (N) awards within
each treatment, i.e., BNBN, BNNB, NBBN, NBNB.
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matching groups by using permutations of these pre-drawn costs constellations over
the 40 periods.
In order to control for learning effects (e.g. Coppinger, Smith, and Titus (1980),
Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989), Harstad (2000)), we implement Experience as a third
treatment variable and classify subjects in periods 1-20 as inexperienced and in periods




Binding Non-binding Binding Non-binding
# feasible bids per subject & period 1 2 1 2
# sessions 8 8
# subjects 96 96
# matching groups 16 16
# periods 40 40
with inexperienced subjects 20 20
with experienced subjects 20 20
Table 3.1: Experimental procedure overview: treatments, feasible bids, numbers of
sessions, subjects, matching groups, and periods (periods with inexperienced and
experienced subjects).
In the experiment we used the artificial currency unit ExCU with a conversion
rate of 20 ExCU for 1 Euro. We set the minimum bid price at 50 ExCU and the
maximum bid price at 250 ExCU. Before the experiment, the instructions were read
aloud and subjects answered a set of multiple-choice comprehension questions. At the
end of every session, subjects received their profits from 16 randomly drawn periods
in cash. The sessions lasted about 75 minutes and the average total payment was
24.27 Euro per subject (minimum payment: 15.05 Euro, maximum payment: 35.55
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Euro).78 Any kind of communication during the experiment was not allowed. The
experiment was conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
3.3.2 Hypotheses
The hypotheses for our experimental analysis are derived from the theoretical results
in Section 3.2. Our first hypothesis follows from Proposition 1 and 6 and Corollary
1.
Hypothesis 1. In the non-binding PAB and UP-HAB auctions,
(1) bidders submit two different bids,
(2) bidders spread their bids around the bid in the corresponding binding auction.
Our second hypothesis follows from the RET stated in Proposition 3 and 6.
Hypothesis 2. In the four auctions (binding/non-binding PAB/UP-HAB),
(1) the (average) auction prices per good are equal,
(2) bidders’ profits are equal,
(3) the allocation is efficient.
3.3.3 Experimental Results
In this section we present and analyze the experimental results. When applying a
statistical test, the level of significance is labeled with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ for 5%, 1%, and
0,1%.
In line with Hypothesis 1 (1), in the non-binding auctions, subjects make con-
sistently use of the option to submit two bids: 95.3% under PAB and 94.5% under
7Incl. 5 Euro show-up fee.
8In order to control for risk-aversion, subjects also participated in a pen-and-pencil Holt and
Laury (2002) lottery-choice task after the experiment but before payment.
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UP-HAB. Inexperienced subjects use this option in 95.0% and experienced subjects
in 94.8%.
Result 1. The option of two different bids in the non-binding auctions is used almost
always. Under both PAB and UP-HAB, inexperienced and experienced subjects submit
two different bids in the non-binding treatments in about 95% of all cases.
In line with Hypothesis 1 (2), we observe in the non-binding auctions that, on
average, subjects’ lower bid is lower and their higher bid is higher than their corre-
sponding bid in the binding auctions. This holds for every single induced value (see
Figure 3.2). The degree of diversification is higher for subjects with low costs.9
Result 2. In in the non-binding auctions with both PAB and UP-HAB, the subjects
spread their bids around their corresponding bids in the binding treatments.
The average auction prices in the four treatments are very homogeneous and
range from 163.9 to 165.4 ExCU with small standard deviations of 1.9 to 3.3 ExCU
(Table 3.2).10
The subjects’ profits are more heterogeneous with higher profits in the UP-HAB
treatments than in the PAB treatments (see Table 3.3).
PAB UP-HAB
Binding Non-binding Binding Non-binding
Mean 163.9 164.3 165.4 164.7
Median 162.8 163.7 165.0 164.8
Std. dev. 3.3 1.9 1.9 2.7
Table 3.2: Average auction prices [ExCU].
With respect to efficiency, we consider two commonly used measures. First, the
efficiency rate, which is defined as the welfare surplus generated by the auction divided
9The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients are -0.889 for PAB and -0.837 for UP-HAB and
the corresponding rank correlation tests yield p-values < 0.001∗∗∗.
10Details for auction prices on matching group level can be found in Table A.1.
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(a) Binding and non-binding bids (PAB)
(b) Binding and non-binding bids (UP-HAB)
Figure 3.2: Bid diversification: average bids in the binding and non-binding auctions.
PAB UP-HAB
Binding Non-binding Binding Non-binding
Mean 16.03 16.74 17.32 17.12
Median 15.53 16.52 17.38 17.44
Std. dev. 1.73 1.19 1.15 1.91
Table 3.3: Average bidders’ profit [ExCU].
by the maximum achievable welfare surplus.11 Second, the strict efficiency, which for
11Here, we (conservatively) assume that the auctioneer is able to produce both units of the good
at the bidders’ maximum cost, i.e., 199 ExCU.
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any auction is either 1 if the auction outcome is efficient or 0 if not. That is, an
auction is efficient in the strict sense, if and only if the two subjects with the lowest
costs are awarded. The efficiency rate, on the other hand, also equals 1 if the auction
outcome is efficient, but is positive for non-efficient allocations, and, thus, it also
indicates the welfare loss. Table 3.4 reveals that all four treatments generate high
efficiency rates of at least 97.5%.12
PAB UP-HAB
Binding Non-binding Binding Non-binding
Mean 97.5% 98.6% 97.9% 98.8%
Median 97.9% 98.7% 98.0% 99.0%
Std. dev. 1.4% 0.5% 1.1% 0.8%
Table 3.4: Average efficiency rates.
PAB UP-HAB
Binding Non-binding Binding Non-binding
Mean 76.3% 82.5% 79.8% 85.8%
Median 77.5% 82.5% 80.0% 83.8%
Std. dev. 7.2% 5.8% 6.2% 5.8%
Table 3.5: Average strict efficiency rates.
We get a similar picture for the strict efficiency (see Table 3.5). The share of
efficient allocations ranges between 76.3% in the binding PAB treatment to 85.8%
in the non-binding uniform treatment. However, the non-binding treatments show
higher values and a lower variation for both efficiency measures.
For testing the Hypothesis 2, we first conduct a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) in order to test whether the treatment variables Award and Pricing
have an effect on the auction prices, bidders’ profit, and efficiency.13 As a control
12Details of auction prices on matching group level can be found in Table A.2.
13In the following statistical analysis we use the strict efficiency as the efficiency measure. All
stated results, however, also hold if the strict efficiency is replaced by the efficiency rate.
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variable we also include the subjects’ dichotomous experience. As Table 3.6 shows,
all treatment variables, Award, Pricing and Experience, have a significant effect on
the dependent variables auction prices, bidders’ profits and efficiency. However, we
observe no interaction effects.
Variable Pillai approx. F p-value
Award 0.131 4.416 0.002∗∗
Pricing 0.118 3.919 0.005∗∗
Experience 0.085 2.721 0.033∗
Award:Pricing 0.055 1.724 0.149
Award:Experience 0.020 0.607 0.658
Pricing:Experience 0.048 1.473 0.215
Award:Pricing:Experience 0.014 0.426 0.790
Table 3.6: Multivariate analysis of variance. Fit: (Efficiency, Prices, Bidders’ Profits)
∼ Award + Pricing + Experience + Award:Pricing + Award:Experience + Pric-
ing:Experience + Award:Pricing:Experience. Number of observations n = 128, de-
grees of freedom df = 117.
We disentangle the effects found by the MANOVA by conducting a separate
ANOVA for each dependent variable. The results of the three analyses are presented
in Table 3.7.
None of the treatment variables show a significant effect on the auction prices,
which supports Hypothesis 2 (1).
Result 3. The auction prices in the four auctions are homogeneous and we observe
no differences.
However, we observe differences in the profits of the bidders with respect to the
price rule, which contradicts Hypothesis 2 (2).
Result 4. Bidders’ profits are higher under UP-HAB than under PAB.
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Auction Prices Bidders’ Profits Efficiency
Variable Diff F p-value Diff F p-value Diff F p-value
Aw (NB-B) -0.191 0.126 0.720 0.251 0.575 0.450 1.219 15.838 0.000∗∗∗
Pr (UP-PAB) 0.987 3.444 0.067 0.837 6.383 0.013∗ 0.688 5.040 0.026∗
Exp (E-I) -0.419 0.602 0.435 -0.638 3.711 0.056 0.625 4.165 0.043∗
Aw:Pr 0.933 0.336 1.869 0.174 0.010 0.919
Aw:Exp 0.144 0.705 0.004 0.951 1.760 0.187
Pr:Exp 0.133 0.716 0.149 0.700 1.499 0.223
Aw:Pr:Exp 0.471 0.494 0.416 0.520 0.260 0.611
Table 3.7: Analysis of variance. Fit: Prices/Bidders’ Profits/Efficiency ∼ Award +
Pricing + Experience + Award:Pricing + Award:Experience + Pricing:Experience +
Award:Pricing:Experience.
This result can be attributed to the effect of the price rule on efficiency, which
we now consider. The last column of Table 3.7 indicates that all three treatment
variables have a significant effect on efficiency, which contradicts Hypothesis 2 (3).
First, we observe significantly more efficient auction allocations in the non-binding
treatments. This suggests that the option to diversify bids in the non-binding auctions
facilitates the calculation of optimal bid-shading, whereas the binding mechanism
allows only one bid. The underlying intuition for the superiority of non-binding
mechanisms is based on the diversification of bids: a bidder’s lowest bid is nearer
to her true costs than her bid in the corresponding binding auction. This leads to
a more accurate mapping (regarding the monotonicity) of individual costs onto bids
and, thus, better efficiency performance.
Second, UP-HAB leads to more efficient allocations than PAB.14 The intuition
is that a varying absolute value of bid shading in PAB auctions (due to e.g. risk
14This is in line with recent empirical studies and often referred to as one of the main advantages
of a UP-HAB, see e.g. Vickrey (1961). Smith, Cox, and Walker (1985) observe that UP-HAB is
more efficient than PAB in case of experienced subjects. For single-unit auctions the result holds
independent from subjects’ experience, see e.g. Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982) and Coppinger,
Smith, and Titus (1980).
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aversion) may lead to inefficiencies. Since auction prices remain constant, subjects
benefit from participating under UP-HAB with a higher efficiency (Result 4).
Third, we conclude that auctions with experienced subjects tend to generate more
efficient outcomes, since the variance in bids of inexperienced subjects is higher due
to their only sketchy understanding of the mechanism.15
Result 5. The efficiency rate is higher
• in the non-binding auction than in the binding auctions,
• under UP-HAB than under PAB,
• for experienced subjects than for inexperienced subjects.
Since the control variable experience is significant in the MANOVA, we further
separate the data with respect to the subjects’ experience and conduct two more
analyses of variance (Table 3.8 and Table 3.9). For inexperienced subjects, the only
significant effect is that of Award on efficiency: non-binding awards lead to signifi-
cantly more efficient allocations than binding awards. For experienced subjects, both
Pricing and Award have a significant effect on efficiency: UP-HAB and non-binding
awards significantly increase the degree of efficiency.
3.3.4 Comparison of the Experimental and Theoretical Re-
sults
In this section, we compare the experimental observations with the corresponding
theoretical results in Section 3.2. We conduct sign tests (two-tailed binomial tests)
15Similar results are presented by Cox, Smith, and Walker (1984), where subjects learned through
repetition to adapt their bids towards the optimal bidding strategy in PAB auctions. Also, Cop-
pinger, Smith, and Titus (1980) finds that learning results in more dominant strategy bids in second-
price auctions. In contrast, Harstad (2000) states that even experienced subjects tend to overbid in
second-price auctions. However, if subjects have bid in a dynamic English auction before, significant
learning effects can be observed in form of bidding closer to the dominant strategy. Nevertheless,
Smith, Cox, and Walker (1985) observe that submitted bids deviate stronger from optimal bidding
in case of increasing experience in PAB and uniform price auctions, see also Smith (1967) and Miller
and Plott (1985).
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Prices Bidder’s Profits Efficiency
Variable Diff F p-value Diff F p-value Diff F p-value
Aw (NB-B) -0.396 0.240 0.626 0.231 0.217 0.643 1.625 11.880 0.001∗∗
Pr (UP-PAB) 1.184 2.143 0.148 0.709 2.047 0.158 0.313 0.439 0.510
Aw:Pr 1.215 0.275 1.809 0.184 0.070 0.791
Table 3.8: Analysis of variance for inexperienced subjects. Fit: Prices/Bidders’ Prof-
its/Efficiency ∼ Award + Pricing + Award:Pricing.
Prices Bidder’s Profits Efficiency
Variable Diff F p-value Diff F p-value Diff F p-value
Aw (NB-B) 0.013 0.000 0.985 0.272 0.382 0.539 0.813 4.319 0.042∗
Pr (UP-PAB) 0.789 1.221 0.273 0.965 4.816 0.032∗ 1.063 7.385 0.009∗∗
Aw:Pr 0.045 0.834 2.96 0.589 0.023 0.633
Table 3.9: Analysis of variance for experienced subjects. Fit: Prices/Bidders’ Prof-
its/Efficiency ∼ Award + Pricing + Award:Pricing.
with the null hypothesis that lower and higher observations than in the correspond-
ing symmetric equilibrium are equally likely. The p-values are computed by the
Z-statistics.
Each auction (Binding PAB, Non-Binding PAB, Binding UP-HAB, Non-Binding
UP-HAB) is played in 16 blocks of ten rounds. Although we do not observe differences
in the average auction prices between the four auctions (Result 3), the average price
in each of the 16 blocks of each auction (Table A.1) is smaller than the expected
(average) equilibrium price of 174.25 (determined by the expected value of the third
order statistics).16
Result 6. The (average) auction prices in each of the four auctions are smaller than
the corresponding (average) equilibrium price.
16Sign test for each treatment on the difference between the (average) equilibrium price and
average auction price: 16 observations with no negative differences and 16 positive differences, p-
value < 0.001∗∗∗.
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The deviations of the observed bids from the equilibrium bids in the binding PAB
and UP-HAB auctions (see Table 3.10) are in line with Result 6: subjects submit
lower bids (i.e., they bid less aggressive) than theory predicted. However, Figure 3.3
reveals for both binding auctions PAB and UP-HAB that this does not apply for
subjects with high costs, who on average submit higher bids than in the equilibrium.
Binding PAB UP-HAB
# Equilibrium 113 98
# Overbid 236 228
# Underbid 1571 1594
Z-statistics 28.562 31.979
p-value <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗
Table 3.10: Binding auctions: number of bids equal, higher or lower than the corre-
sponding equilibrium bid.
Result 7. In the binding auctions with both PAB and UP-HAB, the subjects submit
lower bids than in the symmetric equilibrium, except for high costs.
The same applies to the non-binding PAB auctions (see Table 3.11 and Figure
3.4). For both the first and the second bid, the subjects submit lower values than
theory predicts in the equilibrium, except for subjects with high costs.
Non-binding PAB Bid 1 Bid 2
# Equilibrium 211 39
# Overbid 435 201
# Underbid 1274 670
z-statistics 20.270 15.858
p-value <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗
Table 3.11: Non-Binding PAB auctions: number of bids equal, higher or lower than
the corresponding equilibrium bids.
Result 8. In the non-binding PAB auctions, the subjects submit lower bids than in




Figure 3.3: Binding auctions: average bids and corresponding equilibrium bids.
Figure 3.2 (b) together with Result 6 allow us to conclude that this also applies
to the non-binding UP-HAB auction in the case that a symmetric equilibrium exists.
Our observation of less aggressive bidding behavior is in line with Harrison (1989),
who also observes less aggressive bids in experimental binding PAB sales auctions.
He argues that here risk aversion plays a crucial role. Subjects with high costs do not
show this behavior in our experiment. They bid more aggressively and even submit
higher bids than in the equilibrium. A plausible explanation for this phenomenon is
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Figure 3.4: Non-binding PAB auctions: average first bids and second bids and corre-
sponding equilibrium bids.
that the subjects add a minimum mark-up on their costs to ensure a minimum profit
in case of winning, and this mark-up exceeds the equilibrium mark-up for high costs
since this becomes very small (see Figure 3.3 and 3.4).
3.4 Extensions
Our model can be extended for further research. For a generalized and increasing
number of bidders, we expect the results for PAB and UP-HAB to converge towards
those for UP-LRB because costs exaggeration might converge to zero as competition
increases. Next, the impact of positive costs of withdrawal z > 0 might be worthwhile
to investigate. We anticipate that rational bidders only reject their award in case the
difference between their actual award price and the award price after withdrawing
exceeds the withdrawal costs z. As a consequence, increasing withdrawal costs inhibit
withdrawals. Further analyses with multi-unit supply might be complex but also have
far-reaching implications for real-world applications. Last but not least, penalties
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should be added to these analyses as they might become crucial for governments to
ensure expansion goals.
3.5 Conclusion
We find both theoretical and experimental evidence that non-binding awards per se
are not determinant for an auction to fail. Particularly, in case of a reallocation
procedure, non-binding awards seem to have no unfavorable impact on the outcome
of multi-unit auctions with single-unit supply, neither under PAB nor under UP.
As a main result, our theoretical analysis reveals that non-binding awards with
exhaustive reallocation offer the bidders the chance to optimize their multiple bids
for one good in the non-incentive compatible auctions with PAB and UP-HAB. First,
it is a (weakly) dominant strategy to submit as many bids as feasible. In the ex-
periment the subjects seize the opportunity to submit an additional bid in almost
all cases. Second, according to our theoretical results, in a non-binding auction bid-
ders spread their multiple bids around the corresponding bid of the binding auction,
which we also observe in the experiment. By submitting lower and higher bids, bid-
ders optimize the trade-off between increasing their winning probability (by a lower
bid) and their individual profit in case of award (by a higher bid). However, we ob-
serve systematically lower bids in the binding and non-binding auctions than in the
symmetric equilibria with risk-neutral bidders, except for bids for high costs with a
low probability of winning. A plausible explanation is that subjects rather behave
risk averse, but add a minimum mark-up on their costs in order to ensure a minimum
profit in case of winning. Summarizing, the theory and the experiment yield the same
form of bid diversification, but with systematically lower bids in the experiment. In
theory, revenue equivalence holds among the considered auctions, which also applies
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to the experiment, however with a significant lower price level, which follows from
the observation of experimental bids below the equilibrium.
We also observe deviations from the theory for bidder’s profits and efficiency.
While theory predicts equal profits in the PAB and UP-HAB auctions, we observe
higher profits for experienced subjects in the UP-HAB auctions. This might be due
to windfall profits under UP-HAB which arise in case the price determining bidder
submits a very low bid in relation to the awarded ones. Finally, we observe in our
experiment that non-binding awards increase efficiency. The reason is that lower bids
in the bid diversification come closer to the bidder’s costs signals and hence offer a
more accurate mapping from costs onto bids, which increases the chances of efficient
allocations. Further, the efficiency rate is higher under UP-HAB than under PAB
and increased by experience. An intuitive explanation is that, first, UP-HAB bids
are lower than PAB bids and hence closer to the bidders’ costs, which again encourages
efficient allocations, and, second, experience reduces irrational bidding and thereby
leads to higher efficiency rates. We conclude that non-binding awards in combination




Discrimination in Auctions for
Renewable Energy Support –
Three Theoretically Equivalent but
Practically Different Concepts
The design of auctions for renewable energy support becomes more complex by the
integration of different types of bidder with asymmetric cost structures, e.g., multi-
technology auctions or cross-border auctions with bidders from different countries. In
order to privilege specific bidder groups and to control the allocation, discriminatory
elements are often included into the auction design. We analyze the three most
applied discriminatory instruments: a minimum quota or a bonus for a bidder class
to be privileged or different maximum prices for different bidder classes. Typically,
these instruments discriminate stronger bidders (with lower costs) in favor of weaker
bidders (with higher costs). We show that all three instruments can reduce the
support costs compared to free competition. Moreover, we prove that the three
instruments are theoretically equivalent: every auction outcome that can be reached
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by one instrument can also be reached by the others including the outcome with
minimal support costs. However, there are crucial differences concerning the practical
application, particularly with respect to the robustness to misestimations of the cost
structures. We show that the combination of the instruments helps to avoid costly
errors.
4.1 Introduction
The European Commission proposes to conduct auctions that are open to multiple
RE technologies (European Commission, 2014). This requirement is based on the
assumption that multi-technology auctions increase efficiency and reduce support
costs even further.1 Multi-technology auctions have been implemented, e.g., in the
United Kingdom (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2017),
Spain (Ministerio de Energia, Turismo y Agenda Digital, 2017a), the Netherlands
(Minister van Economische Zaken, 2015) or Mexico (Centro Nacional de Control de
Energia, 2017). Denmark and Germany conducted auctions for large photo voltaic
installations that were open to bidders from both countries (Kitzing et al., 2016).
Further, Germany conducts technology-neutral auctions for solar and wind onshore
in a pilot phase from 2018 to 2020 (German Federal Parliament, 2017b).
The general differences between technology-neutral and technology-specific sup-
port is well discussed in the literature (Aghion et al., 2009; Azar and Sandén, 2011).
According to Jägemann et al. (2013) and Jägemann (2014), technology-neutral sup-
port may reduce the overall expenses and CO2 emissions of energy production. How-
ever, Gawel et al. (2017) and Lehmann and Söderholm (2017) state that the evaluation
of technology-neutral and specific support is more complex. These considerations play
a role when designing auctions for RES-E. With these auctions, national governments
1Concerns about windfall profits are sometimes cited as arguments against auctions with hetero-
geneous types of bidders, e.g., multi-technology auctions (Held et al., 2006).
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typically pursue different targets, particularly with respect to the type of costs that
are aimed to be minimized (del Ŕıo and Cerdá, 2014; Kreiss et al., 2017). There are
arguments to address only support costs or only generation costs or also to include
integration costs (Joskow, 2011; Ueckerdt et al., 2013).
Most commonly, the minimization of support costs is the stated primary goal and
main reason for RE auctions, e.g., in the United Kingdom (Department of Energy and
Climate Change, 2011), in Mexico (Centro Nacional de Control de Energia, 2017) and
in California (Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, 2010) it is explic-
itly stated that the auctions should minimize the costs of RE support. The definition
of auction goals in other countries and even the statement of the European Commis-
sion can be interpreted so that the support costs are (one of) the most important
target (European Commission, 2014; Ministerio de Energia, Turismo y Agenda Digi-
tal, 2017b). That is, the minimization of support costs attracts particular attentions
when designing auctions for RES-E.
Auctions for RES-E also include discriminatory design elements to privilege spe-
cific bidder groups and to control the allocation. The focus of this paper is to analyze
different discriminatory instruments and their effects on the auction outcome, par-
ticularly on support costs. The considered instruments are minimum or maximum
quotas, maximum prices (i.e., reservation prices), and boni or mali for different bidder
classes. All these instruments have been implemented in auctions for RES-E: differ-
ent maximum prices in the multi-technology auction in the Netherlands (Minister van
Economische Zaken, 2015), a bonus depending on the location in the German auction
for onshore wind (German Federal Parliament, 2016a) and quotas that depend on the
availability in the Californian auctions (Public Utilities Commission of the State of
California, 2010).
The implementation of discriminatory instruments is often not only intensified by
the minimization of the support costs but also by other criteria, e.g., grid and system
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integration, mixture of different RE technologies, regional distribution of RE, or actor
diversity (Kreiss et al., 2017). Also in the context of such criteria, it is important to
understand the effects of the discriminatory instruments on the auction outcome and
the support costs.
Discriminatory instruments have been theoretically analyzed in a general context
by, e.g., Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1989), Myerson (1981), Bulow and Roberts
(1989), and McAfee and McMillan (1989). This paper goes one step further with a
detailed analysis of the three discriminatory instruments for the actual application of
RE auctions.
We show that each instrument (quota, bonus, maximum price) can reduce the
support costs, and we derive conditions (w.r.t. support cost minimization) for each
instrument and prove that the instruments are theoretically equivalent: every auction
outcome (including support costs) that can be implemented by a specific parameter-
ization of one instrument can also be reached by the two other (correspondingly
parameterized) instruments.
However, with respect to the application in practice, there are crucial differences
between the instruments, which have to be taken into account when deciding on their
implementation. This particularly refers to the robustness of the desired effects of
discrimination and the risk and magnitude of undesired effects that may be caused by
a wrong calibration, e.g., due to misestimation of the absolute and relative strength
of the different bidder classes that are treated differently in the auction. This is also
of particular interest in the above mentioned cases with additional or other targets
than the minimization of support costs.
This paper transfers microeconomic theory to a dynamic environment of increasing
importance. It helps to understand the effects that different discriminatory instru-
ments have on bidding behavior and the auction outcome. Since auctions for RES-E
become increasingly relevant and more and more auctions are opened for several
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technologies or participants from different countries, the relevance of this topic also
increases.
In Section 4.2, we present our theoretic analysis of the discriminatory instruments
quota, maximum price, and bonus in auctions for RES-E. An illustrating example is
provided in Section 4.2.4. The results of our analyses are compared and discussed
regarding the practical implementation in Section 4.3. We summarize in Section 4.4.
4.2 Model
Consider a procurement auction for RES-E with a fixed demand D for a specific good
(e.g., capacity [MW] or energy [MWh per year]). The supply is given by single-project
bidders each offering the same volume that sum up to the total supply. The bidders
have independent and private project costs for producing an unit of the good. The
ascending order of private project costs is given by the marginal cost function MC(v)
with MC(0) > 0 and MC ′(v) = dMC(v)
dv
> 0 for all v ≥ 0. That is, if v is delivered
by the projects with the lowest costs, MC(v) are the highest marginal costs among
these projects. The lowest total costs C(v) for delivering v are given by the cumulated
marginal costs, C(v) =
∫ v
0
MC(z)dz. In the context of RE, MC(v) are the levelized
costs of electricity (LCOE) at v, i.e., the net present value of the total life cycle
costs per unit of generated electricity of the RE source which would be ranked in the
ascending order at v (Short et al., 1995). Hence, C(v) are the aggregated LCOE for
delivering v of all RE sources with LCOE lower than or equal to MC(v).
There are two disjoint classes of bidders (e.g., two different technologies): low-
cost bidders (L) and high-cost bidders (H). The two bidder classes L and H are
characterized by different marginal cost functions MCL and MCH with
MCL(v) < MCH(v) for all v ≥ 0. (4.1)
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That is, the marginal costs and total costs for delivering any volume v are lower for
the low-cost bidders than for the high-cost bidders. In the context of RE, this means
that the high-cost bidders need higher support for delivering a certain volume v than
the low-cost bidders. According to IRENA and CEM (2015), different RE sources
in different countries and different years have significantly different cost structures.
This means, costs to supply RE in a specific country and year are lower for one
technology than for another. However, the overall costs might be minimized utilizing
both technologies2.
In the auction, the uniform price rule is applied and the uniform price is deter-
mined by the lowest rejected bid.3 Bidders simultaneously submit their bids for the
monetary support for their projects. In this auction, a bidder’s optimal bidding strat-
egy (weakly dominant strategy) is to bid the support that exactly covers his costs
(Weber, 1983b). Therefore, the supply functions SL(p) and SH(p) of the low-cost and
high-cost bidders are given by
SL(p) = MC
−1
L (p) and SH(p) = MC
−1
H (p) (4.2)
and increase in the price p. From (4.1) follows
SL(p) > SH(p) for all p ≥MCL(0) . (4.3)
Thus, in free competition, the market clearing price p∗ is determined by
SL(p
∗) + SH(p
∗) = D , (4.4)
2Even though the marginal costs for every demand v are lower for one technology, there are
demands y and ỹ with ỹ > y so that the marginal costs for the lower cost technology for demand ỹ
are higher than for the higher cost technology and the lower demand y, i.e., MCH(y) < MCL(ỹ)
3Since the marginal cost functions and, thus, the supply functions are continuous, there is no
difference between the price rule of the lowest rejected bid and the price rule of the highest accepted
bid, which is more common in practice.
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where the supply of the low-cost bidders exceeds the supply of the high-cost bidders:
SL(p
∗) > SH(p
∗) ≥ 0. The auctioneer’s total costs amount to TC(p∗) = p∗D, i.e., the
overall costs of all support payments to the awarded RE projects.




p with S ′i(p) =
dSi(p)
dp
, i ∈ {L,H} . (4.5)
Additional to (4.1), we state the following assumptions.
Assumption 1.
(i) The elasticities of supply εL(p) and εH(p) are non-increasing in p.
(ii) SH(p
∗) > 0 and εL(p
∗) < εH(p
∗) at the market clearing price p∗ of free compe-
tition.
Assumption (i) is a standard economic assumption and also supported by the
RE literature (de Vries et al., 2007; Hoefnagels et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2016).
Assumption (ii) is more context sensitive: the high-cost bidders at least gain a small
share in a non-discriminatory auction.4 Since this share is smaller than that of the
low-cost bidders, it is reasonable to assume that the high-cost bidders’ price elasticity
of supply at p∗ is higher than that of the low-cost bidders.
In the following, we analyze three discriminatory instruments. First, a quota guar-
antees the high-cost bidders a certain minimum supply volume. Second, a maximum
(reservation) price for the low-cost bidders is set, which the low-cost bidders must
not exceed with their bids. Third, the high-cost bidders receive a bonus in form of
4In case that the bidder classes are distinguished by their technology, there are examples of
regions where one technology is much less costly than the other so that the high-cost bidders never
have a chance to be awarded in a non-discriminatory auction. This, for example applies to North
Dakota (Brown et al., 2016) or to Norway (Hoefnagels et al., 2011), where wind energy is much
less costly than PV. However, there are many examples where wind and solar are both awarded in
multi-technology auctions, e.g. Mexico (IRENA, 2017), or are awarded in separate auctions but at
similar price levels, e.g. in Germany (German Federal Network Agency, 2017a,b).
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an additional payment in case of award. All three forms of discrimination induce a
(supply) volume shift from the low-cost to the high-cost bidders (by always covering
the total auction volume D) involving a respective price change. Moreover, all three
forms of discrimination necessarily involve different prices pL and pH for the awarded
low-cost and the awarded high-cost bidders.
In our analyses, we consider the total support costs
TC(pL, pH) = pLSL(pL) + pHSH(pH) (4.6)
which depend on the prices pL and pH and the corresponding supply volumes SL(pL)
and SH(pH) with SL(pL) + SH(pH) = D.
4.2.1 Quota
Consider a minimum quota (minimum contingent) Q < D for the high-cost bidders.5
The quota guarantees that the high-cost bidder group will at least supply Q. Thus,
the low-cost bidders’ supply never exceeds D −Q. The quota only becomes effective
if Q > SH(p
∗), i.e., the high-cost bidders would not reach Q in free competition. If
the quota is effective, each bidder class gets its own uniform award price pL and pH ,
which are given by
pL = MCL(D −Q) and pH = MCH(Q) . (4.7)
The volume shift
q = max{Q− SH(p∗), 0} (4.8)
from the low-cost bidders to the high-cost bidders, induced by the quota Q, increases
the award price for the high-cost bidders and decreases the award price for the low-
5Analogously, we could consider a maximum quota for the low-cost bidders.
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cost bidders compared to free competition, pH < p
∗ < pL, if q > 0. The volume
shift q and the price difference both effect the support costs. First, we investigate
the effects by starting at q = 0, which corresponds to the situation of an ineffective
quota.
Lemma 2. Consider a procurement auction with uniform pricing, fixed demand D,
two bidder classes L and H and a minimum quota Q for the high-cost bidders H. The
support costs decrease when the quota becomes effective, i.e., q = max{Q−SH(p∗), 0}
becomes positive.
Lemma 2, whose proof is presented in Appendix B.1, states that the auctioneer can
reduce costs by limiting the low-cost bidders. Since the high-cost bidders’ elasticity
of supply exceeds that of the low-cost bidders at the free competition price p∗, the
relative price change (savings) induced by a volume reduction for the low-cost bidder
group is greater than the relative price change (costs increase) induced by a volume
shift to the high-cost bidders. That is, the cost increase caused by the higher prices
for the (few) high-cost bidders is smaller than the savings caused by the lower prices
for the (many) low-cost bidders. Therefore, the auctioneer can reduce the support
costs by implementing a quota that leads to q > 0.
Proposition 7. There exists an unique quota Q̂ > SH(p
∗) that minimizes the support
costs. The optimal quota Q̂ together with the award prices pL and pH are determined
by Q̂ = SH(pH), SL(pL) + SH(pH) = D and






The proof is presented in Appendix B.1. The price difference pH−pL > 0 caused by
the quota is also referred to in the literature. McAfee and McMillan (1989) show that
this applies to international auction where domestic and foreign companies compete.
Both results are based on the principle of monopolistic third degree price discrim-
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ination (Schmalensee, 1981; Varian, 1989). The monopolist discriminates different
classes to absorb their different spending power. In auctions for RES-E, the auction-
eer reduces the bidder rent by absorbing low-cost bidders’ profits at the expense of
an inefficient outcome. The total support decreases as long as the high-cost bidders’
elasticity of supply is larger than that of the low-cost bidders.
4.2.2 Maximum Price
The next discriminatory instrument is a reservation price R in form of a maximum
price for the low-cost bidders: low-cost bidders may not submit bids higher than R.
The maximum price does not have an effect on bidding behavior and, thus, incentive
compatibility holds: the bidders of both classes bid their true costs, except for the
low-cost bidders with higher individual costs than R, who do not participate.
The maximum price is effective if R < p∗, i.e., the maximum price is lower than
the uniform award price in free competition. Then, by (4.2) and (4.4), the low-cost-
bidders receive a smaller volume SL(R) < SL(p
∗) and a lower price R < p∗ than in
free competition, while by the high-cost bidders receive a higher volume and a higher
price pH > p
∗. The maximum price induces a volume shift from the low-cost bidders
to the high-cost bidders and a higher price for the high-cost bidders than for the
low-cost bidders. These effects are equivalent to the effects of a volume shift (4.8)
induced by a quota Q > SH(p
∗), as derived in Section 4.2.1.
Corollary 2. Consider a procurement auction with uniform pricing, fixed demand
D, two bidder classes L and H and a maximum price R for the low-cost bidders L.
(i) The support costs decrease when the maximum price R becomes effective, i.e.,
R− p∗ becomes negative.
(ii) There exists an unique maximum price R̂ > 0 that minimizes the support costs.
The optimal maximum price R̂ together with the award price pH for the high-cost
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bidders is determined by SL(R̂) + SH(pH) = D and







First, we consider a bonus in form of an additional monetary payment to the awarded
high-cost bidders.6 Let B > 0 denote the bonus that is added to the award price p
for the awarded high-cost bidders.
Incentive compatibility holds in the sense that the low-cost bidders bid their true
costs and the high-cost bidders reduce their bid by exactly the bonus B (Thiel, 1988).
Thus, all bidders receive their costs if the award price equals their bid. However, the
awarded low-cost bidders receive pL = p, while the awarded high-cost bidders receive
pH = p+ b = pL + b.
The higher price pH for the high-cost bidders leads to a corresponding supply
increase for these bidders described by (4.2). Together with the analysis in Section
4.2.1, this directly implies the following. First, implementing a bonus B > 0 for the
high-cost bidders is equivalent to a volume shift (4.8) from the low-cost bidders to
the high-cost bidders that is induced by a quota Q > SH(p
∗). Second, the bonus that
fulfills the condition in Proposition 7, minimizes the support costs. We can state the
following result.
Corollary 3. Consider a procurement auction with uniform pricing, fixed demand
D, two bidder classes L and H and a bonus B for the high-cost bidders H.
(i) The support costs decrease when the bonus B becomes positive.
(ii) There exists an unique bonus B̂ > 0 that minimizes the support costs. The
optimal bonus B̂ together with the award price p is determined by SL(p)+SH(p+
6Analogously, we could consider a malus for the low-cost bidders in form of a deduction on the
award price.
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The second bonus type is the so-called bid bonus, which reduces the high-cost
bidders’ bids by B. Incentive compatibility holds for both bidder classes, i.e., all
bidders bid their true costs. The bid bonus is only relevant in competition and does
not apply to the award price. It “strengthens” the high-cost bidders by increasing
their chance of winning. The supply of the high-cost bidders SH(pH) and their award
price pH are higher than in the free competition case, while the reverse holds for the
low-cost bidders. Since the argumentation is the same as for the monetary bonus,
Corollary 3 also applies to the bid bonus.
4.2.4 Example
The following example illustrates the principle of functionality of the three discrimina-
tory instruments Q̂, bonus B̂ and maximum price R̂. In our example, we assume that
the marginal costs of the bidders in class i ∈ {L,H} are uniformly distributed over
the interval [MCi,MC i] with MCH > MCL > 0, MCH > MCL, and MCL > MCH .
We first assume MCH −MCH = MCL −MCL and the same number of bidders in





for v ∈ [0, n(MC i −MCi)] with n > 0. The number of bidders is represented by n,
i.e., the inverse of the gradient of the marginal cost function, which, by assumption,
is the same in the two classes. Thus, the marginal cost functions are parallel shifts of
each other. Translated to a practical application this means that there are as many
low-cost bidders as high-cost bidders, however, there is a structural price difference
(MCH −MCL) between the two groups. Thus, the condition of lower costs for every
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quantity is fulfilled. By (4.2), the supply functions for i ∈ {L,H} are
Si(p) =

0 for p < MCi




















< 0 for all p 6= MCi .
Since MCH > MCL, εH(p) > εL(p) for all p > MCH . In free competition, the

























That is, both bidder classes receive one half of the total demand plus/minus a spread





> MCH −MCL . (4.13)















In Figure 4.1, the individual support costs TCL(p
∗) and TCH(p
∗) are visualized by the
areas p∗SL(p
∗) and p∗SH(p
∗). Clearly, the low-cost bidders receive a larger payment









Figure 4.1: Illustration of the example with free competition.
We now consider the optimal quota Q̂, bonus B̂, and maximum price R̂. According
to Proposition 7 and Corollary 2 and 3, optimal values of discriminatory instruments
are determined by the price difference





= (pL −MCL)− (pH −MCH) ,
114
which directly determines the optimal bonus B̂:
pH − pL =
MCH −MCL
2
= B̂ . (4.15)
Applying (4.4), the relationship between the free competition price p∗ and the prices
pH and pL under the optimal discriminatory instruments is given by
SL(p
∗) + SH(p
∗) = SL(pL) + SH(pH) = D ,
⇒ 2p∗ = pH + pL .





















= R̂ , (4.17)
which also determines the optimal maximum price R̂.
The price increase for the high-cost bidders is equal to the price reduction for the
























(MCH −MCL) = D − Q̂ . (4.19)
7This equality is caused by the characteristics of the example because the marginal cost curves
of both classes are parallel shifts of each other. This equality does not necessarily hold for other
marginal cost curves.
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With (4.18) and (4.19), the volume shift q = Q̂ − SH(p∗) from the low-cost bidders
to the high-cost bidders is
q = m
(
p∗ − 3MCH +MCL
4
)
− n(p∗ −MCH) =
m
4
(MCH −MCL) . (4.20)
Comparing the total support costs TC(pL, pH) under the optimal quota Q̂, bonus
B̂ and maximum price R̂ with TC(p∗) in free competition (4.14) yields























(MCH −MCL)2 < TC(p∗) .




Figure 4.2, the individual support costs are visualized by the areas pHSH(pH) and
pLSL(pL). Compared to Figure 4.1, the sum of the two areas, i.e., the total support
costs, is smaller. Although the price increase for the high-cost bidders is equal to the
price reduction for the low-cost bidders, the overall costs for the auctioneer decrease
as the number of bidders for which the price increases is lower than the number of
bidders for which the price decreases.
4.3 Assessment and Practical Application of the
Instruments
We showed that the three instruments are theoretically equivalent in the sense that
all outcomes (including the same support cost minimum) that can be achieved by
one instrument can also be achieved by the others. However, there are differences
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the example with optimal discriminatory instruments Q̂,
B̂ and R̂.
concerning the practical implementations. In the following, we compare the three
instruments with respect to their robustness to misestimations. In Section 4.3.3, we
extend the example of Section 4.2.4 by including uncertainties regarding the marginal
cost functions.
4.3.1 Robustness to Misestimations
As the exact number and strength of the bidders and thus their cost functions are
usually unknown to the auctioneer, he has to calibrate the discriminatory instruments
according to his beliefs and estimations. In the following, we analyze and compare
the effects of misestimations, particularly on support costs, under the three different
instruments.
Generally, a too low minimum quota for the high-cost bidders or a too high max-
imum price for the low-cost bidders may not have any effect, while a bonus is always
effective.
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For a more detailed analysis, we first consider the case that the auctioneer overes-
timates the costs of the high-cost bidders, i.e., the high-cost bidders are stronger than
expected. Then, a quota does not have a negative effect because it is calibrated to
high-cost bidders which are assumed to be weaker than they actually are. The same
holds for the maximum price. In both cases, the calibration of the instrument is not
optimal, but the costs are weakly lower than in free competition. A bonus, however,
might over-privilege the high-cost bidders and, thus, increases the costs compared to
free competition. This effect becomes stronger if the anticipated high-cost bidders
are even stronger than the anticipated low-cost bidders. In this case, a quota or
maximum price are ineffective, whereas a bonus discriminates in favor of the stronger
bidders and, thus, increase the support costs.
Second, if the high-cost bidders’ costs are underestimated, the negative effect of a
bonus is lower than the negative effect of a quota or of a maximum price. The bonus
might not be sufficient for enough high-cost bidders to be awarded. The quota and
maximum price, however, will lead to an inappropriate share of awarded high-cost
bidders.
As a matter of course, the arguments in the last two paragraphs analogously
hold if the costs of the low-cost bidders are overestimated or underestimated. We
also discuss these two cases in the example in Section 4.3.3. In this section, we also
analyze the effects of a wrong estimation of the size of a bidder class, i.e., the number
of bidders within a class. In this case, a bonus is more robust to misestimations than
a quota or a maximum price, as long as the general cost difference between the two
classes is estimated correctly. Under quota and maximum price, the negative effect
of misestimations is stronger if the the number of high-cost bidders is overestimated
than the other way round.
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4.3.2 Combination of Discriminatory Instruments
The combination of discriminatory instruments can increase the robustness to mis-
estimations. A good example is the combination of a bid bonus and a maximum
quota: the high-cost bidders are privileged by a bid bonus, which, however, is only
applied to a limited number of high cost bidders – those with the lowest bids. This
number is determined by the maximum quota. Hence, the quota restricts the number
of privileged bidders. In this way, the quota protects the auctioneer from excessive
costs in case he overestimated the number or the strength of high-cost bidders.
This application reveals an important different between the monetary bonus and
the bid bonus. As pointed out in Section 4.2.3, the two bonus types are to be con-
sidered equivalent if the bidders know that they will be privileged by the bonus.
However, this is not the case here because the high-cost bidders do not know this
when submitting their bid. Since a bid bonus has no impact on the optimal bid (i.e.,
bidding the true cost), whereas a monetary bonus induces bidders to reduce their bid
by the bonus, the bid bonus is the right choice for this application.
The combination of a bid bonus and a quota increases the the robustness to
misestimations compared to the two instruments alone as it combines their advantages
and lessen their disadvantages. The effectiveness of the discriminatory instrument is
guaranteed, while possible negative side-effects are limited. This also applies to other
combinations. Thus, the advantages of discriminatory instruments in auctions with
different bidder classes can be utilized without further information regarding the
bidders’ strength and number.
These considerations particularly apply to cases in which the implementation of
discriminatory instruments is also guided by other targets than the minimization of
support costs, such as grid and system integration, mixture of different RE technolo-
gies, regional distribution of RE, or actor diversity (Kreiss et al., 2017). Here, the
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considerations about the combination of instruments can help to keep costs low and
to protect against “unpleasant surprises.”
4.3.3 Illustrative Example of Consequences of Misestima-
tions
In this section we illustrate the effects and implications of misestimations by means
of the example of Section 4.2.4.
First, we examine the case in which the auctioneer does not correctly estimate the
relation between the number of high-cost bidders and the number low-cost bidders.
In line with our assumptions in Section 4.2.4, we model the relation between the






for v ∈ [0, n
λ
(bH −MCH)] with MCH(v) ∈ [MCH , bH ] and λ > 0. Since we consider
only two classes, it is sufficient to only change the marginal cost function of one class.




with MCL(v) ∈ [MCL,MCL] for v ∈ [0, n(MCL −MCL)].
Let us assume that the auctioneer estimates λ = 1 as in the example in Section
4.2.4. Thus, an actual λ 6= 1 refers to a situation in which the auctioneer’s estimate
is wrong. For λ > 1 there are less and for λ < 1 there are more high-cost bidders
than the auctioneer expects.8 The actual supply function is
SλH(p) =

0 for p < MCH ,
n
λ
(p−MCH) for p ≥MCH .
(4.22)
8The combination of the parameters λ,MCH ,MCL,MCH ,MCL is assumed to be such that the
curves of the two classes do not intersect in the considered interval.
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Note, by (4.12), the elasticity of supply εi(p) =
p
p−MCi
does not depend on λ, which
is due to the linear supply function.

























which yields the total support costs












That is, the price and the support costs decrease in λ.
Second, we consider the case that the auctioneer does not correctly estimate the
general relation between the strength of the two classes, given by the difference be-
tween MCH and MCL.
In the following, we investigate the effects of misestimations of λ and MCH−MCL
on the calibration of the discriminatory instruments and the support costs.
The optimal bonus is determined by the price difference pλH − pλL in Corollary 3:



















Thus, the optimal bonus does not depend on λ and is equal to the optimal bonus in
(4.15) for λ = 1. In the linear case, the bonus is robust to misestimations regarding
the number of bidders and still leads to the support cost minimum. However, by
(4.25), the optimal bonus B̂λ depends on MCH −MCL and, thus, is not robust with
respect to misestimations of the general cost difference of the bidder classes.
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Things are different for the optimal maximum price R̂λ for the low-cost bidders.
By (4.16), (4.17), and (4.22), the optimal award prices pλL and p
λ
H for the two classes



















That is, R̂λ depends on λ and, as shown in Appendix B.2, increases in λ.
The effect of misestimations regarding the number of bidders is the same for the
















(MCH −MCL) = D − Q̂λ .
The optimal quota Q̂λ depends on λ and, as shown in Appendix B.2, decreases in λ.
Hence, the implementation of the maximum price R̂ yields the same result as the
implementation of Q̂. That is, a misestimation regarding λ has the same effect if
either a quota or a maximum price is implemented.
Misestimations of the difference MCH−MCL have the same effect for the optimal






which is given by the difference between (4.26) and (4.24) and which depends on λ
and MCH −MCL. Hence, maximum price and quota are also not robust regarding
misestimations of the general relation between the strength of the bidder classes.
If the auctioneer implements the quota Q̂, which in this case is equivalent to the
implementation of the maximum price R̂, the support costs depend on the misesti-
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mation of λ. To see this, consider TCλ(Q), i.e., the support costs depending on a
quota Q:
TCλ(Q̂) = (D − Q̂) ·MCL(D − Q̂) + Q̂ ·MCλH(Q̂) ≥ TCλ(Q̂λ) . (4.27)
The equality only holds for λ = 1. If λ 6= 1, the costs TCλ(Q̂) of the non-optimal
quota Q̂ are higher than the costs TCλ(Q̂λ) of the optimal quota Q̂λ and, as shown
in Appendix B.2, the difference TCλ(Q̂)− TCλ(Q̂λ) increases in |λ− 1|.
For λ < 1, TCλ(Q̂λ) ≤ TCλ(Q̂) ≤ TCλ(0). That is, discrimination through Q̂ or
R̂ still leads to lower costs than in the free competition case with Q = 0 although the
auctioneer wrongly estimates the relation of the bidder classes (see Appendix B.2).
This does not hold for λ > 1. In this case, TCλ(Q̂) > TCλ(0) is possible, i.e., the
implementation of a non-optimal quota or maximum price leads to higher costs than
in the free competition case without discrimination.
As shown before, the bonus B̂ is (more) robust to wrong estimation of λ. In the
linear model, the optimal bonus does not depend on λ but only on MCH −MCL.
The key to design a discriminatory auction robust to misestimations of λ is to achieve
the optimal cost difference (4.25) which is always fulfilled through the optimal bonus.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the effect of either the implementation of Q̂ or R̂ for different
misestimations of λ. The optimal price difference pH − R̂ is only implemented if the
relation of the number of high-cost bidders and low-cost bidders is estimated correctly.
For λ < 1 the price difference is lower than pH − R̂ and, thus, there is potential for
further cost reductions. For λ > 1 it is possible that the costs are even higher than
in the free competition case.
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of the extended example.
4.4 Conclusion
It is a general trend in the expanded implementation of auctions for RES-E to open
the auctions to either multiple technologies or to bidders from several countries. The
corresponding buzzwords are “technology-neutral” and “cross-border” auctions. As
a consequence, designing the auction becomes more complex and more stakeholders
express their opinion and try to shift the design parameters in their favor. Obviously,
the argumentation that more competition always reduces prices falls short. The
most discussed topics regarding more open auction formats for RES-E are dynamic
efficiency, integration costs and windfall profits.
We contribute to this discussion by transferring general microeconomic principles
to the RE auction applications. We showed how three different discriminatory auction
design elements – a quota, a bonus and a maximum price – can be implemented in
auctions for RES-E and what their implications are. We proved for each instrument
that the discrimination of the stronger bidders in favor of the weaker bidders reduces
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the overall support costs. Moreover, to formulate it the other way round, if the
introduction of a discriminatory instrument does not reduce the support costs, then
there is no sense in conducting a non-discriminatory, multi-technology auction because
only the strong technology would be awarded.
Additionally, we proved that the support cost minimum can be achieved by each
of the three instruments. However, the optimal implementation requires information
regarding the cost distribution of the different bidder groups. Depending on the
availability of this information the three instruments vary regarding their robustness.
If the auctioneer aims to minimize the support costs, the auction design should
include discriminatory elements, which, however, is at the expense of efficiency. While
effective discrimination reduces the support costs, the awarded bidders are not nec-
essarily those with the lowest generation costs. This conflict between support cost
minimization and efficiency highlights the importance for the auctioneer to be aware
of his targets and their priority.
There is no panacea for designing the “right” auction for the promotion of RE
sources. The design has to be adapted to the target and the current market and
technological developments, possibly including discriminatory instruments.
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Chapter 5
Favoritism through a Right of
Subrogation
Since 2018, the German Federal Parliament (2016b) favors owners of existing projects
in Germany’s wind offshore auctions by a right of subrogation (ROS) to respect their
special position in the auction. Thereby, the introduction of a ROS represents a
completely new aspect in RES-E auctions. For a basic understanding, the model
and results of Haufe (2014) are presented in the following, where sales auctions are
investigated as usual in auction theory. Nevertheless, all results are easily transferable
to procurement auctions.
First, the analysis in Section 5.3 provides basic theoretic results for first-price
auctions with ROS, e.g., the bidding strategy as in Haufe (2014). Subsection 5.3.1 is
based on Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009) and deduces that for specific value
distributions of the favored bidder, the non-favored bidder’s optimal bid is more
aggressive in a first-price auction with ROS than without. Then, we follow Haufe
(2014) by showing that a profit-maximizing auctioneer always (weakly) prefers to
favor the weak bidder in Subsection 5.3.2. Based on that, Haufe (2014) highlights
combinations of asymmetric bidders in which the auctioneer’s expected revenue is
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increased by granting a ROS in comparison to a standard second-price auction. It is
concluded that if the asymmetry between bidders is sufficiently high and the weak
bidder is weak enough, the first-price auction with ROS can outperform a standard
second-price auction, see Subsection 5.3.3. Section 5.4 concludes by summarizing the
theoretical results in Subsection 5.4.1 and highlighting the relevance of the results for
RES-E auctions in Subsection 5.4.2.
5.1 Introduction
In auctions different forms of favoritism can be established in order to accommodate
the individual relationship between seller and buyer. In the following, we focus on
favoritism through the assignment of a ROS as implemented in the German wind
offshore auctions (German Federal Parliament, 2016b). In those, the support for wind
offshore projects is auctioned to potential project developers. In the early stage, from
2017 to 2018, existing projects are already owned by particular project developers. To
also integrate those projects in a competitive bidding process and respect their owners
adequately a ROS is offered to them. Thereby, the project owners are excluded from
competition, i.e., they do not participate in the competitive bidding process. But
they have the chance to match the winning bid afterwards. In addition, this kind
of favoritism is often used in industrial awarding for long-term business partners to
grant them an exceptional position in the procurement process. A broad variety of
practices of ROS can be found in Walker (1999).
The scientific literature already examines the ROS with respect to their impact on
bidding behavior, expected auction revenue and efficiency in special cases. Bikhchan-
dani et al. (2005) state that this form of favoritism will never be advantageous in
terms of increased auction revenue and even may lead to inefficient outcomes in
second-price auctions. All authors mentioned in the following examine first-price
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auctions with ROS. Though most of them consider the coalition of auctioneer and
favored bidder, and hence only investigate the joint surplus of both. For example,
Choi (2009) states for two symmetric bidders that the joint surplus of auctioneer and
favored bidder can be increased by the assignment of a ROS, however, only at the
expense of the third party’s payoff. Burguet and Perry (2007) find that the auctioneer
may benefit in a procurement auction with two asymmetric bidders from granting a
ROS combined with certain forms of bribery. In contrast to those, we aim to find
constellations in which the auctioneer’s expected revenue increases independently of
potential compensation payments by the favored bidder. In other words, we analyze
the auctioneer’s revenue without considering side payments. This approach is also
adopted by Brisset et al. (2012), who show that heterogeneous risk attitudes of the
bidders may be the crucial factor for an increased auction revenue. Furthermore, Lee
(2008) demonstrates that a certain degree of asymmetry among bidders’ strengths
yields a higher expected profit for the auctioneer in a first-price auction with assign-
ing a ROS than without. Related to his work we address the question under which
assumptions regarding two asymmetric bidders the auctioneer can benefit from fa-
voring one of the bidders in first-price auctions compared to incentive compatible
second-price auctions. For that, we assume different forms of asymmetries between
the participating bidders. Beyond the work of Lee (2008), who defines the asym-
metry by uniform distributions on staggered intervals, we model the bidders’ value
distributions on a common interval by linear, strictly convex and strictly concave
beta distributions. According to the work of Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009)
the curvature of the favored bidder’s value distribution may play a decisive role with
respect to the aggressiveness of the non-favored bidder’s bidding behavior. Further-
more, we find an increase in the expected auction revenue in case of asymmetric
bidders – depending on the non-favored bidder’s value distribution. 1
1We act on the assumption of a two-bidder case, i.e., one favored and one non-favored bidder.
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5.2 Model
We examine first-price auctions, in which the auctioneer favors one of the bidders
by awarding a Right of Subrogation. In a sales auction, the ROS offers the favored
bidder the option to buy the good at the best price submitted by the competing
bidders. After the auctioneer has chosen a favored bidder and proclaimed her decision
to all participants, a sealed-bid first-price auction is conducted. Hence the highest
submitted bid determines the award price the winner has to pay. However, the highest
bidder will win the auction only if the favored bidder does not exercise her ROS. In
case the favored bidder exercises her ROS and so accepts the highest bid, she will win
the auction and acquire the good at the award price. Thus, the award price is always
the highest submitted bid in a first-price auction with ROS, the winner, however, can
either be the favored bidder or the highest non-favored bidder, if the favored bidder
declines to exercise the ROS. Further, it is to emphasize that the favored bidder is
only allowed to match, if her initial bid was lower than the winning bid or she even
did not submit any initial bid at all.2 We limit our work on the following mechanism:
The favored bidder does not submit any initial bid, but only decides at the second
stage whether to match the winning bid or not. This basic auction mechanism is
deduced from the work of Lee (2008).
As already discussed by Güth and Van Damme (1986), a first-price auction with
ROS and two bidders can be interpreted as an auction, where the situation of the non-
favored bidder corresponds to that in a first-price auction and the favored bidder’s
situation to that in a second-price auction. The non-favored bidder determines the
award price she has to pay in case of winning through her submitted bid and the
favored bidder decides whether to match her opponent’s bid.3
2A first-price auction with ROS can be considered as a two-stage mechanism, where at the first
stage a first-price auction is conducted and at the second stage the favored bidder has the option to
match the winning bid.
3In particular, supposing two symmetric bidders, whose valuations are uniformly distributed on
[0, 1], the equilibrium bidding function of the non-favored bidder in a first-price auction with ROS is
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Our analysis focuses on a two-bidder case for first-price auctions with ROS. Ac-
cordingly, one non-favored bidder (I) and one favored bidder (II) compete against
each other. We suppose an independent private value model, i.e., both bidders assign
values to the good represented by realizations of Xi, which are private information and
independent of each other. We restrict our analysis to risk-neutral bidders and cases
in which distributions of both bidders Fi are either linear, strictly concave or strictly
convex beta distributions with support on [0, 1] and publicly known. We assume that
the auctioneer does not assign any value to the good. The number of bidders (here
N = 2) as well as the fact that bidders are risk-neutral is common knowledge. In
the course of the work this model is preserved as far as either symmetric or asym-
metric bidders are supposed. For the asymmetric case, we distinguish between one
strong and one weak bidder, i.e,. i = {s, w}. The bidders’ valuations will be drawn
independently from the same interval [0, 1] of the beta distribution, where the weak
bidder’s distribution Fw on [0, 1] is stochastically dominated by the strong bidder’s
distribution Fs on [0, 1] according to the reverse hazard-rate order. Further it holds
that Fs first-order stochastically dominates Fw, i.e., Fs(x) ≤ Fw(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1],
and therefore E[Xw] ≤ E[Xs]. That is, the expected valuation of the strong bidder
is higher than the weak bidder’s expected valuation for the good.
5.3 Analysis
The non-favored bidder’s bid always determines the price in the two bidder case,
because the favored bidder does not submit any initial bid and only matches the
non-favored bidder’s bid if applicable. In the following, we refer to the non-favored
and price-determining bidder’s bid as bROS = p and to the favored bidder’s value
distribution as FII(·). First, we deduce the equilibrium bidding strategy of the non-
exactly the same as in a first-price auction. Further, the situation of the favored bidder corresponds
exactly to that in a second-price auction as well.
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favored bidder βROS. Then, we demonstrate how the information about the favored
bidder’s strength, i.e., FII(·), affects this strategy.
Proposition 8. The non-favored bidder’s equilibrium bidding strategy βROS : xI 7→
bROS in a first-price auction with ROS is given by





where xI is the non-favored bidder’s valuation and the favored bidder’s value distri-
bution and density functions are given by FII and fII .
The proof is presented in Appendix C.1. Consequently, the non-favored bidder
always shades her bid in equilibrium. By maximizing the expected rent, she finds
herself in a trade-off situation: On the one hand a higher bid increases her winning
probability. On the other hand, a higher bid reduces her profit in case of winning,
because she determines the payment through this bid. Thus the equilibrium bidding
strategy balances these opposite effects to maximize the bidder’s expected rent.
The non-favored bidder’s equilibrium bidding behavior is in the further analy-
sis easier to handle by utilizing the explicit inverse equilibrium bidding function
βROS
−1
: p 7→ xI instead of the implicit equilibrium bidding function presented
above. Therefore we demonstrate below that the equilibrium bidding function is
strictly monotone and therefore bijective and invertible for strictly concave, convex
and linear beta value distribution functions.
Lemma 3. If βROS(xI) is bijective, the inverse equilibrium bidding strategy of the









where p ∈ [0, 1] is the award price and FII the favored bidder II’s value distribution
with corresponding density fII .
Lemma 4. Let the favored bidder’s value distribution FII be a linear, strictly concave
or strictly convex beta distribution. Then the equilibrium bidding strategy of the non-
favored bidder in a first-price auction with ROS, βROS(xI), is strictly monotone and
hence bijective.
The respective proofs are presented in Appendix C.1. The inverse equilibrium
bidding strategy depends on the favored bidder’s value distribution FII and den-
sity function fII , which are common knowledge. That is, the price-determining bid
βROS(xI) is influenced by the strength of the competing favored bidder. The stronger
the favored bidder the more aggressive is the non-favored bidder’s submitted bid, i.e.,
a stronger opponent will lead the non-favored bidder to offer a higher price.
The fact that the non-favored bidder offers a higher price if the strength of her
opponent increases is intuitive: a stronger opponent will lower the winning proba-
bility and the non-favored bidder attends to compensate this effect by bidding more
aggressively.
Next, the expected auction revenue in a first-price auction with ROS is deduced.
On the one hand the non-favored bidder’s equilibrium bid depends on her individual
valuation and on the other hand it is influenced by the strength of the competing
favored bidder. Consequently, the expected auction revenue, determined by the non-
favored bidder’s bid, is affected by both bidders’ strengths.
Proposition 9. The distribution function of the expected payment in a first-price






(p) = p + FII(p)
fII(p)
is the inverse equilibrium bidding strategy of the non-
favored bidder I and p ∈ [0, 1].










The respective proofs are presented in Appendix C.1. Notice that Proposition 10
only applies if the favored bidder was selectively elected and not if one of the bidders
is favored by chance. For the latter see Haufe (2014).
5.3.1 Impact of the ROS on Bidding Behavior
According to Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) linear, strictly concave or strictly convex
beta distributions are log concave. Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009) find that
for log concave value distributions symmetric bidders may bid more, less or equally
aggressive in a first-price auction with ROS than without depending on the ratio
ρ(x) = F (x)
f(x)
: If ρ(x) is strictly concave (convex) in x, symmetric bidders bid more (less)
aggressively, whereas the bidding behavior remains unaltered in case ρ(x) is linear in
x. As we consider an asymmetric two-bidder case, the strength of the favored bidder
is crucial for the bidding strategy of the non-favored and price-determining bidder.
Hence, only the favored bidder’s value distribution and density function are relevant
for determining ρ(x).
Proposition 11. In case the favored bidder’s value distribution is a linear or strictly
convex beta distribution the bidding behavior is unchanged in a first-price auction with
and without ROS.
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Proposition 12. In case the favored bidder’s value distribution is a strictly concave
beta distribution the bidding behavior is more aggressive in a first-price auction with
ROS than without.
The proofs are presented in Appendix C.1. Surprisingly, the introduction of fa-
voritism has no unfavorable effects on bidding behavior in the considered cases. Nei-
ther concave nor linear or convex opponents yield lower bids.
5.3.2 Favoring the Right Bidder
In the following, we demonstrate that in case of asymmetric bidders the expected
auction revenue in a first-price auction with ROS may exceed that in a second-price
auction. Especially, the form of asymmetry between bidders is a crucial factor for the
auctioneer to decide whether to conduct a first-price auction with ROS or a second-
price auction.4 For that purpose, two asymmetric bidders are considered, one strong
bidder s and one weak bidder w.
Recall that conducting a first-price auction with ROS with asymmetric bidders
means for the auctioneer to decide which bidder is granted the ROS. In the following
we focus for the defined asymmetric bidder constellations on the question, whether
a selective assignment is advantageous for the auctioneer or not. For that purpose,
we demonstrate that if the auctioneer knows who of the participating bidders in
the first-price auction with ROS is the strong and who the weak one, it might be
meaningful to favor the correct bidder in order to gain a higher expected profit.
That is, we consider the different expected payments in case of favoring the strong
and the weak bidder. We suppose two asymmetric bidders characterized either by a
convex-convex, linear-convex or concave-linear combination of value distributions.
4In the symmetric case, the auctioneer does not benefit from granting a ROS to any bidder for
the considered combinations of beta distributions.
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For the convex-convex and linear-convex combination the bidding behavior of
the non-favored bidder remains unchanged since in both cases the price-determining
bidder faces an opponent whose value distribution and density function lead to
linear ratios ρ(x) or ρ̃(x), see Proposition 12. Hence, it can be shown that for a
linear-convex and convex-convex combination the expected auction revenue in the
first-price auction with ROS is the same independent of favoring the weak or the
strong bidder.
Proposition 13. Let Fs(x) = x
ζ and Fw(x) = x be the bidders’ value distributions,
ζ > 1. The auctioneer’s expected profit if the weak bidder is favored E[pROSw ] equals
the expected profit with granting the ROS to the strong bidder E[pROSs ] for all ζ > 1.
The proof is presented in Appendix C.1. Thus, in the case of a weak bid-
der with a linear distribution and a strong bidder with a convex distribution the
auctioneer’s expected profit remains the same whether she favors the weak or the
strong bidder, although the weak bidder submits a relatively more aggressive bid
βROSw (x) for ζ > 1 than the strong bidder with β
ROS
s (x). The expected payment
if the weak bidder determines the price, i.e, the strong bidder is favored, never
exceeds the expected payment if the weak bidder is favored. The reason is that
the weak bidder’s expected valuation E[Xw] is lower than the strong bidder’s one
E[Xs], however her more aggressive bidding behavior is outweighed by her weak-
ness compared to the strong bidder, which results in equal expected profits, i.e.,
E[pROSw ] = E[β
ROS
w (Xs)] = E[β
ROS
s (Xs)] = E[p
ROS
s ].
Proposition 14. Let Fs(x) = x
ζs and Fw(x) = x
ζw be the bidders’ value distributions,
where 1 < ζw < ζs. Then the auctioneer’s expected profit if the weak bidder is favored
E[pROSw ] equals the expected profit if she grants the ROS to the strong bidder E[p
ROS
s ],
∀ζw, ζs > 1.
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The proof is presented in Appendix C.1. Notice that for ζs, ζw →∞ both bidders’
bids will approach their true valuations. Further, the weak bidder’s bidding strategy
is more aggressive than the strong bidder’s one, which is obvious, because the weak
bidder faces a strong competitor, whereas the strong bidder competes against a weak
one. However, the expected auction revenue by favoring the strong bidder never
exceeds the expected auction revenue by favoring the weak bidder. The reason is that
the more aggressive bidding behavior of the non-favored weak bidder is compensated
by her lower expected valuation.
For the concave-linear combination the expected payment by favoring the weak
bidder E[pROSw ] and the expected payment by favoring the strong bidder E[p
ROS
s ]
differ and do not correspond to each other as in the linear-convex or convex-convex
combination. We find that under these assumptions favoring the weak bidder always
generates a higher or equal expected revenue for the auctioneer compared to favoring
the strong bidder.
Proposition 15. Let Fs(x) = x and Fw(x) = 1 − (1 − x)η be the bidders’ value
distributions, η > 1. Then the expected payment in a first-price auction with ROS
is higher or equal if the auctioneer grants the ROS to the weak instead of the strong
bidder.
The proof is presented in Appendix C.1. To conclude, favoring the weak bid-
der yields in all three considered cases an equal or higher expected revenue for the
auctioneer compared to favoring the strong bidder.
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5.3.3 Conditions for A-priori Superiority of First-price Auc-
tions with ROS
Based on Proposition 13, 14 and 15, we presuppose that always the weak bidder is
favored. In Appendix C.2, it is shown that the auction revenue in a second-price
auction always exceeds that in a first-price auction with ROS for the linear-convex
and the convex-convex combination.
Hence, we consider the concave-linear combination. As we learned from Propo-
sition 12, bidding behavior may be more aggressive, at least if the weak bidder is
favored in this combination. For the sake of completeness, we also assume that the
strong bidder is favored in the first-price auction with ROS and find that the second-
price auction still outperforms the first-price auction with ROS in terms of expected
auction revenue, see Appendix 17. Nevertheless, this result may change if the weak
bidder is favored in the first-price auction with ROS.
Proposition 16. Let Fs(x) = x and Fw(x) = 1 − (1 − x)η be the bidders’ value
distributions, η > 1. Then the expected payment in the first-price auction with ROS,
where the weak bidder is favored, exceeds that in the second-price auction if η & 2.745.
The proof is presented in Appendix C.1. Thus, a selective assignment of the ROS
to the weak bidder yields a higher expected profit for the auctioneer if a certain
degree of asymmetry is given among the participating bidders. The intuition behind
is that the weaker the weak bidder is the more aggressive are the bids of the strong and
price-determining bidder. Further, we assume the auctioneer only knows that the two
participating bidders are unequally strong, but she is not informed about which bidder
is the weak and which the strong one. Then, a randomly granted ROS also leads to a
higher expected auction revenue than the expected auction revenue, in the concave-
linear combination. For the selective favoritism of the weak bidder it holds that there
exists a degree of asymmetry such that a higher expected auction revenue can be
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gained, which is also possible for a randomly assigned ROS. However, favoring one of
the ex ante asymmetric bidders by chance will require a higher degree of asymmetry
in order to gain a higher expected auction revenue in the first-price auction with ROS
than in the second-price auction. Finally, we state that a weak bidder with strictly
concave beta distributed valuations entails advantageous properties for the expected
auction revenue in a first-price auction with ROS compared to weak bidders with
linear or convex beta distributions.
5.4 Conclusion
5.4.1 Summary of Theoretical Results
In the concave-linear combination it makes a difference whether the weak or the
strong bidder is favored, in contrast to the other combinations. In this case we show
that the auctioneer is always better off in regard to her expected profit by favoring
the weak bidder. Further, besides a sufficient degree of asymmetry, the weak bidder’s
concave value distribution is essential for the higher expected auction revenue in a
first-price auction with ROS. In this case, if the ROS is appointed to the weaker
bidder, the first-price auction with ROS generates higher expected auction revenues
than a standard second-price auction. Even if the ROS is randomly granted to one of
the two asymmetric bidders, the auction revenue in a first-price auction with ROS will
exceed the revenue in a second-price auction as soon as the asymmetry is sufficiently
large.
5.4.2 Applicability to Auctions for RES-E
Granting a ROS represents a clear and simple measure to favor owners of existing
projects without foregoing competitive determination of support levels. As main
disadvantage, it implies the risk of inefficiency. Namely in case the opponents have
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lower costs than the project owner but overbid the latter for increasing their profit in
case of winning. Nevertheless, the implementation of a ROS is promising, which the
following conclusions emphasize: In the considered combinations, bidding behavior is
either unchanged or more aggressive, which is both not disadvantageous, first. Second,
favoring the weak bidder is always the right choice. Applied to the wind-offshore
auctions in Germany, it might be difficult to ensure that the project owner is the
weak bidder. However, granting the ROS by chance leads similar results. Third and
finally, governments can benefit from lower support costs induced by more aggressive
bidding due to a ROS in the auctions. Summarizing, the implementation of a ROS is
a potentially suitable measure in cases where one particular bidder deserves a favored




Auctions can be a suitable instrument for the allocation and determination of renew-
able energy support (RES-E). However, there exists no one-size-fits-all auction design
for RES-E. The appropriate choice of auction design crucially depends on the market
framework, the political and economic targets, as well as the expected economic and
technological development particularly of the renewable energy and electricity mar-
kets. That is, while general suitable as competitive and efficient mechanism, auctions
are sensitive to existing market and framework conditions. Consequently, theoretical
findings have to be applied carefully to prevent false conclusions.
6.1 Summary
From an auction theoretic perspective, this work first provided a basic framework for
auctions for RES-E, then highlighted general chances and risks for their conduction,
and finally analyzed real-world implementations.
Chapter 2 sensitized to general chances and risks of auctions for RES-E and re-
vealed the ambiguity of auctions under different conditions with simple examples.
This established a broad basis for auction implementations in the RES-E context and
complemented with first lessons-learned from theory.
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Then we focused on particular questions from practice and especially had a look
at unconventional auction implementations as adopted in the German EEG (German
Federal Parliament, 2017a).
Chapter 3 dealt with non-binding awards that offer bidders the option to with-
draw after the auction due to financing risks. We learned from theory and laboratory
experiments that non-binding awards in combination with reallocation yield equiva-
lent auction outcomes compared to their binding counterparts. Surprisingly, we even
observed an efficiency increase in non-incentive compatible auctions with non-binding
award in the experiment. Hence non-binding auctions with reallocation represent a
promising approach to address costs uncertainties in auctions for RES-E. Last but
not least, the German solar auctions may finally overcome the prominent negative
examples of non-binding auctions1.
With regard to open auctions, discriminative measures were studied in Chapter
4. Due to persistent asymmetries among bidders, discrimination is inevitable to
further control the technology mix or regional distribution of the expansion. Our
analysis demonstrates that support costs can be minimized despite discrimination.
In particular, the considered discriminatory measures, i.e., quota, bonus and different
maximum prices, yield the same support cost minimum in their optimum. However,
discrimination always is at the expense of efficiency. Further, optimal calibrating in
practice is limited. We find that the robustness with regard to misestimations strongly
depends on the available information regarding the cost distribution and size of the
bidder groups.
Motivated by the German wind offshore auctions, Chapter 5 highlighted that the
auctioneer can benefit from favoring a bidder by a right of subrogation in terms
of higher profit. First, we learned that favoring the weak bidder is always revenue
superior because then the strong bidder determines the price. Dependent on the
1See Cramton et al. (2015), Merlob et al. (2012) and McMillan (1994).
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curvature of the opponent bidder’s signal distribution, the non-favored bidder bids
more aggressively, which increases the auctioneer’s profit. Consequently, if the strong
bidder’s costs distribution function is a strictly concave beta distribution, the support
costs can be reduced by favoring the weak one through a right of subrogation in case
of sufficient asymmetry.
6.2 Scientific Outlook
Auctions for RES-E are still in their infancy. Their worldwide implementations in-
crease not only in numbers and auction volumes but also in significance. As a con-
sequence, many new scientific issues will appear in the future. Recent auction imple-
mentations already provide a broad variety of cases worth investigating. In the course
of this thesis, our focus was limited to very special auction designs as implemented
in Germany. Analogously, global implementations provide further research objects.
Moreover, regarding non-binding auctions only little research exists in general and
from practice only negative examples have been reported. Due to our advantageous
results for the implementation of non-binding awards, they should be further exam-
ined. Typically, the withdrawal of awards is associated with costs for both the bidder
and the auctioneer. Thus, further research should be spent to analyze withdrawal
costs, especially the optimization of penalty payments the bidders have to pay in case
of withdrawal.
Discrimination might develop to the main question regarding auctions for RES-E
as technology neutral auctions are the future. Not only different renewable but all
energy sources are planed to be combined in one competitive energy system. In this,
differences may persist not only regarding electricity generation costs but also with
regard to availability of particular energy sources and regional need of electricity, to
name just a few. An adequate integration is only possible with regulative instruments
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that will be discriminative, inevitably. Laboratory experiments may provide crucial
insights into human behavior in case of favoritism and discrimination in auctions for
RES-E.
Besides theoretical analyses of proposed auction formats, evaluations of conducted
auctions in particular countries will become crucial. To date, lessons learned can be
drawn only limitedly due to the early stage of auctions for RES-E. Because of long
realization phases after the auction, general success and failure of auctions for RES-E
will be unearthed only in the coming years, and finally allow broader conclusions.
6.3 Policy Implications
It seems that governments have realized the general potential of auctions for RES-E,
currently become familiar with particular design options and already draw valuable
conclusions from first experiences over the past few years. As a result, the success
of auctions for RES-E is outstanding: First and foremost, many countries already
benefit from the cost decreasing potential of competitive bidding (REN21, 2016).
In Germany, for example, support levels for photo voltaic felt to such an extent
(4,33 EURct per kWh) that they even beat support levels for wind-onshore (4,73
EURct per kWh) in February 2018 (German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs
and Energy, 2018a,b). This demonstrated that competivity between technologies can
be achieved, which was considered impossible for many years. Another important
remark is that bidders seem to highly accept auctions for RES-E despite being con-
fronted with award risks. Oversupply, i.e., competition through an exceeding amount
of supply compared to the tender volume, could be observed in many countries. In
Germany’s photo voltaic auctions the auction volume was exceeded by a factor of
two to three for several times (German Federal Network Agency, 2016, 2018a). Al-
though high competition and decreasing support levels may put project developers
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under pressure, high project realization rates can be achieved, for example in Ger-
many (German Federal Network Agency, 2018b). Thus auctions for RES-E have
already proven their potential to yield satisfactory results in many aspects. This
development is based on several properties and advantages of auctions compared to
other options for RES-E. Auctions create competition and hereby reduce the costs
of RES and increase allocative efficiency. The auction results generate information
about scarcity and prices, which is valuable for project developers and the auctioneer.
The competitive auction environment also creates innovation incentives, which will
lead to further support cost reductions. Moreover, auctions allow the policy maker
to control the RE expansion in order to reach the respective targets. These are the
main reasons why the European Commission requires that its member states conduct
auctions for RES from 2017 on (European Commission, 2014). Although auctions
become or already are mandatory in many countries throughout the world (REN21,
2016), national governments can usually select the particular auction design to a great
extent. In conclusion, for the implementation of auctions for RES we recommend a
theoretically and empirically proved auction design with a low level of complexity
for the bidders, which facilitates a simple and straightforward determination of an
appropriate bidding strategy. The auction should also minimize the incentives for
strategic supply reduction and implicit collusion. Moreover, the auctions should be
implemented in a long-term oriented framework with regular repetitions and should
also be accompanied by appropriate measures (e.g., prequalification and penalties)




Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. In the initial award allocation, an awarded bidder faces one of two constella-
tions. First, only her leading bid is awarded and her second bid component would
not move up if she withdraws. In this case, she will not withdraw her award. Second,
the bidder is initially awarded with several bids or one of her bid components would
not move up if she withdraws an awarded bid. Now, she will withdraw all winning
bids but one as she is only interested in one of the K units. In this case, initially
non-awarded bids move up but the bidder retains her award. Assuming an exhaus-
tive reallocation procedure, this leads to a new allocation in which each bidder (either
initially awarded or not) again faces the above mentioned constellations. However,
the awarded bidder keeps her award, potentially with a higher price. Iteration of this
procedure yields to an allocation in which none of the bidders has an incentive to
withdraw her bid. This is the case if the bid that would move up is a leading bid of
a non-awarded bidder. However, since awarded bidders always keep their award and
always withdraw excessive awarded bids this implies the claim.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (1) Obviously, optimal bids have to exceed the bidder’s cost, i.e., ct > x
for t = 1, 2, . . ., and have to be different. Without loss of generality, we can set
cPAB1 < c
PAB
2 < . . . < c
PAB
T .
(2) By Lemma 1, 1 − GPABK (cPABt ) is the award probability of a bid cPABt ,
t = 1, . . . , T , taking into account an exhaustive replacement procedure, i.e.,
1 − GPABK (cPABt ) is the probability that cPABt outbids the K lowest leading bids of
the competing bidders. The situation where only the leading bid cPAB1 of a bidder is
awarded occurs with probability GPABK (c
PAB
2 )−GPABK (cPAB1 ), i.e., cPAB1 is lower than
the K lowest competing leading bids and cPAB2 is not. If the two lowest bids c
PAB
1
and cPAB2 are awarded, the bidder will withdraw the lower one c
PAB
1 and pay z ≥ 0.
This occurs if cPAB2 is lower than the K lowest competing leading bids and c
PAB
3 is
unsuccessful, i.e., with probability GPABK (c
PAB
3 )−GPABK (cPAB2 ). Continuing for all L
bids yields the bidder’s expected profit E[π(x, cPAB, z)], which is given by
E[π(x, cPAB, z)] =(cPAB1 − x)[GPABK (cPAB2 )−GPABK (cPAB1 )]+
(cPAB2 − x− z)[GPABK (cPAB3 )−GPABK (cPAB2 )] + . . .+




(cPABt − x− (t− 1)z)[GPABK (cPABt+1 )−GPABK (cPABt )]+
[cPABT − x− (T − 1)z](1−GPABK (cPABT ))
where cPAB = (cPAB1 , c
PAB
2 , . . . , c
PAB
T ). Supposing that the bidder aims to maximize
her expected profit through her submitted bids cPAB1 , c
PAB
2 , . . . , c
PAB
T , we obtain the
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following first order conditions
∂
∂cPAB1




2 )−GPABK (cPAB1 )
)









3 )−GPABK (cPAB2 )
)






E[π(x, cPAB, z)] =(1−GPABK (cPABT ))− (cPABT − cPABT−1 − z)gPABK (cPABT )
!
= 0
Solving these equations for cPAB1 , c
PAB
2 , . . . , c
PAB
T and verifying the second order-
conditions provides the optimal bidding strategies.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Because of cPAB1 = γ
PAB






t−1 ) for t = 2, . . . , T , a bid-
ders optimization calculus is supermodular in (x, cPAB1 , c
PAB
2 , . . . , c
PAB
T−1 ) and, there-
fore, fulfills the single crossing property. Thus, the first component of the equilib-











T−2 (cT−3) = γ
PAB
T−2 (γT−3(cT−4)) and so
on, γPAB1 (x) is monotone in x.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Because of the monotonicity of γPAB1 , the K bidders with the lowest costs are
awarded. That is, the allocation of the K units is efficient and corresponds to that in
a binding PAB auction. Therefore, the expected bidder profits, winning probabilities
and the auctioneer’s expected payment equal those of the binding mechanism (e.g.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1988).
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Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. From Proposition 1 follows that bidders diversify their optimal bids in the non-
binding mechanism. In addition, revenue (payment) equivalence of both mechanisms
follows from Proposition 3. For analyzing the expected auction outcome of the non-
binding PAB auction, we consider two cases: First, only leading bids are finally
awarded and, thus, are price determining. Second, in the complementary case, in
which at least one higher bid than leading bid is awarded, the auctioneer’s payment
is higher than in the first case. Since RET applies and the allocation is the same and
efficient, the claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. With the assumption of a symmetric monotone equilibrium strategy βHAB,
condition (3.3) leads to the differential equation







(K − 1)!(N −K − 1)!






j!(N − j − 1)!
jF (x)j(1− F (x))N−j−1 (A.2)
⇒ F(K−1:N−1)(x)− F(K:N−1)(x) =
(N − 1)!
(K − 1)!(N −K)!
F (x)K−1(1− F (x))N−K
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M(x,N,K) = 0 , (A.3)
M(x,N,K) =
(N − 1)!
(K − 1)!(N −K)!
F (x)K−1(1− F (x))N−K−1 .
By (3.1) the symmetric monotone equilibrium strategy of a first price auction (i.e.,







which is derived from the differential equation












(1− F (x))N−K−1 = 0 .
That is, βFA(x) fulfills (A.3) and, thus, βHAB ≡ βFA .
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Given that in the non-binding UP-HAB auction there exists a symmetric equi-
librium γHAB = (γHAB1 , γ
HAB
2 , . . . , γ
HAB
T ) : [x, x]→ RT with γHAB1 (x) is increasing in
x.
First, x < γHAB1 (x) < γ
HAB
2 (x) < . . . < γ
HAB
T (x) follows from the considerations
above Proposition 6.
Second, according to Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1988) the RET applies, which can be
transferred to the non-binding UP-HAB procurement auction: the auction outcome is
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efficient, the bidders’ winning probabilities and expected profits and the auctioneer’s
expected payment per good (equal to E[X(K+1:N)]) are the same as in the binding
UP-HAB auction.
Third, from expected payment equivalence with the binding UP-HAB auction
follows that the non-binding bid components have to spread around the corresponding
binding bid, i.e., γHAB1 (x) < β
HAB(x) < γHABT (x) for all x ∈ [x, x] and T ≥ 2.
A.2 Derivation of the Optimal Bid bHAB in the
Binding UP-HAB Auction
Proof. Given a bidder’s costs x and her beliefs about the opponents’ K-th lowest
bid, which are described by the distribution and density function HHABK and h
HAB
K .
Two cases of winning with bid b are relevant: First, b is lower than the highest
accepted bid, i.e., the price is determined by the opponents’ (K − 1)th lowest bid.
Second, b is the highest accepted bid and determines the award price. Then, b lies
between the opponents’ (K − 1)th and Kth lowest bid. The probability of this case




(y − x)hHABK−1 (y)dy + (b− x)(HHABK−1 (b)−HHABK (b)) ,
whose maximization with respect to b yields the first-order condition
∂
∂b








Matching group Binding Non-binding Matching group Binding Non-binding
G01 161.5 163.6 G17 169.2 163.9
G02 174.0 163.2 G18 168.4 163.9
G03 161.7 166.6 G19 167.7 164.7
G04 162.8 163.9 G20 165.8 162.0
G05 161.1 164.7 G21 162.9 166.0
G06 167.1 168.6 G22 165.0 166.6
G07 163.4 165.6 G23 164.3 167.3
G08 164.8 163.0 G24 162.6 164.6
G09 168.6 162.1 G25 165.1 167.7
G10 162.8 164.7 G26 168.2 156.4
G11 161.8 163.5 G27 163.0 164.0
G12 163.9 167.3 G28 165.6 164.0
G13 160.4 162.9 G29 165.9 164.9
G14 164.4 164.2 G30 164.1 166.8
G15 162.2 162.2 G31 164.8 168.0
G16 162.3 162.1 G32 164.5 164.9
Mean 163.9 164.3 165.4 164.7
Median 162.8 163.7 165.0 164.8
Std. dev. 3.3 1.9 1.9 2.7
Table A.1: Average auction prices [ExCU] of all blocks of ten rounds.
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PAB UP-HAB
Matching group Binding Non-binding Matching group Binding Non-binding
G01 98.9% 98.0% G17 95.1% 97.8%
G02 93.4% 97.6% G18 96.7% 99.7%
G03 97.5% 99.3% G19 98.0% 98.7%
G04 97.9% 98.7% G20 99.4% 96.8%
G05 98.0% 98.8% G21 97.6% 98.8%
G06 96.7% 97.8% G22 97.7% 98.8%
G07 96.4% 98.8% G23 97.1% 98.6%
G08 97.0% 97.8% G24 98.9% 99.6%
G09 95.9% 98.8% G25 98.9% 98.7%
G10 99.1% 98.8% G26 97.0% 97.6%
G11 97.1% 98.7% G27 98.0% 99.3%
G12 98.7% 98.5% G28 98.5% 99.6%
G13 98.4% 99.1% G29 97.8% 99.3%
G14 98.7% 99.1% G30 98.3% 99.4%
G15 97.9% 98.8% G31 99.2% 99.1%
G16 98.6% 98.7% G32 99.0% 99.5%
Mean 97.5% 98.6% 97.9% 98.8%
Median 97.9% 98.7% 98.0% 99.0%
Std. dev. 1.4% 0.5% 1.1% 0.8%
Table A.2: Average efficiency rates of all blocks of ten rounds.
A.4 Numerical Analysis
Let γPAB1 (x) and γ
PAB
2 (x) denote the symmetric equilibrium in the non-binding PaB
auction with T = 2. Further, GPAB2 and g
PAB
2 denote the distribution and density
function of the bidder’s beliefs about the lower leading bid of the two competing
bidders, N = 3. Then, the differential equation system to be solved is




































As numerical solution method the following source code was compiled with Wolfram
Mathematica.
Clear [“Global’*“] ;
n = 24 ; (* number of iterations *)
(* initialization *)
SetPrecision[
h = Round[(199− 100)/(n+ 1), 0.01]; (* increment *)
values = Array[x, n+ 1, 0] ; x[n] = 199;
Array[y, n+ 1, 0] ; y[n] = 199;
bids1 = Array[b1, n+ 1, 0] ; b1[n] = 199;
bids2 = Array[b2, n+ 1, 0] ; b2[n] = 199;
nearestX = n ;
estimatedB2 = 199 ;
(* initial values for x and y *)
y[n− 1] = 199− (h/2) ;
x[n− 1] = 199− h ;
(* density and distribution function of values and of second order statistics with 3
bidders *)
f [x ] = 1/(199− 100) ;
F [x ] = (x− 100)/(199− 100) ;
g[x ] = 2 · F [x] · f [x] ;
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G[x ] = F [x]2 ;
(*iteration*)
For[i = n− 1, i > −1, i−−,
(* reinitialization *)
If[i < n− 1 ,
estimatedB2 = 2 · b2[i+ 1]− b2[i+ 2] ;
j = nearestX ;
While[ b1[j] > estimatedB2 && j > i,
nearestX = j ;
j −− ;
];
estimatedY = Round[x[nearestX] − (b1[nearestX] − estimatedB2)/((b1[nearestX] −
b1[nearestX− 1])/h), 10−50000];
Print[N [estimatedY]];
y[i] = estimatedY ;
x[i] = x[i+ 1]− h ;
] ;
(* iteration step *)
b1[i] = Round[(g[x[i]] · (x[i + 1] − x[i]) · x[i] + (G[y[i]] − G[x[i]]) · b1[i + 1])/(g[x[i]] ·
(x[i+ 1]− x[i]) + (G[y[i]]−G[x[i]])), 10−50000] ;
b2[i] = Round[(g[y[i]] · b1[i] · (y[i+ 1]− y[i]) + (1−G[y[i]]) · b2[i+ 1])/(g[y[i]] · (y[i+
1]− y[i]) + (1−G[y[i]])), 10−50000] ;
] ;
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, MachinePrecision] ; ;







Please find the plotted numerical solutions for the bidding functions of γPAB1 (x) and
γPAB2 (x) in Figure 3.1.
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A.5 Experiment Instructions
Welcome to the Experiment
You are participating in an economic experiment. Please read the following instruc-
tions carefully. The instructions state everything you need to know about your par-
ticipation in the experiment.
Please note:
• From this moment on, during the whole experiment, you are not allowed to
communicate with other participants. Turn off your mobile phones. If you
have any questions, please silently raise your hand.
• All decisions are anonymous. That means none of the other participants
will learn about the identity of any other decision maker.
• In this experiment, you can earn money. The exact amount depends on
your decisions as well as on the decisions of the other participants. The total
amount of money you will have earned during the experiment will be paid out
in cash at the end. The payment will be individual and anonymous
that means no one learns about the payments of the other participants. This
experiment uses the currency “Geldeinheiten” (GE). 20 GE corresponds to
one Euro, or 1 GE corresponds to 0.05 Euro.
• For arriving on time to the experiment, you will receive an additional
10 Euro.
The Experiment
The experiment consists of 40 rounds. In each round, you will be grouped with two
other randomly selected participants in a group of three. It will not be revealed
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with whom you were grouped and new groups will be randomly formed every round.
In each round, you have exactly one decision to make.
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EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The experiment with its 40 rounds is divided into four sections each consisting of 10
rounds: section 1 consists of rounds 1 - 10, section 2 consists of rounds 11 - 20, section 3
consists of rounds 21 - 30 and section 4 consists of rounds 31 - 40.
The sections differ only in the used procurement procedure. In all rounds in section 1
and section 3 (i.e. rounds 1 - 10 and 21 - 30) procurement procedure 1 will be used.
In all rounds in section 2 and section 4 (i.e. in rounds 11 - 20 and 31 - 40) procurement
procedure 2 will be used. The experiment informs you when a new section begins.
DECISIONS
In all 40 rounds, you represent a company which produces one unit of a certain good
with the intention to sell. All participants (i.e. their companies) produce one unit of the
same good and compete for selling their good only by setting a bid offer, respectively. At
the beginning of each round, you will be informed of your individual production costs
of the good. The costs are determined randomly and change every round.
In each of the 40 rounds, you can produce one unit of the good and sell it. Your decision
consists of submitting a bid offer for selling the unit. In each group, the three
participants compete for selling two units of the good. Therefore, in every round
offers of only two participants per group are accepted. These two participants then
produce the good and sell it at the sales price which depends on the procurement
procedure in use.
If your offer is accepted, your profit equals the sales price less your production costs.
If your offer is not accepted, you won’t receive any payment, and no costs incur, as you do
not produce the good, and hence, your profit equals zero.
THE STRUCTURE OF A ROUND
Each of the 40 rounds consists of the following four phases
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(1) Random group formation
In each round, you are grouped with two other randomly selected participants in a
group of three. The identities of the two members in your group will remain un-
known to you. You will be reassigned to a new group every round and its composition
changes every time.
(2) Individual production costs
At the beginning of every round, you will be informed of your individual production
costs of the good. Your costs are determined randomly to be a whole number
between 100 GE and 199 GE. Each of the numbers is equally likely to be chosen.
The production costs for every participant can differ and you will be only told about
your production costs and will not have any information about the production costs
of any other participant.
(3) Decision
You make the decision on the offer for one unit of the good you produce. This
decision is made by all participants simultaneously and unaware of the others
decisions. Depending on the procurement procedure (1 or 2) your offer consists of
one bid offer (in procurement procedure 1) or of either one or two bid
offers (in procurement procedure 2).
(4) Result
At the end of every round, you will be informed about your result in this round.
This information consists of whether or not your offer has been accepted and if yes
at which sales price you can sell your unit of the good and what your resulting profit
in this round is.
The phases (1) and (2), “Random group formation” and “Individual production costs”
are the same in all 40 rounds. The phases (3) and (4) differ depending on which




(3) Decision (Procurement Procedure 1)
Your offer for the sales of one unit of the good consists of one bid offer. A bid offer
is a whole number (i.e. a number without decimal places) between 50 GE and
250 GE. Enter your decision in the corresponding field “bid offer”.
(4) Result (Procurement Procedure 1)
The two best offers in each group of three, i.e. the two offers with the lowest
bid offers, are accepted.
The two participants whose offers are accepted sell their units of the good at the same
sales price. The sales price equals the higher bid offer of the two accepted ones:
Sales price = Higher bid offer of the two accepted ones
If your offer is accepted, youll receive a payment in the amount of the sales price, and
individual production costs incur. Your profit is thereby
Profit = Sales price - Production cost
If your offer is not accepted you wont receive any payment, and no production costs
incur, and your profit equals zero.
At the end of every round, you will be informed of whether or not your offer has been
accepted. If your offer has been accepted the sales price and profit will be displayed
on the screen.
PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE 2
(3) Decision (Procurement Procedure 2)
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Example 1 : Suppose participants A, B and C with their production costs as written
below respectively submit the following bid offers for one unit of the good:




Result: The two offers with the lowest bid offers are accepted. In this example, the
offers made by A with a bid offer of 120 GE and B with a bid offer of 130 GE are
accepted.
The two accepted bid offers are 120 GE and 130 GE. As the sales price for one unit
of the good equals the higher bid offer both participant A and participant B sell
their units of the good for 130 GE (B’s bid offer). For both participants, individual
production costs are incurred. Therefore, the profit made by A equals 130 - 110 = 20
GE and the profit made by B equals 130 - 150 = -20 GE, i.e. he incurs a loss.
The offer of participant C is not accepted, and therefore, no costs are incurred, and
his profit equals zero.
Your offer for the sales of one unit of the good consists either of one bid offer or
two alternative bid offers. A bid offer is a whole number (i.e. a number without
decimal places) between 50 GE and 250 GE.
• If you want to submit only one bid offer, enter your offer in the corresponding
field “bid offer 1” and leave the field “bid offer 2” empty.
• If you want to submit two alternative bid offers, enter your offers in the
fields “bid offer 1” and “bid offer 2” whereby your bid offer 2 has to be higher
than your bid offer 1.
(4) Result (Procurement Procedure 2)
The two best offers in each group of three, i.e. the two offer with the lowest bid
offers 1, are accepted.
The two participants whose offers are accepted sell their units of the good at the
same sales price. The sales price equals the highest of all bid offers 1 and 2 of the
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two accepted offer, which are smaller than (or equals) the highest bid offer 1 in your
group of three (i.e. the bid offer 1 of the participant whose offer has been rejected).
sales price = Highest bid offer of the two accepted offers which is
smaller than (or equals) the bid offer 1 of the rejected offer
Therefore, your sales price is at least as high as your bid offer 1, if your offer is
accepted.
If your offer is accepted, youll receive a payment in the amount of the sales price, and
individual production costs incur. Your profit is thereby
Profit = Sales price - Production cost
If your offer is not accepted you wont receive any payment, and no production costs
are incurred, and your profit equals zero.
At the end of every round, you will be informed of whether or not your offer has been
accepted. If your offer has been accepted the sales price and profit will be displayed
on the screen.
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Example 2 : Suppose participants A, B and C with their production costs as written
below respectively submit the following bid offers for one unit of the good:
Participant Production costs [GE] bid offer 1 [GE] bid offer 2 [GE]
A 110 120 170
B 150 160 210
C 190 200
The participants A and B have obviously submitted two alternative bid offers and
participant C only one.
Result: The two offers with the lowest bid offers 1 are accepted. In this example,
the offers made by A with a bid offer 1 of 120 GE and B with a bid offer 1 of 160 GE
are accepted.
The bid offer 1 of participant C whose offer has been rejected equals 200 GE. The
accepted bid offers made by A and B are 120, 160, 170 and 210 GE. The highest of
these four bid offers which is smaller than 200 GE is 170 GE (bid offer 2 by A). This
offer defines the sales price, i.e. the sales price for one unit of the good equals 170
GE.
Therefore, both participant A and participant B sell their units of the good for 170
GE. Both participants incur costs in the amount of their individual production costs.
Thus, the profit made by A equals 170 - 110 = 60 GE and the profit made by B
equals 170 - 150 = 20 GE.
The offer of participant C is not accepted, and therefore, no costs are incurred, and
his profit equals zero.
NOTE
In cases of equal bid offers the accepted offer(s) is (are) randomly chosen.
YOUR PAYMENT
For the payment at the end of the experiment, in each of the four stages, four out
of the ten rounds are randomly chosen, all rounds having the same probability. The
profits in the chosen rounds will be converted in Euro (20 GE corresponds to 1 Euro) and
added to your show-up fee (10 Euros). Therefore, in total, you will receive your 10
Euros show-up fee plus your profit in 16 randomly chosen rounds, where 20 GE
corresponds to 1 Euro.
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The results in the remaining rounds are irrelevant for your payment.
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FURTHER INFORMATION
Please give your decisions serious consideration as they will determine the amount of pay-
ment you will receive at the end of the experiment. Before the experiment starts, you have
to answer a series of question to make sure that you have understood the experimental
procedure and your tasks. Both, questions and possible answers, will be displayed on your
screen.
If you have any questions during the experiment itself, remain quietly seated and raise your
hand to indicate an issue. Please wait until the experimenter has approached you and ask
your question as quietly as possible. However, your questions should only relate to the
instructions and not to possible strategies!
Furthermore, please note that the experiment will only continue if all participants have
made their decisions.
On the last page of the instructions, you may take notes during the experiment.
END OF EXPERIMENT
After you have finished the experiment, we would like you to complete a questionnaire.
Please remain seated after finishing the questionnaire until your seat number is called out.
Bring the instructions and your seat number to the front. Only then you will receive your
payment for participating in the experiment.
Thank you for your participation and good luck!
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OVERVIEW OF THE MOST IMPORTANT INFORMATION
General
Rounds 40 rounds (rounds 1 - 10: procurement procedure 1,
rounds 11 - 20: procurement procedure 2,
rounds 21 - 30: procurement procedure 1,
rounds 31 - 40: procurement procedure 2)
Groups groups of three (randomly formed every round)
Production Costs random whole number between 100 and 199 (individual, and
for every participant in each round randomly determined)
Geldeinheiten (GE) 20 GE corresponds to 1 Euro, i.e. 1 GE corresponds to 0.05 Euro
Your Payment 10 Euros show-up fee plus your profit in 16 randomly chosen rounds
Procurement Procedure 1
Bid Offer one bid offer
Accepted Offers 2 out of 3 offers with the lowest bid offers
Sales Price If your offer is accepted:
Sales price = Bid offer
Profit If your offer is accepted:
Profit = Sales price - Production cost
Procurement Procedure 2
Bid Offer one or two bid offer(s) (bid offer 1 ¡ bid offer 2)
Accepted Offers 2 out of 3 offers with the lowest bid offers 1
Sales Price If your offer is accepted:
sales price = Highest bid offer of the two accepted
offers which is smaller than (or equals)
the bid offer 1 of the rejected offer
Profit If your offer is accepted:
Profit = Sales price - Production cost
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let ∆(q) denote the change in the support costs induced by q compared to
free competition, which by (4.6) and (4.7) is
∆(q) = MCL(SL(p
∗)− q) · (SL(p∗)− q) +MCH(SH(p∗) + q) · (SH(p∗) + q)− TC(p∗) .
Differentiating ∆(q) with respect to q, denoted by ∆′(q), yields
∆′(q) = −MC ′L(SL(p∗)− q)(SL(p∗)− q)−MCL(SL(p∗)− q)
+MC ′H(SH(p
∗) + q)(SH(p
∗) + q) +MCH(SH(p
∗) + q) .
Starting with an ineffective quota, q = 0, to prove that the costs decrease when the
quota becomes effective, we have to show that
∆′(0) = −MCL(SL(p∗))−SL(p∗)MC ′L(SL(p∗))+MCH(SH(p∗))+SH(p∗)MC ′H(SH(p∗)) < 0 ,
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i.e., the support cost change is negative and thus the costs decrease.
By MCL(SL(p
∗)) = MCH(SH(p
∗)) = p∗, we obtain
∆′(0) = SH(p
∗)MC ′H(SH(p
∗))− SL(p∗)MC ′L(SL(p∗)) < 0 . (B.1)
With MC ′i(Si(p)) =
1
S′i(p)
























which is given by Assumption 1 (ii).
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Consider the support costs
TC(pL, pH) = pLSL(pL) + pHSH(pH) with SL(pL) + SH(pH) = D . (B.2)
The minimization of the Lagrange function of (B.2) with regard to pL and pH yields
the first order conditions
∂TC(pL, pH)
∂pL













which lead to the condition






For Q ≤ SH(p∗), pH = pL = p∗ and, thus, the left-hand side of (B.3) is zero.
Q > SH(p
∗) implies pH > p
∗ > pL. With an increasing Q, pH increases and pL
decreases and, thus, the left-hand side of (B.3) increases. (4.5) and Assumption 1
(ii)imply that the right-hand side of (B.3) is positive at p∗ which demonstrates that
the optimality condition (B.3) does not hold for an ineffective quota, e.g., Q ≤ SH(p∗.
By Assumption 1 (i), εH(pH) does not increase and εL(pL) does not decrease if pH
increases and pL decreases. Thus, with (4.5), the right-hand side of (B.3) decreases.
Since the left-hand side of (B.3) increases with an increasing quota Q and the right-
hand side of (B.3) decreases, there exist a unique Q̂ that fulfills (B.3). Together with
Lemma 2, that an increasing quota Q above SH(p
∗) reduces the support costs, Q̂ is
the unique cost minimum.
B.2 Additional Calculations for the Extended Ex-
ample in Section 4.3.3
To show that the equilibrium price pλ increases if there are less high-cost bidders than
expected, i.e., λ > 1, we calculate









+MCL +MCH) > 0 due to (4.13) and
λ−1
(λ+1)2
is greater than zero for λ > 1
and negative for λ < 1. Therefore, the equilibrium price increases for an increasing
λ.
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As a direct result, also the support costs TCλ(pλ) are greater than TC(p∗) if there
are less high-costs bidders and vice versa with more high-cost bidders.
To prove that the implementation of a quota Q̂ in a case where λ 6= 0 is not
optimal, we have to show that the difference Q̂λ − Q̂ 6= 0:



















> 0 if λ < 1
= 0 if λ = 1
< 0 if λ > 1
so that only for λ = 1 both quotas are identically. Moreover, for λ > 1 the optimal
quota is lower than before and for λ < 1 it is the other way round.

























which results in the difference
TCλ(Q̂λ)− TCλ(Q̂) =D








which is negative for all λ > 0 and only equals zero for λ = 1. The difference
TCλ(Q̂)− TCλ(Q̂λ) increases in |λ− 1|.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 5
C.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The expected profit of the non-favored bidder is the difference between her
valuation xI and her bid b
ROS = βROS(xI) in case of winning. The non-favored bidder
wins, if bROS exceeds the favored bidder’s valuation and consequently she declines to
match , that is, with a probability of FII(β
ROS(x)). If the opposite holds, the favored
bidder will match and consequently the non-favored bidder’s profit is zero. Let FII(·)
be the distribution function of the favored bidder’s valuation. It follows
E[πI ] = (xI − βROS(xI))FII(βROS(xI)).
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The non-favored bidder aims to maximize her expected profit through her submitted
bid βROS(xI). With the first-order condition follows
∂
∂βROS(xI)









Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The inverse equilibrium bidding strategy follows immediately from Proposition




Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The monotony of βROS(xI) is implied by the monotony of β





(p) > 0 ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. First a linear beta distribution FII(p) = p is supposed
for the favored bidder’s value distribution. Then differentiating βROS
−1
(p) = 2p with





(p) = 2 > 0 ∀p ∈ [0, 1].












> 0 ∀p ∈ [0, 1].
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> 0 ∀p ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. The distribution function FROS(p) is the probability that the expected auction
revenue is lower than or equal to p. That is, the probability that the price-determining
bid bI = β
ROS(xI), where xI is the non-favored bidder’s valuation, is lower than or
equal to p. Therefore the distribution function FROS(p) corresponds to the probability




Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Let the distribution of the expected payment in the first-price auction with
ROS be given by FROS(p). Then for any p ∈ [0, 1] Proposition 9 yields the assertion.
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Let F (x) = x and F̃ (x) = xζ be the favored bidders’ value distributions, where
ζ > 1. Then both value distributions are logconcave, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom



















Consequently, ρ(x) and ρ̃(x) are linear in x and with Arozamena and Weinschelbaum
(2009) we can follow that the bidding behavior is unchanged if the favored bidder’s
value distribution is either a strictly convex or linear beta distribution.
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. Let F̂ (x) = 1 − (1 − x)η be the favored bidders’ value distribution, where







is strictly concave. With Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009), we conclude that
the non-favored bidder’s bid is more aggressive in a first-price auction with ROS than
without.
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. First we describe the expected payments E[pROSw ] and E[p
ROS
s ] in dependence
of ζ and then we prove that Proposition 13 applies for all ζ > 1. In order to calculate
E[pROSw ], we need the strong bidder’s inverse bidding strategy, because she is the
price-determining bidder in this case,
βROS
−1





















































































Comparing (C.1) and (C.2) provides the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. If the weak bidder is favored the strong bidder will determine the price, where
the strong bidder’s inverse equilibrium bidding strategy in the convex-convex case is
βROS
−1



















So the expected payment in a first-price auction with ROS, where the weak bidder is


































Favoring the strong bidder leads to the same inverse equilibrium bidding strategy for


















Both expected payments E[pROSw ] and E[p
ROS
s ] are symmetric in their arguments ζs
and ζw and therefore correspond to each other for all ζw, ζs > 1.
Proof of Proposition 15
Proof. First we calculate the expected payment dependent of η in case of favoring

















In order to calculate the expected auction revenue, the highest possible bid βs(1) is







⇔ (η + 1)p+ 1
(1− p)η−1
= η + 1
⇔ 1
(1− p)η
















































In order to determine the expected auction revenue with favoring the strong bidder









































We demand E[pROSw ]− E[pROSs ] ≥ 0 and it follows





) ≥ 0, η ≤ 2< 0, η > 2






with roots at η = 0, 1, 2 applies





) ≥ 0, η ≤ 0 or 1 ≤ η ≤ 2< 0, 0 < η < 1 or η > 2
Because of assuming that Fw(x) is strictly convex only η ≥ 1 is regarded and we gain
E[pROSw ]− E[pROSs ] ≥ 0, for all η ≥ 1.
Additonal Proposition 17
Proposition 17. Let Fs(x) = x and Fw(x) = 1 − (1 − x)η be the bidders’ value
distributions, η > 1. Then the expected payment in a first-price auction with ROS
with favoring the strong bidder E[pROSs ] is always lower than that in a second-price
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auction E[pSA], i.e.,
E[pROSs ] < E[p
SA].
The proof is presented in Appendix C.1. Next, Proposition 16 will demonstrate
that granting a ROS to the weak bidder generates a higher expected auction revenue
in a first-price auction with ROS than in a second-price auction if the parameter η of
the weak bidder’s concave value distribution exceeds a certain value.
Proof. We suppose that in the second-price auction the bidders follow their weakly





1− F SA(p)dp =
∫ 1
0








If the strong bidder is favored the weak bidder determines the payment through her
bid. Therefore the equilibrium bidding strategy of the weak non-favored bidder is
required as well as its inverse function
βROS
−1
w (p) = p+
Fs(p)
fs(p)





With βROSw (1) =
1
2
for the expected payment in a first-price auction with ROS, where































= E[pSA]⇔ η + 2 < 2η + 2⇔ η > 0,
which holds for all η ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 16
Proof. Assuming that the ex ante weak bidder is favored by the ROS, the expected
payment in the first-price auction with ROS exceeds that in the second-price auction,
see (C.4), if
E[pSA] < E[pROSw ]






> 0, if η < 2
≤ 0, if η ≥ 2
⇔ η & 2.745.
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C.2 Additional Propositions
Proposition 18. Let Fs(x) = x
ζ and Fw(x) = x be the bidders’ value distributions,
ζ > 1. Then the expected payment in the second-price auction exceeds that in first-
price auction with ROS for all ζ > 1, i.e,
E[pROS] < E[pSA]
Proof. In the second-price auction the bidders follow a weakly dominant bidding
strategy, which signifies to bid their true valuations. This property implies that





1− F SA(p)dp =
∫ 1
0












Comparing the expected payments in the second-price and first-price auction with















⇔ 0 < ζ.
With an increasing ζ > 1 the expected auction revenue will raise in both auction
forms and converge to 1
2
. The reason for the higher expected payment is that one
of the bidders, in this case the strong bidder, becomes stronger since ζ increases and
therefore this strong and price-determining bidder is expected to submit a higher
bid. In a second-price auction the expected payment will also raise, if one of the
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potentially price-determining bidders becomes stronger. The fact that the expected
auction revenues will never exceed 1
2
in this linear-convex combination is obvious:
Since we suppose that the weak bidder is favored in the first-price auction with
ROS the strong bidder determines the payment in dependence of the weak bidder’s
strength, particularly it is βROSs (xs) =
1
2
xs. Consequently, the price-determining bid
converges to 1
2
because the strong bidder’s expected valuation E[Xs] converges to
1 for ζ → ∞. In the second-price auction the second-highest bid or valuation will
determine the price. If ζ increases the strong bidder’s expected valuation converges
to 1 and the weak bidder’s expected valuation is 1
2
, which then will determine the
expected payment.
Proposition 19. Let Fs(x) = x
ζs and Fw(x) = x
ζw be the bidders’ value distributions,
1 < ζw < ζs. Then the expected payment in the second-price auction exceeds that in
the first-price auction with ROS, i.e.,
E[pROS] < E[pSA].
Proof. The weakly dominant bidding strategy in a second-price auction is to bid





1− F SA(p)dp =
∫ 1
0






















ζs + ζw + 1
= E[pSA]
⇔ ζs + ζw + 1 < (ζs + 1)(ζw + 1)
⇔ 0 < ζsζw.
which is true for all ζw, ζs > 1.
Finally, we state that for an increasing ζs as well as for an increasing ζw the
expected payment in both auction forms is augmented, where the expected payments
converge to 1 for ζs, ζw → ∞. This is immediately obvious, because both bidders
become stronger, i.e., their expected valuations, E[Xs] and E[Xw], converge to 1 for
ζs, ζw → ∞. Notice that for ζs = 1 or ζw = 1 the linear-convex combination is
obtained as a special case.
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der Förderhöhe für Photovoltaik-Freiflaechenanlagen. Technical re-
port, 2016. URL https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/B/
bericht-pilotauschreibungen-photovoltaik-freiflaechenanlagen.pdf?
__blob=publicationFile&v=2. Last access: 2017-11-30.
German Federal Network Agency. Ergebnisse der EEG Ausschreibung für Solaran-
lagen vom 01. Juni 2017. Technical report, Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität,





German Federal Network Agency. Ergebnisse der EEG Ausschreibung für
Windenergieanlagen an Land vom 01. Mai 2017. Technical report, Bundesnet-





publicationFile&v=2. Last access: 2017-11-23.
German Federal Network Agency. Solaranlagen - Beendete Ausschreibungen. Techni-
cal report, 2018a. URL https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Sachgebiete/
ElektrizitaetundGas/Unternehmen_Institutionen/Ausschreibungen/
Solaranlagen/BeendeteAusschreibungen/BeendeteAusschreibungen_node.
html. Last access: 2018-04-13.
German Federal Network Agency. Pressemitteilung - Realisierungsrate der dritten
Ausschreibungsrunde für Photovoltaik-Freiflächenanlagen. Technical report,
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5. Die Bedeutung der eidesstattlichen Versicherung und die strafrechtlichen Folgen
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